Subcommittee on International Human Rights Committee on June 11th, 2009

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

Thank you.

Mr. Hiebert, please.

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Comras, I appreciate your explanation and detailed list of possible sanctions that Canada or Japan or other countries could take against Iran. You also mentioned that the U.S. has basically exhausted its options when it comes to sanctions. They have done pretty much everything they could do. What impact are those sanctions having?

[Victor Comras]

I think the U.S. sanctions are having an impact. They're mostly having an impact in boardrooms in Europe and around the world, and causing a much greater caution with respect to Iran from the international financial community. That has had a significant impact, but it's an insufficient impact to realize the objectives we have of convincing the Iranian regime to put at least some halt to its movement towards nuclear weapons capability, towards its uranium enrichment program.

I think these measures serve as a good template for others to join in. If others do join in, that might bring us up to the threshold necessary to convince the Iranian regime that it has to comply with international norms.

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

They're putting pressure on the leadership in Iran, but insufficient pressure in your perspective. Are they having an impact on the average Iranian? Is the average Iranian blaming the government for the imposition of these foreign sanctions and thus being motivated to try to change the regime?

[Victor Comras]

I don't think that's the case. I think most of the people in Iran recognize that it is the Iranian government's own failed economic policies that have caused most of the hardship in terms of unemployment and the downturn in the Iranian economy, as has the oil situation.

I think sanctions have not yet reached that threshold where they can be blamed for creating the economic difficulties Iran is facing. They're insufficient for that. U.S. sanctions have been around for so long now that, as I said, they've been digested. President Clinton reinstated a full range of sanctions in 1995. Since then, Iran has substituted in just about every respect for any way in which lack of American products and services has caused them any hardship. Unfortunately, they've also developed ways of circumventing the American sanctions. Hewlett Packard, for example, is still the favourite printer to be found in Iran. It's acquired through Dubai. Many other U.S. products still find their way to Iran through third-country intermediaries.

Again, I don't think the U.S. sanctions have had that impact.

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

I appreciate your comment about the importance of having leverage in dialogue. You always need a plan B. But I begin to wonder, if the current sanctions haven't been effective—and they have been substantial, the U.S. is a large trading partner and it can have a tremendous impact on any country in the world—whether or not additional sanctions from smaller countries would move it to the tipping point where it would make that significant difference that the regime would change.

I'm also wondering if the electorate is not attributing their hardship to sanctions and whether additional sanctions would actually increase the likelihood of an uprising within the country.

I'll let you comment on those if you choose. Also, is there anything preventing Europe from proceeding with sanctions? Is it a lack of political will? Is there a reciprocal relationship that prevents them? What's the prevention on their side?

[Victor Comras]

I don't think there's anything that prevents Europe from imposing sanctions on Iran. I know that is a matter of continued debate and discussion within European circles. President Sarkozy and Prime Minister Brown have both indicated that sanctions may well be necessary against Iran, and have at times tried to convince their European partners to move ahead on sanctions.

There was a time in the last administration when it appeared European sanctions would actually be put in place. That was the time when the CIA report came out and was misunderstood internationally as saying that Iran was not in fact pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. That undercut, at that moment, the political will on the part of many European leaders to move ahead. In fact, Europe's difficulty with sanctions is that they are also suffering from an economic recession and that sanctions always entail not only an effect on the recipient state but a foreclosing of business on the part of the European states. Some countries that are major partners with Iran in trade, such as Germany, Italy, and Austria, have been reluctant to force their own businesses to cut those relationships.

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

Very understandable.

We've talked a little bit about the youthful demographic in Iran. Some projections indicate that 70% of the population is less than 30, that nearly half the electorate that will be voting tomorrow is under 30. Do you anticipate that this youthful demographic will bring about a change in leadership, that perhaps it will be a form of quiet revolution as they begin to exert their influence, and have different expectations from those of their elders?

[Victor Comras]

I won't pretend to be an expert on the internal political dynamics of Iran. I'm always an optimist that the youth will bring about change, in time. Whether that will happen within my lifetime, I certainly can't say.

I am not optimistic that this election will mark a significant change in Iranian policies. I am doubtful that we will see anything new on the uranium enrichment program, any steps that are more forthcoming. We should wait for signals--and I hope that I'm wrong, but so far those signals are markedly lacking from both candidates--that they would be able or be willing to undertake a significant dialogue and to at least suspend their work on uranium enrichment or missile development.

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

Mr. Hassan-Yari, I was a little bit surprised at your comment suggesting that the dialogue that the U.S. is currently engaging in with Iran is actually putting the leadership on the defensive. I hadn't heard that before. I was wondering if you could provide further proof or evidence of that, because in fact I see the exact opposite. My sense from all the testimony that we've heard is that, if anything, this pretense of dialogue is providing them a cover to continue their nuclear enrichment activities. It's simply buying them time to do what they would do otherwise, and they're playing foreign nations as fools in attempting to simply limit themselves to dialogue. What evidence can you provide us that this is actually putting them on the defensive?

[Dr. Houchang Hassan-Yari]

Thank you for the question.

When I talk about dialogue, obviously dialogue should have a framework, not just for the sake of talking to Iranians, but to establish a framework where you are looking for something and they are looking for something in order to advance the cause.

If you look at the discourse of the candidates--those three, again, putting Ahmadinejad aside, because we know what his position is--the three are talking about the necessity to talk to the international community about the nuclear issue. All of them, including Ahmadinejad, are in favour of mastering the technology. This is a right, they say: based on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, this is a right. Many people, including Mr. Obama, I believe.... On the way here I was reading the headline that Senator Kerry also is in favour of enrichment for Iran. It means there are rights, there are obligations.

What is absolutely important, really, is engaging Iranians in a very frank, very open—not clandestine, not as it has happened sometimes in the past—dialogue, where you air your concerns and you ask Iranians to put on the table whatever they have as sources of concerns, and you put yours. Then you talk based on those concerns.

I believe you asked if there is any trace or tangible evidence to show they are on the defensive. Yes, you can do that. You can easily find it. This is why it's really crucial to read what they say and what they do. If you look at the discourse of Khamenei's leaders during President Bush's time, whenever Bush said something positive—in rare moments, maybe—Khamenei immediately rejected any positive step that George Bush might have proposed. If you compare Khamenei's position to what Obama is talking about, you see that he is in a very uncomfortable position. For example, recently in the city of Mashhad, before the campaign got into this heated phase that we see, he was intervening. He was actually pre-empting what Obama was going to say in Cairo. He said that the words were good, because he had heard Obama before. He had heard the message he sent to the Iranians for the Iranian New Year. He said the words were good, they were pleasant, but they needed some action.

In other words, if you compare this with what he used to say about the American presidents prior to Obama, it was a simple refusal of any kind of dialogue with those people, because for him—as I mentioned earlier—he loved George Bush, he loved Reagan, he loved McCain when he said bomb, bomb, bomb, because that was really music to his ears.

So yes, you can see that if you look closely at what they say. They are clearly in a very difficult situation. You can see that.

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

Thank you.

I allowed that round to go on basically long enough to take up both the seven minutes and the supplementary five, so I'm simply going to allow one final question, and that will go to Ms. Mendes.

[Alexandra Mendes, Liberal, Brossard—La Prairie, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Dr. Hassan-Yari, I have a question for you about the vulnerability of Iranian institutions.

First of all, why do you say that these institutions are vulnerable and what can be done to ensure that they are more respectful of the needs of the Iranian people?

[Dr. Houchang Hassan-Yari]

That is an excellent question. The country's institutions are indeed vulnerable. Remember that it took Canada several decades, if not several centuries perhaps to forge the kind of institution that is reflected here in this room. Things were different initially.

The same can be said for France, the United States and all other countries. I'm not comparing everything, simply from the standpoint of structure. The situation is what it is. When I refer to the vulnerability of Iranian institutions, I'm referring for instance to the freely elected Parliament. Elections are considered free elections once candidates have been screened by the Guardian Council.

Yet, Parliament is not assuming its role, the one assigned to it by the people, which is to represent them. For example, with the sixth parliament, the reform parliament, came to power several years ago, either in 1997 or 1998, its first act was to revise the law respecting the media. Parliament wanted to abolish censorship and eliminate pressures on reporters and the media. The very day that Parliament began discussing the legislation, Leader Khamenei wrote a letter that was read immediately by one of the current candidates, Mr. Karoubi, who was the speaker of the Parliament at the time. The letter was very clear. Khamenei asked Parliament in a briefly worded letter to suspend the debate. And Parliament complied with the request. That decision went against the Iranian constitution. Mr. Karoubi maintained that because a State order had been issued, the debate must be suspended. And the debate was suspended, even though members were none too pleased about it. This issue has continued to haunt Mr. Karoubi during the current election campaign. Therefore, certain individuals in Parliament are vulnerable because they put a stop to a completely democratic and legitimate movement.

[Alexandra Mendes, Liberal, Brossard—La Prairie, QC]

Regarding the case of Canadian photographer Kazemi who was assassinated in an Iranian prison, do you feel that the vulnerable state of legal institutions, including the courts, is responsible in some way for the guilty parties having acted with impunity and for the Iranian state's failure to punish the guilty party for an offence committed against a Canadian citizen? Does the vulnerability of your institutions extend that far?

[Dr. Houchang Hassan-Yari]

Iran does not recognize dual citizenship. I am a Canadian and an Iranian. As soon as I set foot on Iranian soil, I am no longer a Canadian. That is why Ms. Kazemi was considered under Iranian law to be an Iranian citizen, not a Canadian. I'm very happy that you asked that question because it illustrates what I have been trying to say, namely that power is not in the hands of any one person, but rather is shared.

Ms. Kazemi's assassination was investigated by the government of then President Khatami. I also used the word “assassination“ when I was in Tehran. President Khatami set up a commission of inquiry which found that Ms. Kazemi had been killed while in prison and that someone was responsible for her death. The government in power at the time called upon the judiciary to find the guilty party.

The executive did its job and turned the report over to another authority so that it could do its job. It failed for the simple reason that the person charged with or suspected of having committed the crime was Mr. Mortazavi, a young judge who had expressed an interest in pursing his studies in Canada. Apparently, he was the person who was going to be charged, or dragged before the courts. Its seems that he had the Leader's ear or support and his arrest could ultimately have called into question the Leader's authority.

Do you understand what I'm trying to say? In Iran, there are red lines that no one can cross. This was one such red line. Any Iranian, whether or not he supports the regime, will tell you that what President Khatami did clearly proves my contention that institutions are vulnerable. The good news is that because the power structure is heterogeneous, not homogenous, it denounces its actions from within. Obviously, President Khatami was not in a position to bring Ms. Kazemi back to life. However, her death did not go unnoticed.

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Sweet has just signalled to me that he'd like to ask one question. Can we seek the indulgence of the committee in allowing that?

Go ahead, Mr. Sweet.

[David Sweet, Conservative, Ancaster—Dundas—Flamborough—Westdale, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We had an opportunity to hear Professor Hassan-Yari's opinion of Mr. Comras's testimony vis-à-vis sanctions. I thought that to finish up Mr. Comras could give us some insight into his opinion regarding Mr. Hassan-Yari's testimony, which was counter to what Mr. Comras testified would be effective.

[Victor Comras]

Thank you.

From what I've heard, the thesis has been put forth that in dealing with the serious problems we are facing with respect to Iran—its threats to international peace and security, its government's threats against the state of Israel, and its nuclear weapons development program—we should rely solely on the goodwill of the Iranian people to put limitations on the Iranian government to ensure that either it doesn't proceed along any of these lines, or if it does develop nuclear weapons or a nuclear weapons capability, the goodwill of the people of Iran will act as a sufficient constraint on the government to stop it from ever posing these threats to international peace and security. Frankly, I don't buy that thesis.

Sanctions aren't meant to hurt people; sanctions are meant to influence government policies. Sometimes people are hurt, and that is an unintended, and sometimes very tragic, consequence. Someone cited the 500,000 children who died in Iraq. A number of children did die in Iraq. They didn't die because of the sanctions; they died because of the acts of Saddam Hussein and the way in which he responded to the sanctions. The Ahtisaari report ensured that all humanitarian goods, foodstuffs, civilian items, and medical equipment were always available to Iraq. It was Iraq who chose not to buy them with the funds available to it under the oil-for-food program, but rather to build palaces, to re-arm itself surreptitiously, and to re-fortify a number of its concerns. So sanctions aren't really the cause. It was the way in which Saddam Hussein responded to them, I think, that was the cause.

But sanctions do cause harm. They put pressure on people; they put pressure on institutions. They need to be wisely applied, and they can be wisely applied to affect those entities and individuals who are the key supporters, the financial supporters, of this regime. At the same time, they can be used to help convince the people on the street that the regime is not acting in their interest and that they need to do more.

I think the situation in Iran is a little closer to the situation we saw in Serbia than it is to the situation we saw in Iraq. In Serbia we had a leader, Mr. Milosevic, but we had also certain democratic institutions and people in Serbia who were affected very harshly by the sanctions and who in turn were motivated by those sanctions to dispose of Mr. Milosevic and to turn him over to The Hague.

I think the pressure from the people and the threat to the regime itself that will come from that—by targeting the regime itself and by instituting further pressure on the part of the people against that regime—may well create enough of a risk factor for the regime that it will recognize it needs to change its policies. I don't think we have time to wait until the long term, when we see this new generation of Iranian youth—and maybe the next one—come to maturity and eventually influence the situation. By then, too many drastic situations and crises may have developed.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

Thank you to both of our witnesses. We're very grateful that you took the time to meet with us, especially on short notice. I think you've really assisted us in our hearings.

The meeting is now adjourned.