Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you for this invitation to appear before your committee.
Allow me to introduce myself briefly. I am a full professor of law and innovation in the law faculty at the Université de Montréal. I have 30 years' experience in competition law and economic governance, partly in private practice, but mainly as a professor of competition law in Europe. I taught in Europe for 15 years. At the College of Europe, I taught a number of European Commission officials who work on major competition cases. I taught American competition law during a sabbatical year at Northwestern University. For the last seven years I have been at the Université de Montréal, where I continue to work in this field. I am back in touch with Canadian law.
It is a pleasure to speak to you this morning. I would like to start with a slightly theoretical comment on all of this. There are a lot of good intentions behind the proposed amendments to the Competition Act, such as Bill C‑56, which has been passed, and Bill C‑59, which is under consideration. However, if we compare Canadian law to the law of other member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the OECD, it stands out in two regards: first, the act is very long and very complex; second, the institutional framework is deficient. As a result, Canadian competition law is weak and difficult to enforce. The defendants, the corporations, will be easily able to defend themselves, and they will generally succeed in avoiding enforcement.
Since the act is long and complex, it is my opinion that we have to stop adding details to it. Instead, we need to go back to broad principles, take clear broad policy positions, and give the commissioner and the competition bureau more room to do their work.
Regarding the institutional framework in Canada, the bureau should have decision-making powers the way it is done everywhere in Europe, even in the United Kingdom, and, in part, for the powers of the American authorities. I think that if we look at what has happened recently in Canadian law, especially with the merger between Rogers and Shaw, the tribunal was the main problem. It should have acted only as an appeal body or, even better, should do judicial review on the basis of a decision of the bureau.
I am now going to talk about the two more specific questions that concern you today regarding Bill C‑352, which Mr. Singh referred to earlier. Increasing penalties under section 45 is a good idea in itself, but again, this shows how complex the Canadian law is, forcing a choice between sections 45 and 90. Obviously, the penalties need to be high under section 45, but that is criminal law and it is not as easy. An appropriate penalty, as mentioned here, would be 10% of worldwide revenues. Ideally, if we look at the practice of the European Commission and the American authorities, the level of the penalty should be about the same as the level of the corporation's profit for it to really hurt; it is generally about 5% to 6% of revenues. By adopting a maximum penalty of 10%, Canada is in the right league, and that means that the penalties should easily amount to hundreds of millions of dollars.
However, regarding the second proposal, the market share thresholds for controlling concentrations, I think that is a reference point that is a bit outdated. It is preferable to have a good general test and let the bureau do its work. Market shares may cause errors in both directions. First, there may be the exceptional case of a merger with high market shares where it would still be possible to prove that it is good for consumers. Second, and most importantly, there are also mergers with lower market shares that may be harmful to consumers, for example where the two merging parties are close competitors in the market.
These are factors that are definitely part of the contemporary analysis of competition law and that cannot be addressed in terms of market share thresholds, which obviously create the illusion that the only problem arises out of horizontal mergers, when vertical mergers, or conglomerate mergers, can be just as problematic.
Those are my introductory comments.
Thank you again for hearing me today.