Thank you very much.
Let me first explain that I'm an old-fashioned economist. I study why some nations are rich and others are poor, why some regions are rich and others are poor, why some families are rich and others poor. That's the question that got Adam Smith going with his Wealth of Nations. I think it's a useful way to think about almost any problem in economics.
When you think of how many medical researchers, entrepreneurs, musical composers, and so on, languish in third-world poverty, whether in Africa or in our Indian reservations, the waste is just immense. Once you start thinking about that human waste, it's actually very hard to think about anything else, in the words of Nobel laureate in economics Robert Lucas. Because of a lot of hard work, we know a lot more about this now than we used to, and I think we can relate it to policy decisions, such as the one you're facing, with more confidence than we could a quarter of a century ago.
A huge body of empirical evidence now shows that competition and specialization, what Adam Smith originally talked about, caused the productivity growth that's central to wealth creation. In the past few decades, we've learned that some other things matter a lot more than we might have thought: innovation, governance, and the quality of regulation, in particular. Let me talk about each of those contributors to productivity and how foreign ownership restrictions interact with them.
First is competition. Competition depends on the number of firms in an industry, it depends on the extent to which the firms actually really compete with each other, and it probably, most importantly, depends on how easy it is for new firms to get into the industry. If the existing firms are providing poor service at high prices and getting cozy with each other, you really want those entrants to be able to get in. It seems like that is actually the most important thing, not counting the number of firms. High barriers to entry just correlate remarkably reliably with bad economic outcomes.
Now, foreign ownership restrictions are a really good barrier to entry. If you want to block entry, it's actually a very good way to do it. Most obviously, a foreign company can't move into the Canadian sector if there are prohibitions on foreign-controlled companies coming in. But foreign ownership restrictions can be a barrier to entry in more nefarious ways.
First, foreign ownership restrictions mean this for Canadian entrants. If I want to set up a new Canadian company to move into this sector, I have to issue most of my stock in Toronto. I can't go to NASDAQ or the NYSE to issue stock, even if I might be able to get more money there for selling a given percentage of my firm to the public. That makes my cost of equity higher. It makes it more difficult for me to found a new business. It makes it more difficult for me to enter.
Second, a lot of entry in the United States and elsewhere is funded by venture capital funds. Venture capital funds typically back a whole bunch of firms hoping that maybe one out of 99 will be a runaway winner and the other 99 are going to be losers. In that winner they want to have a big equity stake, because that's the way they recoup the losses they made on all the other 99 ventures they backed. Foreign ownership limits keep foreign venture capital firms out of a sector like this. That means that if I want to set up a new Canadian firm to compete in Canada, I can't get foreign venture capital. Now, unfortunately, there isn't much of a Canadian venture capital industry, and such venture capital as we have here is actually hard to get, badly allocated, and sort of expensive. So I have a problem there, too.
Third, if I want to borrow money to set up a new company, I have to worry about the cost of my debt. The reason foreign ownership restrictions increase the cost of debt is that people who lend me money are going to worry about what might happen if I go bankrupt. If I go bankrupt, what typically happens is they seize my company. They become the new shareholders of my company after the bankruptcy. A foreign lender doesn't want to lend me money, because if they become the owner of my company, they have to turn around and sell it right away, and fire sale prices tend not to be really high. But basically foreign ownership is forcing any foreign lender into a fire sale immediately after bankruptcy.
Even a Canadian lender would think twice about lending me money, because if the Canadian lender gets my company in bankruptcy, they either have to hold on to it--and most banks in Canada probably don't know how to run a telecom firm--or they have to sell it. If there are Canadian ownership restrictions on the company they're selling, they can't sell it to just anybody. They have to shop around and find a Canadian who will buy it. That might not be the highest price the lender could get in bankruptcy for my company. That means the lender is going to be more cautious and probably demand a higher-risk premium from me.
All of those things make entry more difficult, and making entry more difficult cuts productivity growth because it lets incumbents rest on their laurels, become friendly with each other. The result is poor costs and poor quality products, at least potentially, and I think there's some evidence that we face that problem in Canada.
I just read an OECD study that says we've fallen very far behind in the ranks in almost every dimension of quality and cost, and there's an even more recent study by Harvard's Berkman Center that corrects some of the methodological criticisms of the OECD study and shows probably even a worse standing for Canada now in terms of Internet and next generations, telecoms penetration, price/quality trade-offs, capability, and so on. We really have slipped badly.
The second thing that Adam Smith talked about in addition to competition was specialization, and there's a related concept called spillovers. Adam Smith wrote that it isn't from the beneficence of the butcher, the baker, or the brewer that we get our dinner, but from their self-interest. Now, the most obvious thing you take away from that is that the economy runs on self-interest, whether we like it or not. That's true, but the second lesson from that quote from Adam Smith is that we all depend on lots of other people who specialize in things we don't do. We don't make our own bread. We don't make our own cold cuts, and so on, and by having people specialize, we get much greater overall wealth, because we can each do one thing really well and we can trade with each other. That's important, but the cost of this specialization is that we really depend on each other.
How does that connect with telecoms? Meat packers, butchers, flour millers, bakers, and brewers, not to mention engineers and automakers, and even government departments like Industry Canada, all depend on being connected to each other. That's what makes the whole system go, and the telecoms industry and the Internet and everything else connected to it are the ways, increasingly, that we connect with each other. So putting a tax on these connections adds to the bottom-line costs of virtually every industry in the country.
So taxing telecoms, increasing the cost of telecoms, decreasing the quality of telecoms, the Internet, and so on, is not just a tax on one industry; it's a tax on almost the entire economy and that's because of this interconnectedness that's very real. I refer you to the work of Jerry Hausman, who is a first-rate economist at MIT. He looks at this interdependence, how one industry can affect other industries, and he tries to figure out the costs and benefits and trade-offs in these interactions. Specifically, he has a bunch of papers, articles, book chapters, and so on, looking at telecoms. What he finds is that deregulation, innovation, and so on, in the U.S. telecom industry dramatically affect overall productivity across a whole bunch of industries. So increasing the productivity, increasing the efficiency of telecoms, doesn't just affect the telecom industry; it affects the whole economy in ways you don't see for other sectors.
I've also done work jointly with Hyunbae Chun and Jung-Wook Kim in South Korea, looking at developments in information technology, and what we find is that developments in the IT industry have major repercussions that you can see in the share prices of firms in every other sector in the economy, from breakfast cereal to automaking. The telecommunications/communications costs are really important, all across the economy.
Every new technology wave is different, of course. Hausman's work looks at past developments in IT and telecoms and shows this effect, but I still think--in fact, I'd be willing to bet several cases of Molson Canadian beer--that if you wanted to retard the growth of every industry in Canada, there would be few more promising ways of doing it than by imposing inefficiencies on telecoms.
Those are the two things Smith talked about in The Wealth of Nations, competition and specialization. More recently, in the past three decades especially, we've learned about innovation, and a huge body of empirical evidence now shows that this is far more critical to productivity growth than we thought back in the 1970s when I was a student.
In particular, it looks like the Austrian economist, Joseph Schumpeter, is right about a whole bunch of things that he wrote way back in 1911 in his book, entitled Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung. Part of the reason it didn't get attention was that it wasn't translated into English for a few decades. But basically what he argued was that if a firm finds an innovation.... An innovation is a way to take inputs that don't cost so much and produce an output that customers value more. So Research in Motion can take the same kinds of inputs that Nortel used to make its cellphones but produce a BlackBerry instead of an ordinary cellphone. Customers pay more for a BlackBerry, so RIM makes more profits than Nortel.
That's the kind of innovation that Schumpeter talks about, and productivity is exactly the value of the outputs minus the value of the inputs. So innovations that give us more valuable outputs for the same inputs, or the same outputs for cheaper inputs—process innovations—are the things that boost our productivity, just by simple arithmetic, by the definition of what productivity is: value of outputs minus of inputs.
Canadian firms have a productivity gap that people in Industry Canada have been tracking for well over a decade, or longer than that. For some reason, Canadian firms seem unable to seize these opportunities to find more valuable outputs to produce from inputs than companies in other OECD countries. Instead, our companies tend to buy foreign technology, often after a long delay, and ease it into use in our economy. Somewhere in there lies the source of our productivity gap.
The cost of innovation is mostly upfront. For example, the R and D cost of a new smart phone might be $100 million, but once the plans are drawn up and you're in production, basically the unit cost is really low. So the more smart phones the company produces, the faster they recoup their R and D losses. That's why bigger is better in high-tech industries.
My past work with Bernard Yeung of New York University and the National University of Singapore looks at foreign ownership in this light. What we do is look at U.S. firms that choose to go multinational and U.S. firms that don't go multinational and just stay in the U.S., and we find that some U.S. firms become very successful multinationals when they go abroad. Others choke; they absolutely fall apart when they go abroad, and they run back to the U.S. with their tails between their legs. The difference is that the successful U.S. firms that go abroad tend to have a recent track record of very high R and D spending.
What is going on? Well, we think moving into a foreign country is naturally a disadvantage. You don't know the market. You don't know the laws. You don't know the regulations. You don't know the customs. You need something to boost you to get over all those problems, and a technology advantage is one good way to do that. What that means is that successful multinationals, the ones that move into a foreign country and hang around, are the ones with the technology. Unsuccessful multinationals, the ones that come in and leave, are the ones that don't have the technology. So there is kind of an important technology transfer role that multinationals seem to play. Any country's most successful multinationals are also moving their technology abroad. That's one way the Canadian economy could get access to foreign technology.
In Canada, our telecoms dip their toes in foreign markets, but they tend not to go abroad. They tend to move across industries to get economies of scale. So our cable firms provide telephone services and buy television channels, and so on, and that is probably a less desirable way to get these economies of scale.
Despite a lot of convergence, it's still far from clear that our technology innovation in cable TV translates into making TV content. What's basically going on when we have this movement across industries is that we're losing the advantage of specialization. Our butchers are making bread and brewing beer and our bakers are making cold cuts, and they're probably not necessarily as good at each of these things as they would be if they specialized.
Do you want me to continue?