Mr. Chair and committee members, I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear.
I'll begin by clearing up some misconceptions that may be left from previous comments.
First, a billion dollars is a lot of money. If you want to make the denominator large enough, say the entire Canadian economy, almost any cost or loss can be made to appear small or manageable. But in the context of the Canadian corporate bond market, which is what I think we should be considering here, a few billion dollars would be very, very damaging. Even a billion dollars would be a very significant loss, and it wouldn't be easily recovered.
Corporate bonds are relatively safe investments, especially in Canada, where the vast majority are of investment grade. Investment-grade bonds have low volatility, which is what makes them safe compared to equities or trust units. If that low volatility means a 1.5% loss, or whatever the loss might be, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to be quickly and easily recovered.
On another matter, regarding credit default swaps, there's very little net CDS protection outstanding on the bonds of Canadian corporations. A characterization that there's more net CDS insurance protection than there are bonds outstanding is not the case generally, and it is certainly not the case for the Canadian corporate bond market.
These bonds aren't held by faceless speculators, or just by wealthy sophisticated individuals; they're mainly held by ordinary Canadians, both workers and retirees, through their savings in mutual funds, life insurance policies, and pension funds. They're managed by professional investment managers. These managers have a fiduciary responsibility to avoid undue risk and to be adequately compensated for the risks they do assume by holding these bonds.
As you know, the credit rating agencies made terrible mistakes with ABCP and other structured securities, and they have seen their reputations suffer for that. But the rating agencies by and large understand and evaluate corporate credit pretty well, so professional investment managers still pay attention to what the rating agencies have to say.
In discussing this bill the image has often been made of a queue, and the question is posed about who is at the head of the queue. This is exactly the way the rating agencies view the bankruptcy scenario. If through this legislation corporate bonds were suddenly placed behind pension liabilities, downgrades could ensue in many cases.
This would be virtually certain to happen, in my experience. I've worked at two rating agencies for twelve years, and I've been critiquing and predicting the actions of the rating agencies for the nearly ten years I've worked at Scotia Capital. If the rating agencies downgrade, and especially if the market agrees with the rating agencies' reasoning, the losses on outstanding bonds would be very significant and very hard, or impossible, to recover.
As well, because such bond market losses would be based on prudent estimates of possible future scenarios by managers seeking to avoid risk, there's no reason to think there's an even offset between the amounts lost because of downgrades and spread widening and the amounts gained by the relative few who stand to benefit from the bill. The losses could easily outweigh the benefits.
I've published research on the bond market effect of Bill C-501, and it's being submitted to the clerk of the committee. While it may seem technical, I respectfully wish that it will be of some use to the committee in understanding how the Canadian bond market could react to the proposed legislation.
I can tell the committee that the bond market professionals I've spoken to about my research in the past few weeks all agree that the bill is very concerning. While they understand it's been proposed with the best of intentions, it could have very serious unintended consequences.
Mr. Chair and members, thanks for the chance to appear today, and thank you for your attention. I'd be pleased to answer any questions.