That's an excellent question.
I do think that the pre-existing economic leverage that China has in Canada—important Canadian firms that have extensive business dealings with Chinese Communist networks and at the same time have influence over decision-makers, particularly, let's say, in the Prime Minister’s Office—has inhibited our ability to properly review whether Chinese investments in Canada are in the net benefit of Canada. This particularly leads to the kind of thing that Professor Paris referred to as economic leverage.
The situation in Britain now is that the British government is considering not using Huawei in its 5G after all, and the Chinese embassy has threatened Chinese investments in the British nuclear sector. When the Australians suggested that there should be an independent study of the origins and nature of China's response to COVID-19, the Chinese government threatened to limit exports to China of Australian wine. It's already limited barley and meat, is threatening coal and is suggesting that Chinese tourists and students would be less inclined to go to Australia.
When you have a situation in which, unlike other state investors, the Chinese government apparently directly uses the economic leverage of its existing investment in Canada to further its political aims, we have a problem in terms of our sovereignty. I think that includes further investments or the review process of whether we should be transferring high-tech technologies with potential military applications to China.
The Chinese government has set up very many conditions to Canada, by implication or directly, to suggest that if we don't go along with what the Chinese government wants in pursuing its interests in Canada, we will lose the Chinese investment, which means threatening employment and prosperity in Canada. It's very dangerous to deal with them, frankly.