I'm going to move to consent provisions again, similar to what I started talking about an hour and a half ago.
One of the concerns that keeps getting raised to me is that the consent provisions for the anti-spam prohibition are narrow. I'm going to look at what was adopted by PIPEDA and quoted by the anti-spam task force. It defined implied consent much more broadly than the legislation currently does. It says:
“...where consent may reasonably be inferred from the action or inaction of the individual." This covers situations where intended use or disclosure is obvious from the context....
What I'm reading in this particular bill is much more narrow than that. When I look at instances--for example, the Australia Spam Act, or the New Zealand spam act--that actually define consent to include express consent or consent that can be inferred from the conduct and business and other relationships without limiting the circumstances in which such consent can exist, then I'm concerned that we're a bit narrow in this bill. Can you just give me some assurances?
The anti-spam task force again recommended broader exceptions. For example, it said on page 44:
If the organization has service, warranty or product-upgrade information, or if there are health and safety issues related to the product purchase, the organization may send e-mail messages to its customers.
As I read Bill C-27, it doesn't do that.