Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Ladies and gentlemen, I'm sorry to be late. I came from Kingston earlier, so I was wandering in the central building.
My presentation is going to be in French, but I would be more than willing to entertain any questions in English.
I'm going to concentrate, basically, on the issue that I'm asked to do, human rights in Iran. If you are interested, I can react to what Mr. Comras mentioned, in terms of his ideas on how to influence the Iranian regime.
The issue of respect for human rights has always been a source of tension between the Iranian state and Iranian society. It has also always been linked to political arrests and has always shaped relations between the state and society. That is nothing new in Iran; it was going on before the revolution. It has been going on for hundreds of years.
If we look at the country's history, we can see, for example, that the constitutional revolution at the beginning of the 20th century was in fact an attempt to enforce human rights and to weaken the absolute power of the state so that people would be more involved in the decision-making process. The country was in the same boat in the 1950s. The conflict between the state and society focused on the participation of the people and respect for human rights. Things were similar in the 1960s, when people revolted and violence was used to suppress those revolts, which were aimed at improving people's living situations. It was the same in the 1970s until 1978-1979, when the revolution broke out. Ultimately, on February 12, 1979, the revolution known as the Islamic revolution was successful.
In other words, all of these events had one thing in common: Iranian society was seeking a better quality of life, specifically, the protection of human rights. That struggle has been going on since the 1979 revolution and has undergone some changes along the way, which we will come back to. So the goal is still to oppose the excesses of the government and to demand that Iranians receive a fairer share of resources.
In theory, the 1979 revolution was in response to the events of the past century. Specifically, its purpose was to restore respect and dignity to individuals and their communities. The three main slogans of the 1979 revolution—independence, freedom and Islamic republic—symbolized what Iranians were seeking. First, they were seeking independence, not only from foreign powers, but also from the government, which was repressing civil society. Second, they were seeking freedom of expression, of demonstration and so forth. And third, they were seeking an Islamic republic, where the legitimacy of the republic was granted by its people. Those three slogans more or less sum up what Iranian society has been seeking throughout its history.
In short, this attempt to improve living conditions, to enforce human rights and to take back the management of society was at the heart of the revolution, and still is today.
Generally speaking, the rights issue has two important parts. First, the individual aspect, whereby a person is granted rights under the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, such as the right to housing and education, or the right to express oneself freely without fear of repression.
Other rights were going to be enacted and set out by the law.
The second part has to do with collective rights, which I mentioned earlier. Those are the rights that individuals have within their community and that they enjoy beyond their individual rights. For example, religious minorities, be they Muslim or not, Jewish, Christian, Zoroastrian or other, now have representatives within the Iranian Parliament, in accordance with Iran's constitution. Those are collective rights.
In reality, despite what the constitution says, the interpretation of those same rights is, of course, up to the courts and individuals. As a result, interpretations are sometimes contradictory and seriously hinder people's use of those rights, even though they are set out in the Iranian constitution. I have identified a number of factors that may explain this anomaly.
First, there are no powerful institutions able to resist the pressure of political agents and, of course, interest groups. Iran in 2009 must be seen in the Iranian context. In other words, we must not expect that Canadian institutions will be imported by Iran and will run smoothly. It is a third world country that is struggling to solve its problems. One of its main problems, in my view, is precisely that weakness of its institutions. They are vulnerable.
There is also the non-separation of powers and the judiciary's financial dependence on the executive and legislative authorities. In a number of cases, we have seen that judges are under external pressure. They are, to some extent, forced to render decisions that are not necessarily consistent with their responsibilities. Even though the separation of powers exists on paper, it is not applied.
We also see interference by members of the executive authority in the legal system. For instance, the police, who should, in theory, be the agents of the legal system, often impose rules that are not necessarily set out in the law. In other words, the police is sometimes more powerful than the judges.
The manipulation of centres of power and interest is yet another phenomenon. People with power intervene to tip the scales in their favour. And then there is discrimination. In certain fields of employment and with respect to bank loans and other such areas, people are discriminated against. And, of course, that practice is openly criticized by the Iranian people.
The last factor is the weakness of civil society and non-governmental organizations in the face of an all-powerful government.
But beyond what I have just briefly presented, you must not think that Iranian society is a docile society that has resigned itself to the excesses of the government, if you will. On the contrary, it is a vibrant society. As you may know, approximately 75% of Iran's population is under 39 years of age. That is a vibrant population that is demanding its rights by holding student, women's and sometimes minority demonstrations, and so on.
If we take an overall look at Iranian society since 1979, we see that there has been some progress, despite the repression and everything we hear about in the news and in stories. That is a very encouraging picture of a society that is trying to return to the values of the revolution: independence, freedom and its role as a source of legitimacy.
Obviously, in no way does that mean that there is no repression. There is. If we compare the Iranian revolution of 1979 to 2009 to the most famous revolutions in history such as the Soviet revolution of 1917 in Russia and the French Revolution, often called the mother of all revolutions, to the situation in Nicaragua in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and to the events in the Philippines when Marcos left power, we can see that during the 30 years of the Iranian revolution, Iran has made great strides that the French and Russians did not achieve for more than 70 years.
We need only compare the situation today, including the state of human rights, with the excesses that immediately followed the revolution. That means that there is a constant struggle between civil society and those in power. In my view, those in power are backing down. In other words, they are yielding to the advancements of civil society. And that is why I am relatively optimistic about the evolution of Iranian society.
What can we do to improve the situation? I think that the international community, including Canada, has a role to play, but that role has to be balanced by the reality. We have to take into account the Iranian reality and what Iranians want.
Contrary to what many think, I believe the first and most important step is to engage Iran in a dialogue. Since Mr. Obama came to power, the Iranian regime and regime hardliners, in particular, have been on the defensive. Just listen to the remarks made by the supreme leader, Ahmadinejad and others. People who are not very familiar with Iranian society think that the leader wields 80% of the power, and the president, 20%, plain and simple.
There are easily at least 11 centres of power in Iran. In other words, power in Iran is not concentrated in the hands of a few individuals, Khamenei or Ahmadinejad. If you're interested, we could come back to this topic a little later.
Since President Obama's comments, there has been a subtle, implicit change in the discourse of Iranian leaders. That is why I say that they are on the defensive. When Mr. Bush was in office, I often said, while in Iran as well as to the Canadian and foreign media, that if the Americans were serious about bringing change to the country's government, they should engage in a dialogue with the Iranian regime.
By isolating the Iranian regime, you merely play into the hands of the most extremist factions in Iran. That is exactly what they want. Ahmadinejad's comments are not about Israel. He knows full well that he does not have the capability of wiping Israel off the world map. His views on the Holocaust have been denounced by many people in Iran. It is important to look at what the people in power are saying, including Khatami and Rafsanjani, instead of focusing solely on media reports. I urge you to read the comments that have been made and to take a look at what is happening in Iranian society. All you need to do is watch the televised debates that have been taking place over the past few days in Iran. Without exception, the three—