Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you to the committee. I'm happy to be here again to testify.
My name is Robin Shaban, and I am the principal economist and co-founder of Vivic Research. I am also a Ph.D. candidate at Carleton University, where I am studying Canadian competition law.
At a previous hearing, Mr. Erskine-Smith asked that I submit a briefing note to the committee outlining changes that I think should be made to the Competition Act. I will submit this brief in the coming days. In my opening remarks, I will outline some reforms in the brief.
In past meetings the committee has heard about the need for greater independence for the Competition Bureau. Currently, the bureau is nested within ISED. Enforcement actions of the bureau are not subject to ministerial review or approval. However, the commissioner reports to the deputy minister for non-enforcement matters, meaning that the bureau does not have the authority to speak openly about many broad issues of competition policy. This arrangement undermines transparency and is not consistent with our international peers. Therefore, my first proposal is to make changes to the structure of the Competition Bureau so that the commissioner is no longer answerable to the deputy minister of ISED.
Second, the bureau should be given the ability to compel information from corporations to undertake market studies and evaluate the effectiveness of its enforcement decisions. Currently, the bureau can only collect information from corporations during an investigation. In the U.S., for example, the Federal Trade Commission has broad powers to compel information outside an investigation, and it has used these powers to do studies that are available to the public.
Third, as we have discussed before, Parliament should abolish the efficiencies defence on the grounds that it brings us out of alignment with major competition laws elsewhere and is inconsistent with equitable economic growth. Abolishing the efficiencies defence does not mean that the Competition Act will be ineffective at promoting efficiency. Rather, it means that it will prioritize efficiencies that directly benefit all Canadians, not just corporations.
Fourth, some have highlighted that the bureau lacks sufficient resources. An additional way to resolve the bureau's budgetary pressures is to revise the act to make enforcement more efficient.
For example, Canada's system for clearing mergers is complex and more restrictive than that of the U.S. These conditions mean that officers must do more analysis on mergers that are likely not going to raise competition issues, because the risk of overlooking a harmful merger is higher under our system. Aligning our merger clearance system with that of the U.S. could create efficiencies in the bureau, making more resources available for high-impact work.
Another area where our competition policy severely lacks is enforcement in labour markets. Based on my own search, there is no publicly available information that suggests the bureau has ever investigated potential anti-competitive behaviour against workers. I believe there are two reasons for this oversight.
First, our law is inadequate. For example, wage-fixing agreements do not fall under criminal provisions of the Competition Act, unlike in the U.S. Instead, these cases must be taken under civil provisions of the act. This means that the legal test the bureau needs to meet to build a successful case is significantly higher, and this reduces the likelihood of success, accounting for differences between civil and criminal standards of proof. To address this issue, the 2009 revisions to the act with regard to section 45 need to be rolled back.
Second, I find no evidence that the bureau has assessed a merger's potential anti-competitive impact on jobs, even though it could. In this way, the bureau is not fully enforcing the law. This is a major oversight, given the growing prevalence of gig work and other types of employment not covered under traditional labour laws. To address this issue, the bureau should develop specific merger enforcement guidelines that outline how it plans to assess a merger's impact on wages, job quality and job availability.
My last proposal is not a change to the act but rather a change to our approach to competition policy. The logic of our competition law is based primarily on theoretical economic models developed between the 1960s and the 1980s. Research methods in economics have evolved substantially since then, allowing us to create policy based on empirical evidence rather than theoretical models. As part of any reform of the Competition Act, analysts should be collecting and understanding empirical research to inform decision-making. One way to do this could be to reinstate the Economic Council of Canada.
In our conversation today, I'm happy to speak about the proposals outlined here and to answer any questions committee members may have to the best of my ability.
Thank you very much.