Subcommittee on International Human Rights Committee on April 23rd, 2009

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

This is the Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development. This is our 14^thmeeting.

Our guest today is Patrick Clawson.

I'm sure your remarks will be very informative to the committee, Mr. Clawson. Once you've completed your remarks, we'll turn to questions.

Typically we have a round of seven-minute questions, one from each party, followed by a second five-minute round of questions, one each from the Liberals and Conservatives. That uses up our time, but all of this is very much directed by you and what you have to say in your presentation, so please feel free to go ahead.

[Patrick Clawson, Deputy Director of Research, Washington Institute for Near East Policy]

Thank you very much for inviting me today. As a shameless self-promoter, I've brought along some publications from our institute, which are available here for you.

Unfortunately, they are available in English only, but we can always hope.

If you'll permit me, I'll make my opening statement.

Iran's hardliners see their nuclear program and their repression as integrally linked. Both are ways to combat what they see as western arrogance seeking to overthrow the Islamic republic. For this reason, the west should tie its concern about Iran's nuclear standoff with the world community to an insistence that Iran respect the human rights treaties it has signed.

Why is Iran being so unwilling to compromise about its nuclear activities? To answer that question requires understanding the mind of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the main decision-maker in Iran. His main worry for more than a decade has been that the west is working to change Iran's regime. His concern is not a military invasion, but instead a western-inspired Velvet Revolution. That phrase, which he uses very often, refers to the 1989 Czechoslovak overthrow of communist rule, in which the seemingly isolated intellectual dissident Václav Havel was quickly propelled to power.

Khamenei worries that regimes that appear to be solidly entrenched can be quickly overthrown if they have been undermined by civil society organizations and free media, a process he calls post-modern colonialism. His concern about this alleged western strategy is reinforced by his reading of the experience of Iran, where the reformers' surprise 1997 victory in presidential elections led to massive student demonstrations against the regime in 1999. Because of his concern about a Velvet Revolution, Khamenei is paranoid about non-governmental organizations of all sorts, but especially those that promote people-to-people exchanges and the free flow of information.

The objections of the Iranian hardliners are directed at the activities of not only governments but civil society groups. The intelligence ministry's counter-espionage director has said:

Any foreigner who establishes relations is not trustworthy. Through their approaches, they first establish an academic relationship but this soon changes into an intelligence relationship.

These are not empty words. As we speak, there are physicians sitting in Iranian jails who have been convicted of spying because of their contact with foreigners.

Supporting Iran's beleaguered human rights activists is not just a moral value but a vital western security interest. The New York Times has editorialized, “The best hope for avoiding a nuclear-armed Iran lies in encouraging political evolution there over the next decade”. Although a democratic Iran would certainly also be attracted by the pursued advantages of nuclear weapons, it would also be more sensitive to the high cost of international isolation a nuclear-armed Iran would face--a price that an Iran eager to integrate with the world may well not wish to pay.

The cause of reform in the entire middle east would suffer a grave setback if the west were perceived to have abandoned Iran's beleaguered pro-democratic forces by making a deal with hard-line autocrats to secure strategic interests. Iranian reformers fear such a deal. Noted dissident Akbar Ganji warned in his “Letter to America”, printed in The Washington Post:

We believe the government in Tehran is seeking a secret deal with the United States. It is willing to make any concession, provided that the United States promises to remain silent about the regime's repressive measures at home.

Iran's leaders appear convinced that their nuclear program will force the west to treat them with what they refer to as respect. By that, they mean that the west would back off from criticizing the Islamic republic, including criticizing its human rights record.

The prospects for resolving the nuclear standoff are not good, but a common front by the influential members of the international communities offers the best hope of persuading Iran's leaders to compromise. At the same time, we should not stay silent about our concerns about Iran's human rights while negotiating about the nuclear program.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

Thank you. That was very good. We're used to witnesses who run on at great length, so you are a breath of fresh air at our committee.

We'll turn, then, in our order of questioning, to the Liberal side of the table.

Would you prefer to go first, Mr. Silva?

[Mario Silva, Liberal, Davenport, ON]

Thank you very much.

I want to thank the witness for being before this committee. I do apologize for being a little bit late. I was at another meeting. I hope I haven't missed some of the points you made. I will certainly look at the transcript.

We in the committee have been dealing for some time with the issue of Iran, particularly on issues of ethnic minority persecution. Not too long ago, we had a motion on the Baha'is, which was approved in Parliament, and we have also looked at some of the policies and how they impact on human rights in minority communities across Iran.

I think it's appropriate that you're here. You'll be able to speak about one of the issues that concerns us. We have been hearing that Iran is moving ahead in terms of nuclear capabilities. There has been rhetoric coming from President Ahmadinejad. Has there been any reference to using this nuclear development for means other than peaceful means?

[Patrick Clawson]

President Ahmadinejad often describes the nuclear program as an example of how Iran has become a powerful country. In his usual understated way, he has taken to describing Iran as the most powerful country on earth.

In his mind, the advances in the nuclear program show how Iran has the ability to do what it wishes, irrespective of complaints by outsiders, so the nuclear program has been very useful. Even when Iran does not have nuclear weapons, Iran can use this image that it's making advances on the nuclear front to argue that Iran's position should be listened to carefully, that the tide of history is with it, and that Iran has every right to voice whatever opinion it wishes in meetings such as that in Geneva the other day.

[Mario Silva, Liberal, Davenport, ON]

What role do you foresee the International Atomic Energy Agency having in terms of monitoring and making sure that there is proper oversight? Has there been any movement by the International Atomic Energy Agency in terms of sending inspectors, for example, to take a look at what's happening?

[Patrick Clawson]

The International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors are a wonderful example of how important it is to work through the United Nations and its agencies to get people on the ground to investigate situations, in that what they have been able to find when they were able to make inspections has been a treasure trove of information about Iran's nuclear program. It has been much the same experience with the human rights inspectors sent to Iran, by the way, who found a great deal more information than we had otherwise.

Unfortunately, Iran is cooperating less and less with the International Atomic Energy Agency. It now is probably not even fulfilling the absolute minimum requirements. There's a dispute between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency about whether or not Iran is fulfilling the absolute minimum requirements, and I do mean minimum, for these inspections.

Whereas previously Iran better understood that openness did much to dispel concerns and was leading us towards some confidence that we had a handle on or an understanding of what Iran's program is like, now there's a lot of concern that Iran may in fact be trying to hide some covert activities and develop some capabilities similar to what it did during the 18 years before 2003, when, it is now acknowledged, it was doing things covertly.

[Mario Silva, Liberal, Davenport, ON]

The Security Council has pronounced on this issue. Have they insisted on sending inspectors?

[Patrick Clawson]

The Security Council has four times adopted resolutions sanctioning Iran. Indeed, Canada has been at the forefront of enforcing those, as the arrest last week of the gentleman in North York showed. Those UN sanctions have been targeted at the nuclear program and the missile program, and they have been quite effective at slowing down that program. Iran has encountered a number of bottlenecks to progress. In a number of cases, they've had to do workarounds that have slowed them down.

The Security Council sanctions have really been targeted at the nuclear and missile program. The council has not done very much about political sanctions designed to press the Iranian government to come back to the negotiating table.

[Mario Silva, Liberal, Davenport, ON]

Given the fact that we have heard--many times--the rhetoric from the president about wiping Israel off the face of the earth, and given the fact that they are developing nuclear possibilities, which present an incredible threat not just to Israel but to countries around the region, has there been also another pronouncement by the Security Council saying that Iran is violating the peace, security, and order of its neighbours?

[Patrick Clawson]

To gain unanimity of the Security Council, the focus has been on the lack of confidence in the purely peaceful intentions of Iran's nuclear program. By making that issue the centrepiece, it's been possible to get four resolutions adopted without a single country voting no. That has included Libya twice voting to sanction Iran.

But this has required keeping these resolutions very narrowly focused. The constant refrain in the resolutions is that Iran needs to suspend its activities--not to stop them, but to suspend them--until Iran has re-established international confidence in the purely peaceful intentions of its program. The position of some governments, including a number of European governments, has been to announce publicly that they do not see how they can have confidence in Iran's purely peaceful intentions so long as Iran's leaders continue to threaten the existence of another United Nations member, but that has certainly not been in the Security Council's resolutions.

However, I would think it would be a very useful formulation to say that to meet this condition the Security Council has set down about establishing confidence in the purely peaceful intentions will require that Iran clarify the meaning of the statement of its president threatening another United Nations member.

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

You still have time, Mr. Silva.

[Mario Silva, Liberal, Davenport, ON]

It is something that we have to emphasize when you have a regime that has displayed nuclear weapons during their military parades, with signs saying “Wipe Israel Off the Map”, and when you have the rhetoric from the president at the same time that they are building nuclear weapons. That is a real threat. That Iran has nuclear weapons is scary when they are also making such overt statements against Israel, statements about wiping Israel off the map. We have to figure out how to get a Security Council resolution that is specific on that issue, because there is an imminent danger to Israel with the nuclear threat coming from Iran.

[Patrick Clawson]

If you will permit me, sir, I have just one comment. We don't know that Iran is building the nuclear weapons yet. We know that it's building the material that's essential for nuclear weapons, and that would put Iran in a very good position to build nuclear weapons very quickly, but the actual additional step of building nuclear weapons may be something that Iran postpones until it has accumulated more of this material. I'm sorry to be such a stickler for words on this one, but after the experience with Iraq, there are many around the world, unfortunately, who think we exaggerate, so it is very much to our advantage to understate things.

Also, if I may make another comment, I personally worry more not about the hateful statements that Iran makes about wiping Israel off the map but about the hundreds of millions of dollars that Iran is spending to arm, train, and finance those organizations that are fighting to do exactly that, such as Hamas. We've seen in these last few weeks the Egyptian government complaining loudly about Iran's role in providing arms to Hamas and in preparing to attack innocent Israeli tourists in Egypt. Iran is not just making statements. They are carrying out very specific and deadly acts.

[Mario Silva, Liberal, Davenport, ON]

I think that's a very good point, but I'd also state that if we can't also get proper inspections.... If you remember back to when there were inspections for Iraq, for example, there was a clear pronouncement as well that they didn't think there were weapons of mass destruction. The report was actually quite accurate, as we know now. It was an administration that was making the point to the contrary.

That's why we need to have UN inspectors in there who don't belong to any particular country, UN inspectors who are acting on behalf of the UN and specifically the International Atomic Energy Agency, to make sure they are not going in that direction.

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

Perhaps we can treat that as a comment rather than a question, because your time has expired, Mr. Silva.

Mrs. Thi Lac, it is your turn.

[Ève-Mary Thaï Thi Lac, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot, QC]

Good afternoon, Mr. Clawson, and welcome. My questions are along the same lines as Mr. Silva's. But I am going to ask you some others. I would like some clarifications. We have talked about the threat of nuclear attack on the people of Israel.

Do you not feel that Israel is perhaps more in danger than the neighbouring states given the possibility that Iran could have an operational nuclear weapon, if not right now, then shortly?

[Patrick Clawson]

Again, Ahmadinejad, with his charming sense of understatement, has these grandiose ambitions. When UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was giving his farewell tour around the world and stopped in Tehran, The New York Times reported on the meeting that he held with Ahmadinejad, in which Ahmadinejad complained that the structures of the United Nations were too much based on the results of World War II and that the world had changed. Ahmadinejad went on to add that “Britain and America may have won the last world war, but we intend to win the next world war”. Kofi Annan was rather taken aback by that comment.

More realistically, I think that Iran's nuclear program is in many ways a dire national security threat to the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, which seem convinced that Iran would like to press them to take Iran's leadership in the area. Many of the countries in the region have expressed interest in starting their own nuclear programs in response to Iran's advances, and I'm sorry to report that the countries in the region have ordered more than a hundred billion dollars' worth of arms in the last three years, in what is a very destabilizing and disturbing arms race. This is not good for all of us, given that it's an area where so much of the world's oil is found.

So Iran's threats to its neighbours are quite realistic. Iran's world ambitions are exaggerated.

[Ève-Mary Thaï Thi Lac, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot, QC]

I would also like to know something else. Currently, that structure and those positions are staunchly defended by the political regime in power. What would happen if another president were to be elected in June? In terms of their nuclear program, will it be much the same or will there be major changes?

[Patrick Clawson]

The president in Iran has quite limited powers. The Supreme Leader is the man who really decides about questions of foreign affairs. For instance, when an agreement was reached in 2003 to suspend Iran's nuclear activities, the Iranian president at the time was not even informed about this agreement. It was signed by the representative of the Supreme Leader.

So the election of a new president is important primarily as an indication of which direction the Supreme Leader would like things to go. The Supreme Leader has much influence over how the election takes place. He has much influence over the results, the widespread allegations of considerable fraud, but even setting that aside, the Supreme Leader really dictates what kind of coverage there is in the newspapers and especially on television, and this really means that he dictates the results.

Among the three announced candidates besides the current president, I would say that at least two of those candidates have indicated that they think Ahmadinejad's stance is way too provocative and aggressive, but they have not indicated yet if they would change the objective. They would change the tone, but perhaps we should welcome the small step of changing the tone.

[Ève-Mary Thaï Thi Lac, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot, QC]

We know that the United States is currently providing significant leadership in the issue of nuclear energy in Iran. Since the election of Mr. Obama, have things changed a great deal or are the positions similar to those held by the Bush administration?

[Patrick Clawson]

The Bush administration was not prepared to offer Iran much in the way of incentives, even if Iran cooperated with the international community. That was a problem, because we want to make the choices for Iran very stark between the incentives it would get if it cooperated and the problems it would face if it did not cooperate. The Iranians felt that Mr. Bush was too tied down in Iraq to do anything negative to Iran, and they felt that Mr. Bush would not do anything positive towards Iran, so they didn't see much reason to reach an agreement with the Bush administration.

With the Obama administration, it's much more credible for the United States to be able to say they will provide incentives to Iran if it cooperates, and that's certainly been a factor, but so far, the bigger factor of change with the Obama administration is that the Obama administration has adopted a much more respectful tone and has adopted language that goes much more out of its way to show respect for Iran and its leaders, if I may put it that way.

Many Iranian commentators had said that Bush's insulting tone was a very big problem in relations between the United States and Iran, and, in fact, a very big problem for Iran overall in dealing with the nuclear issue. If that analysis is correct, then this change in tone should help.

[Ève-Mary Thaï Thi Lac, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot, QC]

I have one last question. You mentioned incentives and sanctions. I would like to know what the best kinds of incentives for Iran could be and what would be the best kinds of sanctions that the international community could impose.

[Patrick Clawson]

Well, we need to have more leverage with the Iranians, and one of the best ways to get leverage, frankly, is to have political unity in the international community. When Canada makes this tremendous effort at the General Assembly at the United Nations to get the resolutions condemning Iran's human rights practices approved, that has a real impact. It is perhaps as important in influencing Iranian leaders as any of the economic sanctions that we adopt.

The economic sanctions that we can consider may have some impact on Iran, but I frankly think that a political stance of unity is likely to have more.

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

Thank you very much.

We've used up the time for that round.

Go ahead, Mr. Marston, please.