Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Honourable members of the committee, I'm pleased to be with you today. My name is Jennifer Quaid, and I am an associate professor and vice-dean of research of the Civil Law Section of the Faculty of Law at the University of Ottawa.
This isn't the first time I've appeared before the committee. I'm pleased to once again address issues related to competition law and our competition policy in the context of what has transpired in the evaluation of the Shaw/Rogers transaction.
I've read the decisions, which I have right here with me—it's a habit I've developed as a lawyer. I don't really intend to discuss the content of the decisions, unless you have specific questions, because the decision has been rendered.
I think one of the current discomforts is that there is the public perception and many people's perception—the Competition Bureau has also given its opinion—and we disagree with the assessment of the tribunal's evidence and the legal issues at the Federal Court of Appeal. However, in law, once the tribunal has ruled, what it has found becomes the truth. We may disagree with the tribunal's decision, but the tribunal explains very clearly and in detail why and how it reached its conclusions. We can disagree, but personally, I am much more interested in the future and how we should respond.
These are the elements I'll address today.
I'm going to make three points, and I will try to make them as briefly as possible. I know I have a reputation for being long-winded. That's the professor in me. I'm happy to talk about other things as well.
The first thing I want to talk about is what the context and what happened with Rogers-Shaw should make us think about in terms of the process of reviewing mergers in Canada. I'd like to explain that a bit.
Second, I think what happened in this case is a bit of a wake-up call in terms of what kind of decision-making body we need for competition. There's been long-standing discussion about whether we have the right model and whether the tribunal.... This is without taking anything away from the devoted and very serious work that the people who have been part of the tribunal have done. I'm taking nothing away from that. I think it's time to reconsider whether we have the right decision-making body.
Third, I think there is a serious question here—particularly in the context of Rogers-Shaw but not exclusively to that—when we have competition interacting with a regulated sphere, and we need to think about some coherence between these different arms of government. In this case, others who know far more about telecommunications than I do.... I am not a telecom expert and I will say that right now, although you're going to hear from one this afternoon: Ben Klass. There is concern that these two parts of the administration are not talking to each other. They're not working well. I think that should concern you.
Coming back to my first point, what does Rogers-Shaw mean for merger review? I'm not going to give you a 101 on merger review, unless you really want it. We have to understand that in Canada, we don't approve mergers, by and large. We have a process by which mergers are notified to the bureau through the pre-notification process if they are of a certain size or if the parties are of a certain size. There are some transactions that fall below that threshold.
Many transactions are notified to the bureau. Most of the time, the bureau will look at them and say, “We don't see any problems. You can proceed.” However, it's not an approval. They're saying, “We won't object.” Sometimes it gets a little sticky and we have to go a little further along in the process. Perhaps the bureau says, “You know what? We need more information.” They might issue what's called a supplementary information request, or an SIR. The idea there is that they need to understand more. That's often a signal that there are deeper concerns.
It's really important to remember this when we start talking about what happened with Rogers-Shaw and the proposal of the remedy later in the game. All the way through this pre-notification process, there's an opportunity to come to a resolution, and that's what happens most of the time. This resolution is obviously agreed to by both sides. Once again, it's the bureau saying, “We're satisfied, and the way things have been changed and the things you're going to do”—whatever that might be, like divestitures or undertakings—“are good enough that we're not going to object.” Ultimately, though, a small number of cases—and it really is a small number—get contested before the tribunal. It's important to reiterate this, because it gets said so many times incorrectly in the press.
The tribunal does not approve mergers. The tribunal hears an application from the commissioner that says they have concerns about this merger and believe these concerns can be addressed by an order from the tribunal. This is a request for an order to resolve serious competition concerns. They have to reach a threshold of being substantial, and that is how this process before the tribunal starts.
Without getting into a lot of detail, what is significant and I think important to keep in mind with respect to why there was such a dust-up over whether we looked at the original transaction or we looked at the transaction as modified is that proposing a remedy in the context of the contested proceeding is not something that's happened before, so it is a new question. The tribunal didn't see a problem with it and said that, at the end of the day, the burden of proof didn't really matter. They thought the evidence was there anyway. But it was an altering of the normal way things are done. I think for the future we need to think about whether that's actually what we want to do.
I will tell you what my concerns are, and I'm happy to discuss them in greater detail.
The first is that we are now creating an incentive to wait to propose remedies until things are further along. That matters from a public-interest perspective because the commissioner doesn't invent a section 92 application overnight. That takes months of preparation. In this case, factually, there was no deal with Videotron on the table until June. They did get documents at that time, and then they got the full documents in August.
I think you need to remember that the level of detail—and if you have looked at the tribunal decision you will know—required to prove anti-competitive effect requires serious econometric analysis and lots of information. If you just have the idea that there's a deal out there, that's not enough for the commissioner to prepare a case. They are going to be required to prove things with detailed evidence. You need to know what the numbers are in that remedy. You need to know the conditions of the transaction to assess its impact. When it comes late in the game, that is difficult.
I will be clear about this. As a factual matter, the tribunal said there was no prejudice in this case. The commissioner didn't suffer any harm. I think we have to be careful about how much we expect public enforcers to just twist on a dime, but I think that's part of the reason they didn't go further with it.
I will say that the Federal Court of Appeal does recognize it's possible that proposed remedies coming after a challenge is filed could be a source of abuse or could be problematic, but they don't want to explore the conditions of that right now because there wasn't really a live case before them. They didn't think it was going to make any difference in this case. That's fair enough, but I think for the future we shouldn't just be passive about this and say we will leave this Rogers decision like this. What are the conditions under which we would be willing to say we're comfortable that deals can be changed and that maybe considering the remedy right into the merger is acceptable?
I have some reservations and I will tell you why. It's a feature of our corporate law and it's a feature of our economic system here that companies don't have to consider the public interest. They are not obliged to do that. They are absolutely entitled and free to consider their profit maximization self-interest. In that context, we need to be a bit careful about saying we're just going to allow unilaterally proposed remedies to be baked in and we will analyze them. I'll put that to you.
My next two points I'm going to say very quickly. They are on the tribunal process. I can't remember if I have said this already, but I think it's a heavy process. It's like a court, yet it's packaged as an expert entity. I urge you to look at the kinds of expertise that are generally used in the tribunal and at whether or not you think that captures the full public interest that might bear on competition matters.
For the most part, the expertise is in business and economics. The question is whether there are other perspectives relevant to the competition questions that come up that we should perhaps ensure are better represented in the tribunal. Honestly, when they talked about accelerating the process and the tribunal had an expedited process.... I'm going to give you a metaphor. Imagine an elephant running. The process of the tribunal is heavy. There are limits to how much you can accelerate a court process, so let's examine some other models that are faster.
Finally—and this is really a very short point on regulatory coherence—I think that as we look at competition reform, we should consider how competition relates to other areas of regulation. In this case—and I am not an expert and I defer to those who are—it is clear that there are some cross-purposes happening here between telecommunication regulation and competition regulation, and I think that should concern you.
I'm going to stop here. I'll be happy to answer your questions.
I can respond in French as well, if you prefer.
Thank you.