Thank you, Chairman.
I'm speaking to slide 4. This part of the presentation really wants to emphasize three broad points: first of all, that the purpose and scope of the CAMR is limited; second, that CAMR is not an administrative burden for countries and applicants; and finally, that eliminating CAMR's administrative provisions could leave Canada vulnerable to challenges at the WTO. I'll just spend a few minutes going over these three points.
First, with respect to the purpose and scope of CAMR, I would maybe just note a couple of points of general context.
Approximately 95% of the drugs on the World Health Organization's essential medicines list are currently off patent. The subsequent point is that CAMR can assist in the international supply of low-cost drugs only if there is an external demand for a Canadian-made generic product.
CAMR, and the WTO decision or waiver on which it was based, was not intended to solve the broad problem of access to medicines on its own. It was part of a broader international strategy to combat diseases that impact the developing world: HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria. CAMR effectively implements the WTO decision, which is a small component of a broader effort to promote access to medicines. The WTO decision was an intensely negotiated instrument in that body that sought to bring together divergent stakeholder views and to respond to specific public health problems on the one hand, while at the same time assuring that intellectual property protection is maintained on the other hand. CAMR in turn was the result of extensive consultations here in Canada to balance differing Canadian stakeholder views. It essentially sought to balance facilitating access to medicines while at the same time ensuring that incentives for innovation for new medicines and technologies remained.
As one of the first WTO members to implement the waiver, Canada faced a number of competing objectives: first, facilitating access to lower-cost pharmaceutical products in countries facing public health problems; second, respecting Canada's obligations under the TRIPS agreement at the WTO, the trade-related intellectual property agreement, and other international treaties; respecting Canada's patent system; encouraging generic companies to participate in CAMR; and ensuring products exported under CAMR met the same safety and quality standards as those in the Canadian market. The bottom line, I guess, is a balanced and focused instrument with important specific elements that provide clarity and safeguards.
The second point I would focus on, Chair, is the issues around administrative burden, in other words, the length of time it takes to ship medicines. Here I think we need to look carefully at two timeframes. The first is the process in general, which began in 2003 when the WTO adopted its decision or waiver; then the coming into force of CAMR in 2005; and then in December 2005, the receipt by Health Canada of a submission for a medication Apo-TriAvir. In June 2006, Health Canada completed a review of the submission that was made, essentially in a period of six months rather than the allowable 12.
That's by way of introduction to the more specific timeline related to CAMR, which I would like to focus on now. CAMR essentially kicked in with respect to this submission on July 13, 2007, with the company in question, Apotex, sending letters seeking voluntary licences to three pharmaceutical companies to use their relevant patents to produce and export Apo-TriAvir to Rwanda.
On July 19, 2007, under WTO rules, Rwanda became the first country to notify of intention to use the waiver, stating it would import this medication.
On September 4, 2007, Apotex filed application with the Commissioner of Patents for authorization under CAMR to produce and export to Rwanda.
On September 19, 2007, the commissioner granted Apotex authorization, completing the government's role in the process.
The point I want to stress there is that for the CAMR part of the process it took roughly two months to complete the required elements, and subsequently, there was a series of next steps that involved Canada notifying the WTO of the first authorization using the waiver.
In May 2008, some time later, Apotex announced that it had won the Rwanda public tender to supply the drug, and in September 2008 the first shipment occurred.
In sum, on the second point, the challenges and delays with respect to Apotex's export of medicines to Rwanda can be separated from the CAMR process itself.
The year that elapsed between Health Canada's approval of Apo-TriAvir in June 2006 and Rwanda's notification to the WTO can be attributed to the fact that no country had come forward to request drugs under the waiver.
The third point is potential WTO concerns.
In negotiating the waiver, WTO members adopted certain safeguard provisions to prevent the diversion of generic medicines to unintended recipients. The administrative procedures under CAMR are based on these required safeguards.
In closing, it is important to reiterate that the WTO waiver was very limited in its scope, purpose and what it could achieve and so in turn was the design of CAMR.
Expanding the scope of CAMR beyond the WTO requirements could threaten existing elements in CAMR that secure Canada's compliance with its international trade obligations.
Since the adoption of the WTO waiver, the international environment for procurement of drugs has also changed significantly with the introduction of a variety of other global mechanisms and alliances that offer greater choice to countries to obtain medicines.
Thank you, Chairman.