In terms of unintended consequences, I do not think the situations in Sudan or the Congo are comparable to the situation in Iran, because what you're dealing with in the Congo is a non-governmental force and in Sudan you're dealing with the head of state. Ahmadinejad is the president, but the ultimate power in Iran is the ayatollah, and we've seen in the past that if Ahmadinejad gets too far out of line, Ayatollah Khamenei reins him in. I don't think Ahmadinejad is saying in public anything different from what Khamenei is saying in private, but Khamenei is saying it in private and not in public.
It's possible to get the regime to distance itself from Ahmadinejad if he gets himself into too much trouble. Indeed, a lot of the speculation about the upcoming presidential election is the extent to which Khamenei will support Ahmadinejad. I think it is possible to get the regime to distance itself from Ahmadinejad and the incitement through this type of legal effort, but there's nothing like a Khamenei in Sudan. It's Bashir and Bashir and Bashir. I don't think you could apply that analysis to Sudan.
Also, this argument of unintended consequences can work different ways. Sure, you can see what happens as a result of what was done, but you don't know what would have happened if it hadn't been done. There's an argument that if this hadn't been done, things would be even worse than they are now because you would have had people committing crimes against humanity with impunity, and that, of course, causes problems, not just in the theatre where the crimes are committed, but worldwide. If we are going to come to grips with these crimes, I think we have to send out a message that there's no impunity.