I won't presume to speak for the provincial approach to pension regulation. I can say why we've approached it the way we have at the federal level. We believe pension funds ultimately should be 100% funded on an insolvency basis because we see real risks: Insolvencies can't necessarily be fully predicted. By requiring plan sponsors to be at 100% funding, we anticipate and allow for the possibility that the firm might ultimately go insolvent, and that therefore there are sufficient funds in place to allow for the promise they've made.
For provinces that don't require that level of funding, we didn't introduce that at the federal level, in part because we thought it introduced significant undue risk to workers and pensioners. It raised the possibility that you could have an insolvency that would lead to an unfunded pension liability of a significant nature.
We see real value in solving the problems of unfunded pension liabilities while the firm is actually in a position to be able to address them—that is, while they're operating and ongoing. Doing it in the case of an insolvency is extraordinarily difficult. By definition, there are insufficient funds to be able to pay those to whom there are obligations. Therefore, you are then ultimately making strategic decisions and policy mandate decisions about who should be paid and in what regard.
We also wanted to be mindful of the fact that we are very supportive of the desire for incentive to restructure and allow for entities to emerge as a going concern and continue to make the contributions that ultimately will lead to greater security.