Thank you. That's an excellent question.
Because India now grants patents on pharmaceutical products--where it did not before 2005--in order to produce and export a generic version of a drug, you would need a mechanism like CAMR. In 2005, when India made the changes to its Patents Act to introduce patents on products, it also included one paragraph in the Indian Patents Act, section 92A, that is basically supposed to be the equivalent of CAMR under Indian law.
It's interesting, because that provision has not yet been tested and it's a mirror image of the Canadian problem. With CAMR we have far too much red tape. Things are just gummed up with unnecessary restrictions and laborious processes, and so on.
The unfortunate deficiency of the Indian legislation, in my view, is that it doesn't provide enough detail. You have one paragraph that doesn't actually provide the operational guidance that's needed. So, for example, where the Canadian legislation, to its credit, does define very clearly what the royalties are that have to be paid by a generic company to a brand-name company in the event of a licence being issued, which is a hugely important feature for the generic companies because they said all along that they need certainty about what the cost is going to be at the end, which makes sense from a business perspective, the Indian legislation has no such specificity about what the royalty is that has to be paid. You can be sure that the first time someone tries to use the Indian legislation it's going to be months or years of litigation in the Indian courts, arguing over what's the appropriate royalty that has to be paid here. That's one of the reasons there's this big question mark over whether India is going to be able to continue supplying generics to the developing world.
So, yes, it's there on the books, but I think it suffers from deficiencies just like the Canadian one does, although a different deficiency.