Subcommittee on International Human Rights Committee on Dec. 5th, 2006

[The Chair, Conservative, Jason Kenney]

I'll call this meeting to order. I think we have a quorum. Well, I see one, anyway--unless someone is going to challenge me.

Good morning, and welcome to this morning's meeting of the Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development. We continue this morning our committee's study of the Canada-China bilateral human rights dialogue and related issues.

This morning we have appearing before us

Ms. Adèle Dion, Director General Human Security and Human Rights, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and Mr. Gordon Houlden, Director General, East Asia Bureau.

We also have Hau Sing Tse, vice-president, Asia branch, CIDA; and Jeff Nankivell, director of China and Northeast Asia division, CIDA.

I imagine the witnesses are all familiar with the context of our study, which has been going on for a few weeks. To date, we've met with a number of representatives of NGOs, academics, and others with an interest who have expressed a point of view on the efficacy of the Canada-China human rights dialogue. In the context of this study, of course, we've looked not just at the dialogue; the actual human rights situation in China has come up frequently. I think the committee wanted to have an opportunity to hear from officials of two of the relevant departments about the departmental view, and programming, certainly as it relates to CIDA.

So we welcome you all and look forward to hearing your presentations, which will be followed by a question period.

Why don't we start with our guests from DFAIT.

[Gordon Houlden, Director General, East Asia Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, honourable members. Thank you for inviting us here today to speak on behalf of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

My colleague Ms. Adèle Dion can speak directly to the Canada-China Joint Committee on Human Rights and on Canada's multilateral human rights engagement with China. Mr. Hau Sing Tse will speak about Canada's human rights technical cooperation with China. I will speak to Canada's bilateral human rights engagement with China more generally.

Let me start by addressing the current human rights situation in China. This subcommittee has heard evidence from many witnesses with respect to human rights violations in China, including repression of minority rights and religious freedoms, arbitrary detention and imprisonment, and restrictions on freedom of expression. We share the serious concerns raised by these witnesses.

While we recognize that economic freedoms improved in China over the past 20-some years of reform, continued violations of civil and political rights are of paramount concern. Our key concerns include, but are not limited to, restrictions on freedom of expression, association, and spiritual belief; poor respect for the rule of law and lack of transparency of judicial proceedings; arbitrary detention and treatment of political prisoners; repression of ethnic minorities, especially in Tibet and Xinjiang; police violence and torture; persecution and prosecution of human rights defenders; crackdowns on freedom of the press and intimidation and detention of journalists; a continued ban on independent labour unions and harsh treatment of labour activists; lack of adherence to international standards of free and informed consent in the context of organ transplantations from executed prisoners; reservations to and non-ratification of international human rights conventions, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and discrimination against people living with HIV/AIDS.

As stated in the Speech from the Throne, the promotion of Canadian values, including human rights and democracy, are important goals of our government. At the officials level, we work to implement this approach. Human rights are not only among the basic Canadian values and principles, but they're also enshrined in international human rights instruments, some of which China has signed on to. It is in this context that we seek to engage China to work towards concrete improvements on the ground.

We have a comprehensive relationship with China and seek to advance all Canadian interests, including human rights, trade, investment, health, security, and other multilateral issues. Engagement is the most effective means of advancing our multi-faceted interests with China, an approach consistent with other like-minded countries.

The more we engage with China on all fronts as part of a comprehensive relationship, the better placed we are to advocate forcefully on human rights. Without engagement, we would lose avenues for dialogue and the means by which to advocate for human rights improvements.

We have a range of tools at our disposal in conducting our human rights advocacy with China, ranging from public statements to official diplomatic representations--notes and démarches--to private government meetings at all levels, and in each situation we assess which tool is the most useful in terms of maximizing results. Using these tools, we express concerns on both systematic issues and on individual cases of concern that are brought to our attention by Canadians and Canadian NGOs.

Our goal is to continually improve the effectiveness of our advocacy to maximize results. We are constantly assessing and re-evaluating our approach based on input from civil society and consultations with like-minded countries and multilateral institutions. In other words, our human rights advocacy is not a “one size fits all” approach, nor is it set in stone.

One recent example where we employed a range of tools was in our response to the incident in which Chinese border guards shot at a group of unarmed Tibetans attempting to cross the border into Nepal. We made official diplomatic representations both in Ottawa and in Beijing and our minister made a strong public statement in the House condemning the unprovoked shooting of unarmed civilians. We remain seized with the issue of the well-being and whereabouts of the children detained during the incident, and continue to follow up with the Chinese government in our efforts to obtain this information.

A separate matter of concern involves the detention of one of our own citizens in China and our ongoing efforts to assure ourselves and his family of his well-being and that his human rights are respected. As the Prime Minister has said, “When it comes to the specific case of a Canadian citizen who's been mistreated, we have an absolute moral obligation to defend those citizens and express our views.”

We also employ a variety of tools to raise individual cases of concern that have been brought to our attention by Canadians and Canadian NGOs. We raise cases involving ethnic minorities, pro-democracy and labour activists, prisoners of conscience, lawyers, journalists, cyber-dissidents, and those with direct Canadian family connections.

The possibility of negative repercussions arising from advocacy on individual cases is of primary concern. It is why, whenever we raise any such case, we do so in close consultation with those who have brought the case to our attention. We also monitor for developments in each case, both positive and negative developments. To our knowledge, none of the cases we have raised have suffered as a result of our advocacy.

How effective is all this? This is a question we are constantly using to evaluate our progress on this front. Measuring and attributing results is a challenge for all like-minded countries. In addition, it is a challenge for one country alone to have a great systematic impact. It is why Canada coordinates with like-minded countries at every opportunity on both systematic issues and key cases of concern.

In fact, we have seen improvements in some cases of concern we have raised. Some prisoners in Canada and like-minded countries have been released early, while others have experienced an improvement in their treatment while in prison. For example, family visitation rights to a Chinese political prisoner were recently reinstated shortly after Canada sent a diplomatic note to the Chinese government requesting this, among other things.

However, we are by no means satisfied with the extent to which China has responded to concerns raised by Canada and the international community. Human rights violations are an ongoing reality in the lives of many Chinese people. We are committed to finding ways by which we can maximize the effectiveness of our efforts to help achieve concrete human rights improvements in China. This is a challenge for us, but it's one we readily accept, because it is the right thing to do.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Jason Kenney]

Thank you, Mr. Houlden.

I will now give Ms. Dion the floor.

[Adèle Dion, Director General, Human Security and Human Rights, Department of Foreign Affairs]

Thank you.

I thank the subcommittee for the invitation to speak today on Canada's bilateral human rights relationship. As indicated by my colleague earlier, I will speak specifically about the Canada-China dialogue, which is known as the joint committee on human rights.

Perhaps to begin, I'll give a bit of background. The dialogue was initiated in 1997--that is nine years ago--as an alternative to co-sponsoring the annual resolution on the situation of human rights in China that was presented at the UN Commission on Human Rights. It was jointly agreed upon by the Canadian and Chinese sides, the agenda to be negotiated in advance and discussions to be conducted in private in the spirit of mutual respect and understanding. That is to say, no megaphone diplomacy.

It was agreed that discussions would benefit from the participation of civil society organizations, academics and domestic ministries. In addition to the discussions, normally each session includes a so-called site visit, such as a visit to a regional provincial capital, training centre, or correctional institution, depending on the subjects that are being discussed. In the past, site visits within China have, for example, included Tibet, Hunan, and Xinjiang Uygur.

When the dialogue was first initiated, the framework used was the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However, China has ratified several of the major human rights conventions: the Convention against Torture; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; the International Covenant on All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the convention on the rights of the child. It has also signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, although it has not yet ratified. They are preparing to ratify, and Canada has been supporting these efforts.

As the dialogue has evolved, we have focused more on the implementation of international standards. Canada and other western dialogue partners actively encourage China to sign, ratify, and implement international human rights instruments as well as to agree to visits to China by the various UN human rights monitors, for example, the Special Rapporteur on Torture.

Visits have been undertaken by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention--they've actually visited twice, once in 1997 and again in 2005--the special rapporteur on the right to education, and the special rapporteur on torture, who was there in 2005. Future visits that China has agreed upon in principle include the special rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief and the independent expert on the question of human rights and extreme poverty.

I should also mention that the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has visited twice: first Mary Robinson in 1998, and most recently Louise Arbour in 2005. That last visit resulted in an agreement to formalize the continuation of a program of technical cooperation between China and the office of the high commissioner, which focuses on facilitating China's ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as the implementation of recommendations of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural rights.

Perhaps I could touch briefly on the commission's assessment that the department undertook in 2005. The background to this is that Foreign Affairs, other government departmental partners, and indeed all members of each delegation to the bilateral dialogue undertake to evaluate each round. In addition to that, in 2005 an independent academic review was commissioned to assess the overall dialogue and to identify areas for improvement. As I believe has already been mentioned, my department concurs with many of the findings, and the report was made public as a matter of transparency. The view was that we all share the common goal of improving the human rights situation in China.

In our discussions with the Government of China, we've underlined our concerns with the last dialogue round, as we have in each of the previous years. This is part of the ongoing process of engagement with Chinese ministries. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as other Chinese partners, have agreed with the importance of reform. We're now working to put together a set of proposed constructive reforms based on the findings of this commissioned assessment and other recommendations from civil society and NGOs and our own in-house officials. We will be seeking guidance from ministers once we have an agreed-upon package.

Perhaps I could also touch on some of the recommendations we have received from the non-governmental community--from our NGO partners--many of which have, I think, also been made to this subcommittee, such as collaborating with other countries that have human rights dialogues with China. We are systematically in contact with other western countries that have bilateral dialogues with China concerning human rights. We share information, working methods, and best practices with these countries.

Another recommendation was increased NGO participation in the dialogue, and we do agree with this. We would like to see increased civil society participation. China has expressed openness to this proposal. Both academics and NGOs have participated in previous years, including, among others, Rights and Democracy, Amnesty International, All-China Women's Federation, the Canadian Labour Congress, South Asian Women's Association, the Canadian Council for Refugees, and the Canadian Race Relations Foundation.

Independent NGO participation was introduced in 2004 in Beijing with a round table discussion with Chinese NGOs on HIV/AIDS. In 2005, the dialogue was held in Canada, and the Chinese official delegation agreed to meet with Canadian NGOs. This included a round table discussion organized by Rights and Democracy on the topic of the partnership between the Government of Canada and non-governmental partners. We wish to further build on this kind of progress.

Another recommendation concerns feedback to civil society. We certainly endeavour to maintain open communication with civil society on dialogue activities and discussions. Consultations in the form of teleconferences are held before and after the dialogue rounds. Prior to them, the officials share the planned agenda and invite participants to relay comments, concerns, and priorities with respect to human rights in China. Officials undertake to incorporate these points into representations and discussions within the dialogue. Similarly, we have post-dialogue debriefings in order to relay to our civil society partners discussions, activities, and Chinese engagement.

On the presence of other government departments beyond the MFA at the table, we agree that those departments responsible for implementing human rights norms should not only be at the table, they should be actively involved in setting the agenda. A key objective of the dialogue is to have the knowledge, methodologies, and ideas further disseminated and acted upon back in the participants' home ministries. We think we've made considerable progress in this regard in the last few years. Last year we had approximately five Chinese ministries and organizations represented. On the Canadian side, we brought in a range of government departments in support of our whole-of-government approach.

In terms of the recommendation that objectives must be set and benchmarks used, we do agree that concrete objectives and benchmarks are required in order to set predefined and mutually agreed-upon goals and to measure our progress. The key here is to establish benchmarks that are measurable. Of course, for them to succeed there must be agreement with the Chinese side on the outcomes.

High-level government participation is another key recommendation. The participants of the bilateral dialogue are at the senior working level. Meetings are usually opened by directors general or assistant deputy ministers of the country hosting that particular round. This level was mutually agreed upon as being the most effective in order to be able to discuss practical technical issues and concerns in an in-depth manner.

My colleague has already touched on the next recommendation, to reassess the presentation of prisoner lists in the JCHR; the safety and well-being of prisoners may have been put at risk by highlighting their cases. I would simply flag the fact that the Government of Canada regularly presents prisoner lists in bilateral meetings at all levels, including within the JCHR. If there are specific cases we should be aware of that suggest in fact some prisoners were put at risk, we would certainly like to hear about it from our non-governmental partners.

Another recommendation is that a resolution on human rights in China be again presented within the UN system. On that recommendation, I would simply say that the decision to introduce or support a resolution on China would have to be taken at the political level by cabinet. However, within the new Human Rights Council there is a mechanism of universal periodic review under development. It will require all UN members to have their human rights record reviewed by their peers, starting with the Human Rights Council's member states. China is a member of the Human Rights Council.

I will leave it at that, Mr. Chair. I'll be happy to respond to questions and comments.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Jason Kenney]

Thank you. We'll go to questions once we've heard from our guests from CIDA.

Mr. Tse.

[Hau Sing Tse, Vice-President, Asia Branch, Canadian International Development Agency]

Mr. Chairman, honourable members of the committee, it is a great pleasure for me to testify, along with my colleagues, before the subcommittee today.

Following on the presentations given by my colleagues from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the purpose of my presentation is to provide you with information on CIDA's development cooperation program with China related to human rights.

Since its inception in 1981, CIDA's programming in China has covered a broad range of areas. Through the 1980s and into the mid-1990s, the focus of the program was on food aid, personnel exchanges, and institutional linkages. As China's economy grew and its capacity in these areas increased, CIDA has changed its programming to take advantage of new opportunities in key areas where the Chinese are ready to work with Canadians and where CIDA support can serve foreign policy priorities such as human rights.

Accordingly, CIDA has steadily increased its programming related to human rights with a focus on strengthening the rule of law in China, as defined by international norms, standards, and agreements to which China is a party. Of course, the governments of Canada and China have very different views with respect to the state of human rights in China. CIDA works very closely with the Department of Foreign Affairs to ensure that Canada has a coherent and consistent approach to human rights, and we continue to look for ways to strengthen that approach.

CIDA complements the Department of Foreign Affairs' lead on policy issues by supporting the provision of Canadian expertise to address human rights concerns over the long term. For example, the annual Canada-China human rights dialogue has led to new CIDA projects and initiatives. A direct outcome of a request made by China's public security ministry at the 2005 dialogue has been a new sub-project under CIDA's policy options program, a sub-project dealing with inmates' rights.

Another initiative related to the dialogue is an activity within the long-term CIDA-funded program on implementation of international standards in criminal justice policy. This program, which is run by the Vancouver-based International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy, is opening a new element of activities to work on issues of police accountability, beginning with a mission to Beijing next week, involving Canadian academics and law enforcement officials. These experts will make presentations on issues such as police accountability, police corruption, witness and victim protection, and gender issues in transnational crime.

In our current programming related to human rights, CIDA has engaged a range of Canadian expertise and partners such as the Canadian Bar Association, the Parliamentary Centre of Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada through the National Judicial Institute, Justice Canada, provincial authorities, the Federation of Canadian Municipalities, and the International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy.

Through the CIDA program, Canada has also developed relationships and strong credibility with a wide variety of Chinese institutions that have a direct bearing on human rights, including the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme People's Court , the All China Lawyers Association, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security, and the National Legal Aid Center.

Since the mid-1990s, human rights have comprised an increasing share of CIDA's overall program, and this trend is strengthening. Through the CIDA program, Canadians have been able to achieve some notable results, and here are some examples. CIDA's Canada-China women's law project, which was implemented by the Association of Canadian Community Colleges trained hundreds of Chinese judges, court officials, and police officers on gender issues, developed extensive materials for future use, and helped to create special courts and legal aid clinics to inform and advise women of their rights. Canadian expertise was also used to develop and enact new legislation on domestic violence.

A project implemented by the Canadian Bar Association, sharing Canadian models for provision of legal aid, has contributed to the Chinese government devoting increased funding to legal aid services and improving citizens' access to justice. Legal aid lawyers are now taking on more cases in areas such as claims for wages owed to migrant labourers and claims for compensation by injured workers.

Thanks to the work done by the International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice and Policy of Canada, a Canadian model for community correctional services was adopted in Shanghai and subsequently in 18 other provinces. This international centre has also worked with Chinese legal scholars, judges and top policy-makers to improve their understanding of international legal norms and standards, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the ratification of which con continues to be under study by the State Council.

CIDA also supported the University of Ottawa's Human Rights Research and Education Centre with the University of Beijing on a series of human- rights projects , with results including the establishment of China's first human-rights research centre.

Also, CIDA's Civil Society program, which began in 1998 and was expanded in 2001, is managed in close collaboration with colleagues from the Department of Foreign Affairs at the Canadian Embassy in Beijing. This program has contributed directly to the creation of 20 new Chinese civil society organizations. Another 107 other organizations received training in management and organizational capacity building. More than half of the beneficiaries of this project are women. This program has also funded the creation of one of China's leading NGO advocating for the rights of people living with HIV-AIDS and was an early financial supporter of the work of Mr. Wan Yanhai, who was recently detained by the authorities for his advocacy activities.

The Tibet Basic Human Needs Project, implemented by Agriteam Limited of Calgary, has piloted models of participatory planning models in several hundred rural communities in Tibet. These models have been adopted in rural villages throughout the autonomous region of Tibet.

As you will have noted, these initiatives use the expertise of Canadian organizations and implementing agencies. We continue to explore opportunities to advance the human rights agenda in China through practical cooperation.

I've provided a snapshot of the results that are being achieved in the area of human rights. In order to provide the committee members with more details, we are distributing a list of relevant projects.

In addition, I would encourage this committee to invite representatives from some of the Canadian organizations I've mentioned. These people can tell you much more about the practical work being done by Canadians in China in the area of human rights.

Thank you for your time. I welcome your questions. Mr. Nankivell is here, and he is also ready to provide the required details.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Jason Kenney]

Thank you to each of our witnesses.

We'll begin with questions, starting with Mr. Silva.

[Mario Silva, Liberal, Davenport, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank everyone from the departments.

I have a series of questions, and they're all related in one way or another.

First of all, Mr. Tse, you mentioned the fact that you have a list. I'd certainly like to see the list, if it's possible, and we could also analyze the list.

Oh, there is a list here. Okay. Thank you.

At times there has been criticism that the departments don't work together and that there's a silo mentality. I want to make sure that in Foreign Affairs and with the other branch of CIDA, the goals are in fact being met. If there is an objective here in terms of promoting the entire dialogue on human rights, is CIDA accomplishing a working collaboration with these goals or are there completely separate mandates, without any relation to one another?

[Hau Sing Tse]

Perhaps I can start and my Foreign Affairs colleagues can either confirm or dispute this.

Fundamentally, if you look at the annual human rights dialogue that's spearheaded by the Department of Foreign Affairs, CIDA officers, generally at the director level, are part of the Canadian team. As I mentioned earlier in my statement, some projects and ideas fell out from that dialogue; in 2005, for example, we picked up dealing with inmates' rights as a project.

To give you another example, in the civil society program that is run out of the embassy in Beijing, there again it is the Foreign Affairs and CIDA officers coming together to look at proposals and those kinds of ideas. Of course, at various different levels in the interaction on human rights issues, the two departments work closely together.

[Gordon Houlden]

Perhaps I could add a few words to that. I've been participating in the joint human rights committee for many years. I was at the first meeting. CIDA was present, and they have been present subsequently.

The changing nature of CIDA's profile in China has necessitated closer and closer cooperation between the two. I've served a couple of times in the embassy in Beijing, and because CIDA group is now working on sensitive projects involving human rights and civil society, the political section of the mission, the Department of Foreign Affairs, in effect has been in daily contact with our colleagues on the CIDA side. We meet regularly here in Ottawa as well and, of course, before and after the JCHR meeting.

[Mario Silva, Liberal, Davenport, ON]

I would expect, and I'm not surprised, that there would be at least contact meetings. I'm not surprised that there is some level of cooperation and working relationship. I'm more concerned about whether the mandates are the same.

Is one working with civil society and with groups that are trying to promote democracy, while other department might be saying, well, they're doing that, but we're doing something totally different, and pay attention to us because we're the foreign affairs department?

[Gordon Houlden]

I think you raise a fair point. My response to that would be that when CIDA first began to operate in the early 1980s in China, other projects that did not have a direct impact on human rights were part of that. There was food aid. There was assistance to poverty alleviation and other aspects. As they have drawn closer to an emphasis, an emphasis that governance projects have necessitated and have resulted in this cooperation, I'm not saying we're on the same line of the same page every day, but we do cooperate and communicate on a regular basis.

Overall I would say the answer is yes, but perhaps my colleagues could add to that.

[Jeff Nankivell, Director, China and Northeast Asia Division, Canadian International Development Agency]

In terms of mandate, the guiding mandate that we have presently for the CIDA programming in China is a country development programming framework that was defined in 2004 and revised in 2005. That has given us our two main priority areas, which are, number one, in human rights, democratic development, and good governance; and number two, in the area of supporting China's environmental sustainability. This is the mandate that we have for the program.

Very extensive work goes in each time these policies are determined. Very extensive work goes into that, and our colleagues at the Department of Foreign Affairs, particularly working together in the embassy in Beijing but also here in Ottawa, were intimately involved on the Canadian side in our arriving at those two main priority areas for the program, which are in line with Canadian policy priorities for engagement with China. It's not the sum total of Canadian policy priorities for China, because there are policy interests in areas such as trade. That's not an area in which the CIDA program works these days.

But in terms of our main areas of programming, these were derived together on the Canadian side. When we come to the table with the Chinese to agree on what the priorities are, our priorities have been determined together as Government of Canada priorities and we end up with a set of objectives governing our current program that has been agreed with the Chinese government. But there could be other things that the Chinese government would have wanted us to do that didn't correspond with Canadian foreign policy priorities, and that's how we've ended up with the ones that we have. But they are worked out jointly between Foreign Affairs and CIDA before we come to the table with the Chinese.

[Mario Silva, Liberal, Davenport, ON]

The figures I've heard and read are in the neighbourhood of between $43 million and $50 million that we spend annually on aid and working with CIDA in China. In the last Parliament, there was incredible criticism from the Conservative Party that this was a waste of taxpayers' money, given the fact that China is such a wealthy country. In fact, there were those who argued that even though China certainly has tremendously improved economically in the last few years, there still are very high rates of poverty, and particularly child poverty. There was some justification for that.

I don't think it's fair of me to ask what you think the government's position should be in that regard, because the political question is a decision for the government to make in terms of whether they want to continue that aid or not. But I do want to ask you the question in relation to those who argue that the money was necessary, that it was a way to almost buy into the Chinese market, that it was a way for Canada to engage the Chinese, saying somehow that, yes, we're concerned about human rights, but we're still helping with aid and we're giving you money to allow for other economic.... There was the economic or business interest tied into that aid as well. Is that in fact fair, or was that just a “somewhere out there” argument?

[Hau Sing Tse]

I would say that if you look at the current programming, it's highly focused on human rights and the environment. In those areas, we are sharing and providing Canadian expertise to help influence the opening up of China in those sensitive areas. In the case of the environment, it has clearly had a major impact on the rest of the world and in Canada.

Therefore, notwithstanding the economic growth in China, the opportunities for us to work in the human rights and environment areas are there, and this is the way we are currently doing all our programming.

[Mario Silva, Liberal, Davenport, ON]

You do not agree, then, with those who argue that providing $50 million is almost like entry fee money into China.

[The Chair, Conservative, Jason Kenney]

Sorry, Mario, but we're at nine minutes.

[Mario Silva, Liberal, Davenport, ON]

Maybe it's a yes or no question. Do you agree or not that this is the way for the business community to get into China?

[Jeff Nankivell]

It's neither a yes nor a no. First of all, what we have been doing in recent years has not involved the provision of money to China. It's the provision of Canadian expertise and it's paying the cost of bringing Chinese to Canada to engage with Canadians for training and discussions and exchanges.

It's also important to understand that when you look at individual projects, getting a CIDA project is not something that would be considered by a Chinese partner on a project as a reward. On any of the projects that you see in that list, the Chinese partners on those projects have to put in substantial resources on their side in terms of time and money to be engaged in these long-term projects. It's a significant investment for them, so it's not something we certainly perceive as being seen by them as a reward for anything or as a gift from Canada to China.

[The Chair, Conservative, Jason Kenney]

Before we pass to Madam St-Hilaire, I just want to seek further clarification on a point that has come up here.

What percentage of CIDA projects related to democratic development and good governance and human rights are vetted or approved by the Chinese government?

[Hau Sing Tse]

Right now, I think we're looking at 40-something per cent of our programs being in the human rights and governance area.

[Jeff Nankivell]

The percentage of those projects vetted by the Chinese government would be very close to, but not up to, 100%.

[The Chair, Conservative, Jason Kenney]

Right.

Dr. Charles Burton—he wrote the study—asks how projects for democratic development that are approved by a non-democratic government can lead to effective democratic development. It's a paradox, isn't it?

[Hau Sing Tse]

It's a question of where you want to have some entry points that will make sense, given the conditions in China. Just to give you one fact—and this is in response to the earlier question about scale and whether there should be conditionality and economics and so on—at the end of the day, the ODA in China is less than 0.1% of their capital flows. Therefore, where Canada or the CIDA program can make a difference is really in being able to look at opportunities that can have a catalytic effect. Take a longer-term view while knowing that there are many serious differences of opinion and approach on how to deal with human rights issues between Canada and China, and look at where we can share with them the best practices, the Canadian practices, on how we deal with these issues. Focus on the conditions and areas where conditions in China permit certain reform-minded people and units or organizations or institutions to be able to capitalize on the Canadian development assistance program to advance the human rights agenda.

[The Chair, Conservative, Jason Kenney]

Madam St-Hilaire.