Thanks, Jaime. It's good to see you again as well. That's a great question.
In the Delgamuukw decision, the court decided that there was title that would be recognized in a national group. The content of that title would be fee simple-like. The Tsilhqot'in case showed that there would be beneficial interest in the land that the first nation would exercise. Those activities would not be limited to traditional activities, but would include the surface and the subsurface rights.
The court also made the point that there was an inherent limit on title, that you couldn't destroy it such that future generations could not benefit from it. The Delgamuukw case set the table for the Tsilhqot'in case to recognize this broad interest in a national group, as has been described.
In terms of mechanisms for recognizing that, we don't have to go back just 23 years; we can go back 250 years. The Royal Proclamation of 1763 said that lands would be reserved for Indians until such time as there was an agreement in public to transfer or share those lands with those who would be coming to live amongst them. We have good broad notice 23 years on, 250 years on, that land remains vested with the Indians until such time as there's an agreement that says otherwise. That has not occurred within the territory.
The point, then, is to incentivize the internal dispute resolution mechanisms of the Wet'suwet'en, as Theresa was talking about, to ensure that people within that nation, by their own laws, can make decisions about how those lands can be used and occupied and be responsibly taken care of.
The notion of using indigenous law for these purposes is something that the courts have recognized in a case called Van der Peet. They said “a morally and politically defensible conception of aboriginal rights will incorporate both legal perspectives”, meaning the perspectives of the common law, the Constitution, as well as the perspectives of indigenous peoples.
As you create these intersocietal dispute resolution mechanisms that will incentivize the internal laws of the Wet'suwet'en, you can do that through UNDRIP, which would, through statute, be opportunity to create agreements—as the British Columbia legislation itself recognizes—to facilitate the implementation of those rights.
UNDRIP is an economic development instrument. Sometimes people mistakenly think that it's about blocking development. Rather, it is trying to democratically figure out what free, prior and informed consent means. It's not a veto, but it is the right to say no. If the community says no, then another process has to kick in that ensures that the honour of the Crown is taken care of if free, prior and informed consent is not reached.
The notion of the indigenous peoples' own laws that would inform the intersocietal dispute resolution mechanisms means that indigenous peoples have the right to be free, that is, to be different from other Canadians in their nations in accordance with their laws. They also have the right to be different from one another within their nations, because what law within a nation does is that it allows you to disagree agreeably. What Theresa is asking for is this idea that when people are engaged together, they could disagree agreeably.
I'm going to refer you to the Wiikwemkoong nation constitution in closing here. They have principles of natural justice, which mean, as follows:
that a person has the right to know the allegations being made against them, they have [a right] to defend themselves and that a fair decision will be made taking into account all of the relevant evidence put before the Justice Counsel;
Reasonable Limits not exceeding the limit prescribed by law, not excessive;
Conflict of Interest occurs when an individual organization is involved in multiple interests, one of which could possibly corrupt the motivation for an act in another.
The point I'm making here, by drawing on the seven grandmother and grandfather principles or citing the constitutional provisions around conflict of interest, reasonable limits or principles of natural justice, is that first nations can be incentivized to make decisions that have clarity attached to them.
There will be differences, just as Quebec is different from Alberta, and just as the federal government might have a different opinion from what's happening in the territories. You construct confederations in which you can get answers to those questions that arise from difference, but you need proper procedures and proper principles to do that, and indigenous law is a part of that network.