I wish I could tell you what the total scope of this activity is. But I think that's extremely difficult, apart from applying economic estimates to try to come to an approximation. If we knew the entire scope of the activity, we'd be well ahead of the game, in that we would be able to record at least some of this counterfeiting activity much better than we do right now. But because we're not enforcing the rules, we really don't have a good sense of the scope of this in Canada. But that's just the scope of the market.
If you look at the social and economic impacts of the lost investment, the lost innovation activity, the concerns that are raised at the border because of issues around stricter enforcement because of the concerns that we are not securing our borders and that there is this inflow of counterfeit products, especially coming from Asia through Canada and being transshipped into the United States, no real economic analysis has taken a look at all those impacts, apart from the work that the CACN has done. I think that's the most authoritative analysis that has been done to date in Canada.
In terms of some of the recommendations—and again I would endorse what Mr. Henderson has said—I think the first step is to see this as a priority issue. I think that between 1999 and 2004 U.S. border authorities made something like 36,000 seizures at their ports of entry. Canadian border authorities made six seizures over that time, and even on a scale of one to ten, that doesn't come close to the activity of the Americans.
If this isn't seen as a priority for legislators, for our border agencies, and we don't have the funding that's necessary, we're not putting enough attention on this issue. I think that's probably the first step, and certainly the recommendations that have been outlined by CACN are much more specific and detailed recommendations.