I know. I guess what I'm saying—and I guess we'll have to agree to disagree on this—is that this bill would actually force them to fix it on the front end, because it would require that they get the money in place as soon as they go to bond markets. If you're doing a bond issuance and you're a CEO, all these extremely sophisticated analysts are going to tear apart your balance sheet, and they're going to say that, on the liabilities side, there's this pension thing, and they're only 84% or 85% funded in the pension thing, and they're getting away with it because they're in this province that allows it. As a bondholder, I would have to come behind that liability, so I'm going to make it known that I'm not bidding on these bonds because their pension is not properly funded. The CEO is then going to be in a present-day position where he has to get the pension in order if he wants to raise money and grow the company.
I think that's actually a positive market discipline to impose on CEOs who are promising pensions to workers and deferring their wages into those pension funds. It's not a bad thing that the CEO is put in that position; it's a good thing. That's the first point, I guess, that I would make.
The next point I would make is that you continue to raise the concern that if companies had to properly fund their pension funds before paying out other creditors in the case of a bankruptcy, they would be inclined to go bankrupt or fall into insolvency. What if we gave them three years for the coming into force of this bill, so that they could use that time to get their act together and replenish their pension funds, eliminate liabilities and present a positive balance sheet to markets when they raise money?