Thank you for inviting me to appear before your committee, Mr. Chairman. It is indeed a great privilege and a great pleasure for me to share a few ideas on the human rights situation in Iran.
I would like to begin by situating the significance of discussing human rights in Iran in a broader context. In particular, I think it's imperative to understand that human rights in Iran are linked to many of the peace and security considerations that seem to be preoccupying the international community at the moment. For instance, I believe that the nuclear question, which seems to have completely preoccupied the attention of the international community, is inextricably linked with the democratization of Iran. The problem we have to understand in Iran is not so much the question of nuclear capability; the problem is the nature of the regime.
The problem is that an authoritarian regime that is not responsive to the wishes of the people of Iran will need, as an ideological expedient, confrontation with the west, anti-American rhetoric, anti-Israeli rhetoric. A regime that feels besieged because it is a menace to international peace and security will feel the need to have a nuclear capability as some sort of insurance against military confrontation.
We have to understand that in the same way the regime, or rather hardliners within the regime who are tenuously holding onto power, engages in the demonization of foreign enemies, they link that demonization to the internal repression of dissent. Every single Iranian dissident who ends up in prison, including Professor Ramin Jahanbegloo, who I'm sure you're all familiar with, the Canadian Iranian who spent last summer in solitary confinement until he confessed, predictably, to having worked as some sort of American agent, unwittingly--everyone who is targeted within Iran is ultimately linked to some sort of foreign conspiracy in order to portray all indigenous calls for domestic change as somehow something that has been planted into the minds of the Iranian people by the United States or others.
There has recently been a deterioration of the human rights situation in Iran under President Ahmadinejad, and I believe my learned colleagues will address that in greater detail. But I think it's very important to understand the radicalization of politics in Iran, the deterioration of the human rights situation, less as a long-term trend and more as a dying gasp of a regime that has lost legitimacy and that is completely unresponsive to the wishes of the vast majority of Iranians.
The demographics are on the side of democratic change. Seventy per cent of Iranians are 30 years of age and under. They are part of a post-ideological, post-utopian, pragmatic culture and are much more concerned with employment, transparency, rooting out corruption, developing the economy, creating hope for the future, having cultural freedoms, and enjoying human rights and democratic freedoms.
The average Iranian does not wake up in the morning fantasizing about nuclear capability or about wiping Israel off the map. This is an expedient of President Ahmadinejad because this kind of polemic is the only thing he can offer the Iranian people as they decline further and further into hopelessness, social despair, and economic decline.
In this respect also I think it's very important to steer clear of any construction of the conflict we have with Iran in terms of a clash of civilizations. This is not a clash of civilizations. This is a clash between authoritarianism and democracy. Suffice it to say there are more Islamic clerics in prison today in Iran than there ever were under the regime of the Shah, and some of the greatest opposition to the sort of totalitarian state structures, which of course have become somewhat relaxed now, comes from within the ranks of the Islamic clerics themselves, in addition to the many other social movements that exist in Iran.
In short, there are two Irans. There is the Iran of the hard-liners, and there is the Iran of the majority, which has a thriving civil society, human rights movements, feminist movements, and social activists involved in all walks of life. This reality requires a nuanced foreign policy, which on the one hand isolates those hard-liners who stand in the way of the wishes of the vast majority of the people of Iran and at the same time helps to empower civil society, which is ultimately the only long-term solution, not only for resolving the interests of the international community in terms of regional stability, but also for the legitimate aspirations of the Iranian people.
I regret to say that for the most part the history of western policy towards Iran has put the human rights of the Iranian people a distant second to real political concerns. Here is an opportunity for Canada to adopt not only a principled foreign policy, but also a realistic foreign policy that understands the links, once again, between regional security and respect for human rights.
Suffice it to say that recently the survivors of the Bam earthquake in Iran protested about why the Iranian government is sending hundreds of millions of dollars to Hezbollah in Lebanon when the survivors of the earthquake still have not been provided with adequate housing. And in a democratic Iran, surely, people will ask whether it's worth spending $15 billion on a controversial nuclear program that risks military confrontation with the west at a time when, officially, there's a 25% unemployment rate, and unofficially, a rate that could be as high as 40%.
The way forward, I believe, is to look simultaneously at targeted sanctions, sanctions that target specific elements of the regime without penalizing the vast majority of Iranian people. Those targeted sanctions, in and of themselves, will significantly empower Iranian civil society to bring about a genuine transformation of the Iranian political system, as opposed to a solution imposed from the outside through some sort of intervention. I need not emphasize the very painful lessons we have learned from the case of Iraq about the consequences of trying to impose solutions from without.
In this respect, I think Canada has a very important role to play. We have, on the one hand, the rather belligerent, I dare say, cowboy diplomacy of the United States, which has played right into the hands of President Ahmadinejad by helping refashion him as some sort of Islamic saviour in a clash of civilizations. The conference on the denial of the Holocaust in Tehran and all these events are invitations to condemnation that help create some sort of legitimacy by rallying the Iranian masses, who have, obviously, nationalistic sentiments, and it's something we need to bear in mind.
On the other hand, the European policy, I dare say, has for the most part bordered on appeasement, even if there are now some more assertive policies in relation to the nuclear issue. Somewhere between appeasement and military confrontation is a policy that I think is effective, and I think in that respect the Canadian government, beyond speaking of human security and these principles in abstract terms, now has to accept this as a challenge to which it must rise.
I'll begin, in terms of particular recommendations, to speak about what I think is a unique challenge, but also a unique opportunity for the Canadian government, and this relates to the death of the Iranian-Canadian photojournalist, Zahra Kazemi, who came from my home town of Montreal. Last summer, the Iranian government included in its delegation Saeed Mortazavi, the notorious prosecutor general of Tehran implicated in Zahra Kazemi's death, not least by a presidential commission of inquiry under President Khatami in Iran and by a parliamentary commission of inquiry in Iran.
When he came to the Human Rights Council in Geneva, it was a slap in the face of the international community. It was a slap in the face of Canada. It was a slap in the face of all Iranians. The message was that we were going to send one of the most notorious figures, who has put hundreds and hundreds of webloggers and journalists and women's rights activists in Evin prison, to the Human Rights Council as a demonstration of the complete impunity with which we can abuse the rights of Iranian citizens.
In this respect the Canadian government, the Honourable Prime Minister, with great courage, I think, called for the arrest of Saeed Mortazavi. Not only was this a principled response, but it really had a profound effect on events within Iran. I've heard from more than one reformist or human rights advocate how emboldened the democratic opposition became when it became clear that this seemingly untouchable symbol of the regime now had to fear arrest. He quickly returned to Tehran and now has to question whether he can ever travel abroad without facing arrest. I think that was a unique example of how so little can go so far, how soft power actually can have very hard results.
I regret, though, that there has been no follow-up to what I think was a very commendable and principled move. Here we have a case in which a Canadian citizen has been brutally tortured, raped, and murdered. Her torture and murder have been the subject of an extensive cover-up by no less than the prosecutor general of Tehran.
As a matter of principle, if we call ourselves a multicultural society and we benefit from all that immigrants bring in terms of wealth and skills, I think we must also accept the burden. When a Canadian citizen, who happens to have a second nationality and has spent the vast majority of her life in Canada, is brutally tortured and murdered in another country, we have an obligation to defend her rights.
One of the arguments I hear about why we cannot move forward with the indictment of Saeed Mortazavi is that this is a problem of universal jurisdiction, that if we indict the likes of Saeed Mortazavi, Canadian courts will become like global courts and we'll have the problem Belgium has of indicting heads of state from across the world.
This is absolutely false. The Criminal Code of Canada, in section 7, paragraph (3.7)(d), expressly provides that Canadian courts can exercise jurisdiction over the crime of torture where the victim is a Canadian citizen. That is all that is required for the exercise of jurisdiction by Canadian courts, that the victim of torture is a Canadian citizen. It is completely inappropriate to suggest that this is somehow a universal jurisdiction case that is going to open a Pandora's box and turn Canadian courts into some sort of global court. If the Criminal Code specifically provides for the exercise of jurisdiction, why should we treat the murder of this Canadian citizen differently than the murder of any other Canadian?
Another argument against the indictment of Saeed Mortazavi is that we don't have access to the evidence. Obviously we cannot go to Iran and conduct an investigation. I believe that is a misleading argument. First of all, there is considerable evidence outside of Iran. We have reports from the Iranian parliamentary commission, from the presidential commission. There is the testimony of the Iranian doctor, who sought asylum in Canada recently. What we're dealing with here is not an isolated instance of criminality where you need the smoking gun or the fingerprints or that decisive piece of evidence.
Saeed Mortazavi is involved in systemic criminality. For all the years he was a senior judicial figure, hundreds and hundreds of dissidents went through Evin prison at his behest and were tortured and murdered. It's just a question of finding the many, many dissidents who have now sought asylum in Europe and North America in order to construct a compelling circumstantial case.
At the very least, even if the evidence is difficult to get, if the Canadian government does not express its intention at least to launch an investigation, then how will those who potentially could provide evidence step forward and help provide what is required for the indictment of Saeed Mortazavi?
I want to emphasize that the administration of justice, obviously, should never be actuated by political considerations. We should not be indicting Saeed Mortazavi as a foreign policy matter. This is a matter of criminal justice. Diplomacy with Iran ended when it became clear that the regime was completely unwilling to bring the perpetrators of this heinous crime to justice. At that point, diplomacy has to end and criminal justice has to begin. This is the lesson of the International Criminal Court, this is the lesson of the Yugoslav and Rwanda tribunals, that when you commit torture, when you commit crimes against humanity, you're no longer a minister, you're no longer an attorney general, you are a criminal.
In this case, though, I think we can't be oblivious to the far-reaching foreign policy consequences of pursuing this case. Not only will aggressive pursuit of this case send a message that Canada will not allow Canadian citizens to be murdered with impunity, but I think it will also send the message to the regime in Iran that there is a cost attached to human rights violations, that you cannot torture Iranians, whether they happen to be Canadian citizens or otherwise; you cannot torture and murder people with impunity. And that goes back to the role that Canada can play in promoting individual accountability for human rights abuses, rather than mere condemnation in the UN Human Rights Council, which is important but, like newspaper headlines, is something that is quickly forgotten.
The value of an indictment, we have learned from hunting Nazi war criminals, war criminals from the former Yugoslavia, and elsewhere, is that it stigmatizes people in positions of authority; it sends the message that even if they're in power today, one day they will not be in power and one day they will have to face justice.
By way of my final remark, I would also like to speak about the importance of investing in the future leaders of Iran rather than being too preoccupied about appeasement or good relations with the present regime. Obviously, certain political realities have to be taken into account. But at the end of the day, the democratic tide in Iran, the burgeoning of civil society, clearly signals the coming end of an unfortunate era of authoritarianism in Iran. In that respect, I believe we need the imagination, the foresight, and the political vision in Canada, whether through track two diplomacy or other means, to empower and speak to civil society in Iran, rather than being preoccupied with those who happen to be in power today but who may not necessarily be there tomorrow.
I will end simply by mentioning that judicial measures can have significant impact. I'm aware that others have spoken also about the prospect of indicting President Ahmadinejad for incitement to genocide and other crimes, but I just want to give you one last instructive example of what is known as the Mykonos judgment.
Mykonos was a Greek restaurant in Berlin where Iranian agents killed four Kurdish leaders in 1992. The German judiciary investigated, arrested some of the perpetrators, and implicated the highest-ranking Iranian leaders, including the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, including the president at the time, Rafsanjani, including the interior minister, Fallahian--names that emerge again in relation to the bombing of the Jewish cultural centre in Argentina, in relation to the assassination of Professor Rajavi in Geneva in 1989, and so on.
The significance is that once the Mykonos judgment came out in 1997, because of the resulting international outcry, there were no more political assassinations in Europe. Until that date, 300 Iranian dissidents had been murdered in Europe, often with the complicity of European governments. I think the Mykonos judgment should be a source of inspiration as we consider rising to the challenge and indicting Saeed Mortazavi for the murder of Zahra Kazemi.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your patience.