I'm interested in that because I think it's crucial. You said:
Moving away from before-the-fact (ex ante) regulatory prescriptions to approaches that place greater reliance on after-the-fact (ex post) regulatory intervention, based on verified complaints of significant market problems
is the way we ought to go. That's, in fact, in the TPR.
But the interesting part is that the recommendation immediately before that, sir, is:
...applying economic regulation symmetrically to all service providers, based on whether they have significant market power, regardless of the technology they use.
It's acceptable, I suppose, to say we can proceed with all these wonderful new technologies that come down the pipe. If an entrant or one of the two vigorous competitors who are left decides not to compete or decides to leave, and in the absence of any other alternative, you're suggesting perhaps voice-over-IP might be one of the ways to go.
What guarantee does the consumer have that these programs will be made available to them, that new technologies will become available to them, when you have one dominant player left in the market?