Thank you for inviting me.
I will do a little presentation and leave time for questions and answers, if there are any.
Thirty years ago a regime based on the negation of human rights was established in Iran. The Islamic Republic of Iran consolidated itself at the cost of thousands of lives. The long list of tens of thousands of known victims attests to the systematic violence that spared no social, political, ethnic, or religious group—high school and university students, teachers, housewives, generals, clerics, ordinary cops, Sunni Muslims, Shia Muslims, Muslims who had converted to other religions, Bahá'ís, Christians, Zoroastrians, Jews, Kurds, Turkmans, Azerbaijanis, French citizens, Argentine citizens, and the list goes on. Even Salman Rushdie's Japanese translator, who was stabbed in his university in Japan, was not immune from the terror that aimed to silence dissent inside and outside the country and preserve the image of rulers in perfect harmony with those they rule.
Iran also has been an important regional actor in the past three decades. More recently, it has preoccupied the international community with its nuclear ambitions. The record of its human rights violations, however, rarely makes the headlines. The Iranian leadership has successfully deterred the international community from consistently supporting human rights defenders and pro-democracy movements and distracted governments from focusing on human rights issues. Through threats, violence, prosecution, and prison, it has also deterred many Iranians from seeking support from the international community. It has done so confident that there would be little consequence and that these actions would at best get short-lived attention.
In a context of steady deterioration and increasing violence, this seems to be a pretty grim picture. In fact, during the past few years the number of executions has been at a record high. Our organization has documented reports of 468 executions in 2007, 381 executions in 2008, and 195 executions so far in 2009. To this you can add close to 400 deaths in shootings, in clashes with the security forces, and in very suspicious circumstances in 2007, 300 in 2008, and 101 so far in 2009.
The situation of students hasn't been any better. In 2007 there were more than 600 summons either to courts or to the university disciplinary committees for students who have used their right to freedom of expression, have written, have protested, or have presented grievances. So far this year there have been 155 arrests, 26 summons to courts, and 17 cases of imprisonment. In universities, there were 164 cases of summons, 76 expulsions, and 70 suspensions.
This is a pretty grim picture, but there are also many positive indicators. There is a vibrant civil society, which over the past decades has shown increasing interest in human rights. Civil society outside Iran, governments that include human rights as a component of their foreign policies, and the media can help make the change durable.
The Islamic republic leaders, with a successful long strategy, have exported their ideas and built a constituency outside Iran where the lack of legitimacy is less obvious. Positive as well as negative developments in Iran have an impact beyond its borders. Therefore, the international community should not exclude human rights promotion in Iran from its agenda. On the contrary, it should focus its attention on details that allow a better understanding of the patterns of human rights violations and a more accurate analysis.
For example, many among you heard about the arrest and release of the Iranian-American journalist Roxanna Saberi. Most of you have probably not heard of the Kurdish women's rights activist Dana Boyasi, who was arrested in Kurdistan, or Mohammad Pourabdullah, a young student who was arrested after protesting about the burial of war martyrs in the university courtyard along with 70 others in March and who is still in solitary confinement and has been reportedly beaten and is in poor health. Behrouz Javid Tehrani, another student who was arrested during the rioting in the student protest of 1999, is in very poor health also and has been long forgotten.
You may also have heard about the closure of the office of the Nobel Peace Prize winner Shirin Ebadi, but what you may not know is that Ebadi and lawyers in her NGO were part of a committee for healthy, free, and fair elections who had called in November 2008 for electoral reforms underlining the incompatibility of Iranian laws and practices with international standards. The government's particular sensitivity regarding those who criticize the electoral laws or promote the boycott of the elections doesn't always get the attention it deserves. That is why very few knew that the young Kurd, Shivan Qaderi, who was killed by the security forces, had actively promoted the boycott of the 2005 presidential elections. Similarly, scores of students punished for criticizing electoral laws and calling for boycotts or a referendum on the constitution are rarely mentioned, let alone supported.
Similarly, there is rare mention of the laws on political parties voted in 1981, which eliminated from the country's political life an overwhelming majority of Iranian citizens. Abas Khorsandi, a political activist, is serving a nine-year sentence for creating the Iran Democratic Party, a party whose constitution is fully compatible with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. His crime is having created an illegal political party.
There are many other significant examples that could help understand the pattern of repression in Iran. The execution last summer of Yaqoub Mehr-Nahad, a young activist who had created an association in Baluchistan with a focus on discrimination and accountability, is a sad example, as is that of his 15-year-old brother Ibrahim, who is now serving a five-year sentence for having tried to give visibility to his brother's case.
The Islamic republic authorities act with impunity and do not tolerate any attempt to hold them accountable. The activities in the area of women's rights, which were once tolerated and hence better known outside Iran, are now leading to prosecutions and prison sentences. These episodes of repression are too often attributed to Ahmadinejad's presidency rather than to the nature of civil society's demands, which the government tries to dissimulate by criminalizing the activities of rights defenders, journalists, and academics.
Criminalizing dissent and coercing confessions are not new in the Islamic republic. Early on the new revolutionary leadership eliminated dissidents, accusing them of spying or being agents of foreign powers. It pushed the absurdity to the point of calling Iranian Marxist Leninists American grouplets. Today rights advocates are accused of acts against national security and charged with publicity against the Islamic republic if they dare share information with the outside world. This attitude is symptomatic of the government's apprehension of attempts by Iranians outside the ruling elite to organize and promote ideas and legal changes that question the legitimacy of the Islamic republic's main tenets.
To prevent the flow of information the authorities isolate human rights defenders, journalists, and dissidents or pressure them into leaving the country. In exile these advocates often lack financial resources and the necessary language skills to effectively continue their activities. The government can easily accuse them of working with foreign powers and make it costly for their allies in Iran to work and communicate with them. The international community, if interested at all, rapidly loses interest in these activists. Most of them, that is most of us, become irrelevant to those interested in Iran.
The government has also successfully used the nuclear issue to distract the international community. Last September, for example, Ahmadinejad was given remarkable visibility in New York and no alternative views were presented to the American public. Ahmadinejad went back home boasting about the fact that the media was begging for interviews and that Iran's government was praised for its inclusion of the Iranian people in the scene.
Over the past years, the international community has not been consistent enough in its interest; it has been narrow in its focus and sometimes lax on definitions and principles. Details, laws, and discourses inside Iran have been neglected, except for sporadic human rights reports. Supporters of reform outside Iran paid little attention to President Khatami's government's inconsistencies, and hence did not foresee the failure of the reform movement.
In a context of increased violence and militarization, this state of affairs seems hopeless. Experts often talk about Iranians' apathy, but general apathy can hardly justify the increasing number of arrests and prosecutions, which in fact indicate a positive trend. So there are many positive indicators. Human rights defenders refer to human rights and universal values more often and more systematically than they used to in the 1960s or 1970s. In fact, human rights defenders were rare in the 1960s and 1970s.
Young Iranians are not drawn to radical ideologies or armed resistance in the face of government repression. They reject violence, for the most part, and look for alternative ways to bring about change. The One Million Signatures campaign is a very good example of this effort, as are various student movements. Mehr-Nahad, and his organization's non-violent effort to call for the end of discrimination and accountability in a region plagued by violence, like Balúchistán, is another example.
The other positive indicator relates to ordinary Iranians, who are more accessible and more receptive to the language of human rights. The massive participation in the 1997 elections, or the attention given today to reformist candidates, was a response to the language used by Khatami in his campaign. Today, again, candidates who include human rights in their discourse and campaign get good public attention.
The existence of modern technology is another good indicator that allows access to the Iranian people and gives the Iranian people the means to access the outside world. The Iranian government cannot afford to shut off completely the Internet and isolate businesses and universities. Young Iranians are technologically savvy and manage to overturn the obstacles created by the government and the filtering created by the government.
Another positive indicator is the Islamic republic itself. The Islamic republic has never totally dismissed human rights. Though the leaders rejected these rights as a western plot, they did not withdraw from the conventions ratified by the Iranian Parliament before the revolution. They have often denied access to human rights monitors, but have adopted the language, created an Islamic Human Rights Commission and a human rights headquarters in the judiciary, for example. The Iranian leaders refer to rights and freedoms when they travel outside Iran and try to project the image of rulers in harmony with their people; hence their dislike of reporting human rights violations.
Human rights monitoring does act as a deterrent, so it is not surprising to hear statements such as “We don't cut thieves' hands in Iran because when we do so we become the subject of human rights discussions outside Iran”. This is the representative of the spiritual leader in Shiraz, who also expressed a hope that some day we will cut hands everywhere in the world.
The ambiguity that characterizes Iran's attitude towards human rights opens a space, albeit small, for progress. But all the above are not enough in the face of the government criminalizing efforts aimed at acts organizing and promoting human rights. Denying freedom of expression and most importantly campaigning against universalism are also serious obstacles that Iranians cannot overcome without the support of the international community.
Since I have your attention, I would like to perhaps make a few recommendations on how you can help and the international community can help the human rights situation in Iran. Of course, as a historian, I always yearn for consistency and follow-up. There should be long-term programs to support the work of human rights defenders, and these programs should be inclusive. These programs should focus on lesser-known activists who work in more isolated and difficult regions and whose work of promoting human rights is the most challenging. Give visibility to crackdowns and publicize what exactly triggered them. Follow up as long as activists are in prison. Investigate laws and practices that exclude the majority of Iranians and focus on impunity of the security forces.
Of course, if you know us better, your work of promoting human rights will also improve. If you train translators who can read Farsi and who can read our newspapers and reports from Iran and who can allow you not to depend on us as your only source of information, your work will improve.
Be true to your values. Iranians who promote universal values rely on your support. Their advocacy is undermined and their morale affected if they feel that the human rights community and democratic governments do not uphold international standards. We do have the same rights and the same needs. Insist on freedom of association and expression, for example. Most importantly, fight back the government's propaganda and take possession of the agenda. The Islamic republic does not often play by the rules. Human rights defenders do need full moral and financial backing, so there is a need to fight back the government's propaganda regarding foreign supports to human rights activists. Rather than defending against the accusation of velvet revolutions and regime change, move the debate to Iran's reason for arresting activists. Focus on laws related to the right to create association and promote ideas and laws on political parties and elections. Focus on excluded Iranians, including practising Muslims. Remind the Islamic republic that the reason for arresting a human rights defender is not due to criminal activities, but it is an effort to hide their despicable record and the Iranian people's view. Don't let the Islamic republic call the shots on what the international community can support and what it cannot.
Finally, keep us relevant. The international community should discourage the government from pushing human rights defenders and journalists into exile by keeping those who leave relevant. To do so, you can provide them with the necessary means to continue their work effectively outside the country and make the government policy too costly. By keeping us relevant, you will also help us be more effective.
I am going to end here. I hope this will be an introduction to questions, if you have any.
