I apologize; I'll answer in English.
This is an important question. To start at the beginning, we've been hearing that sometimes, as Mr. Bester raised, some of the contested mergers have not gone the commissioner's way. That is true, and I think there are some decisions there that I disagree with, but it is important to understand that the bureau has a lot of informal power when it comes to mergers, because the number of firms that are willing to go to litigation to resolve a dispute is relatively small. Mergers are often very time-sensitive, so there is a lot of clout there, and a lot of mergers over the years have been resolved informally. Many more mergers get resolved informally than formally. Thinking that we need structural presumptions to give the bureau more heft might be missing an important part of the picture, which is that the bureau has a fair amount of heft in its ability to say, “Slow down. We may take this to the tribunal and negotiate a settlement.” I think that's an important first part.
The other point that you raise, which is a good one, is that there have been times—and I can think of cases like Tervita—when the courts have been insufficiently attentive to the importance of competition. Professor Quaid spoke of judicial education. Maybe it's something like that. Mr. Bester and Professor Quaid spoke of possible institutional reform to make sure that adjudicators are quite sensitive to the importance of competition.
Those are just two of the other ways that we could be thinking about the importance of competition without adopting numerical tripwires.