Thank you, Mr. Masse.
Certainly with where we are now, and then including this bill, I think the CFIUS process remains much tougher than what we're seeing here and what we have currently in terms of protecting national security. I'm not necessarily saying I agree with it. I think the fact that it has zero transparency and does create uncertainty is a problem. In fact, CFIUS has pretty much killed any Chinese investment in the United States as a result of its process. A lot of companies are looking at this and are asking whether they want to go through that only to find out in the end that their investments are not going to happen.
On the other hand, referring to the previous comments, the fact that CFIUS can retroactively force disinvestment in the name of national security is something I think is worth considering. There's the famous, obviously now well-known, case of Grindr, which is the matching application for homosexuals. They found out that this was bought by a Chinese company and it could potentially be abused. People could be blackmailed, for instance, if they had not come out, or something like that. Retroactively, it forced the sale of the company.
You might question the fact whether, once the data has been transferred, it really matters if you force the disinvestment. It's kind of too late. Once you have the assets, whether it's the data or whether it's the technical information, disinvestment itself—forcing Grindr to be sold to an American, European or Canadian company—to me...the ship has sailed. It's too late, but, at least, it's potentially a threat that could be used, especially in the case of commitments that are made and they're not respecting those commitments.
I think the CFIUS process might be, in a way, too opaque for my liking.