For the Department of National Defence, of course, given its mission, I think quantum computing would be disruptive to its business. Professor Laflamme mentioned the potential challenge that a quantum computer might pose in terms of encryption, and I echo his assessment.
I think a machine that can break encryption is a few years away, still at least a decade away. That doesn't mean a quantum computer's usefulness is so far away. We could have smaller-scale machines doing some other stuff that could be relevant to the Department of National Defence, but decryption is probably a bit of a longer time horizon here.
That said, the question is what type of post-quantum encryption algorithms we're going to adopt, because some of the information being exchanged right now throughout the government network probably has a shelf life of more than 10 to 20 years. You want to essentially secure them right now, because they could be collected by an adversary and sit in their storage for decryption whenever the quantum computer comes around.
Therefore, the sooner we can adopt the right technology to improve our encryption infrastructure, the better it is for the security of our country. Of course, access to hardware could, for example, be used to test some of these algorithms.
These are the areas that I think could be relevant to the mission of the Department of National Defence.