I think Dr. Geist made a good point in that respect in suggesting that we look at the anti-spam law this government has passed and the attention it's getting from industry. Dollars matter, but it's also the process.
With fines, quasi-criminal fines, that require prosecution and proof of intent, even if they are high, the risk of a company being fined is very low.
What's much more effective are administrative monetary penalties, which can be imposed much more easily without the quasi-criminal process and proof of intent. That's the route we've gone with the anti-spam law and that is the route we should be going with for this law as well.
Another very strong incentive is civil lawsuits. If individuals are able to bring civil lawsuits or class action suits against companies, that can be a very strong incentive. It's not a strong incentive under this regime because it's too difficult to do so, because there are no damages for embarrassment in it. That's been taken out. It has to be humiliation, so it's a high standard, and there are not a lot of dollars an individual would get even if they were able to sue.
There are different ways. The third type of incentive is bad publicity, but once again we're not seeing that being used very often by the Privacy Commissioner. This regime—when you look at section 20, which does allow for disclosure by the Privacy Commissioner if it's in the public interest—starts out by saying that there shall be no disclosure of this breach through reporting.
Why not? Why not make that a transparency reporting thing? Why not use bad publicity?
So there are three types of financial incentives that can be used, and I don't feel that any of them are being used to the optimum under this proposed legislation.