Thanks very much.
I think, as we discussed last week at this committee, it's important to recognize that when we do analysis on these kinds of issues, we do it in full view of the totality of the systems we're looking at. It's not just about picking out any one specific element and saying, “That's the same over there. Why can't we do it the same way?” As Mr. Schaan just mentioned, we're talking about a particular constitutional construction here in Canada, where we have an officer of Parliament in the first instance. Nowhere else do we find it structured that way. Right away, we have a distinction that needs to be made about what could fit well within that construct.
Second, as we discussed last week, there are a number of jurisdictions internationally that separate the function of the investigation work, the adjudication work and the decision-making around penalties. I think I mentioned last week that Australia separates it. The commissioner in Australia may seek civil penalties from a court body. Ireland also separates that function. In New Zealand, the privacy regulator cannot issue administrative monetary penalties, but cost and damages may be awarded by a human rights review tribunal. In Quebec, for example, the CAI is essentially a tribunal function built into the privacy regulator. There are many instances.
In fact, as we discussed last week, it's generally understood that, in order for folks to have a fair and impartial hearing, and to have the process stand up under scrutiny and not be subject to a very significant risk of challenge on the basis of a reasonable apprehension of bias, you need to separate those functions. Vesting a single individual or office with the responsibilities of ombuds, investigatory function and adjudication function would significantly open it up to challenge.