Subcommittee on International Human Rights Committee on Oct. 27th, 2009

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

I call the meeting to order.

This is the 33rd meeting of the Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

It is October 27, 2009. We continue our investigation into human rights in Iran. We have two witnesses today. Mojtaba Mahdavi is a professor in the department of political science at the University of Alberta; Renee Redman is the executive director of the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center.

I invite both of you to begin your testimony. Whoever would like to start can do so.

[Dr. Mojtaba Mahdavi, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Alberta, As an Individual]

Thanks for inviting me. It's a great pleasure to be here.

We are here to see how we can help Iran's democratic movement. That's the basic concern and question. For that reason, let me briefly say a few words about the nature of Iran's democratic movement as I see it. Then I will be more than happy to have a dialogue with you in the question-and-answer part.

What is happening these days is an authentic grassroots, bottom-up, social and political movement for democracy and human rights. It's a civil rights movement. It's not a velvet revolution; it's not even a revolution. It's a truly authentic social-political movement, and a popular one. This movement is at least a century old in Iran. It began with the 1905 Constitutional Revolution. In the 1950s came Mossadegh's movement for establishing a parliamentary democracy and nationalizing the oil industry; in 1979 came the anti-despotic movement, and then the 1997 reform movement, and just recently the unprecedented and unique green movement of June 2009.

We are all aware of this great history, but let me share a few words with you on the major lessons one needs to learn from such an impressive wave of democratic movement.

The first lesson is that Iran has always been at the forefront of progressive movements in the Middle East, and I think this is very important. Iran has always been a pioneer of change, of radical paradigm shift, in this region. In 1905 Iran was the first country in the region to fight for a constitutional monarchy. In the 1950s, Iran, under the leadership of Mohammad Mossadegh, had the first anti-colonial nationalist movement in the region and established a secular liberal democracy. In 1979 the great revolution brought together all forces against the Shah's despotism and imperialism.

Of course, post-revolutionary politics were different. In many ways, post-revolutionary politics betrayed the actual goals of the revolution. In 1997 the children of the revolution actually challenged the authorities, the Islamic Republic of Iran; basically, they challenged the authority in the electoral process. It was the first attempt, a very peaceful attempt, to challenge the Islamic hard-liners. Recently, in June 2009, once again the people used the only possible venue to voice their minimum demands, and we know what happened then.

This is simply to suggest that we have at least a one-century-old movement for democracy, human rights, and social justice in Iran, so this is not simply new.

The second lesson, very briefly, that one needs to draw from Iran's waves of democracy and democratization is that, in my opinion, the solution comes from within. We should really believe in the people. Unfortunately, if we look at the history of Iran, in many cases, if not all, most often external forces were, if not destructive, not really helpful to the waves of democratic movement in Iran. There were Russia and Britain in 1905; Britain, the U.S., and the Soviets in the 1950s; the United States in the 1970s; the United States under President George Bush and the neo-conservatives in 1997; and in 2009 there were other external forces.

The realpolitik of some western countries that simply don't care much about democracy and human rights as a first priority when it comes to economic and political interests are definitely a major obstacle. It's good to know that it was neither the President George Bush regime change policy, economic sanctions, nor even boycotting the election that contributed to this democratic movement. It was people's participation, and people's participation from within will guarantee the success of this movement.

So if this is the case, we should say no to military attacks on Iran by western countries or even hard-liner Israelis. We should say no to economic sanctions on Iran, because they would simply be a collective punishment. In any kind of military attack the first casualty would be the Iranian people and the democratic movement, because the hard-liners would simply use this militarization of politics and play the nationalist card.

We should say yes to putting human rights on the agenda of the negotiations and dialogue with Iran. The focus and attention should not be on Iran's nuclear ambitions or the regime's rhetoric toward Israel and even the Holocaust, because that is exactly what the hard-liners want. They want to shift the focus and attention away from the democratic movement and human rights to a more nationalistic agenda.

In my view, the west should not play in this field and should not play with this card of the hard-liners. I understand this is difficult, but that's the first and foremost priority of Iran. The Iranian democratic movement needs the social, moral, and spiritual support of western society's governments and NGOs. But it will be harmed by any kind of military attack or economic sanction.

I should stop there. I will be happy to share my thoughts with you on the questions asked.

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

Thank you very much, Professor.

Madam Redman, would you like to begin?

[Renee C. Redman, Executive Director, Iran Human Rights Documentation Center]

Thank you very much for inviting me.

I am the executive director of the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, and I have submitted a statement, but I wanted to say a few words as well.

We are right now in the throes of an investigation while preparing a report on the human rights abuses that followed the June 12 presidential elections in Iran. While the human rights situation has fallen from the headlines and we are not seeing massive demonstrations—in the west, anyway—it continues, and in fact there's reason to believe that the human rights situation has become worse since June and July.

There is not much reliable information right now, as I'm sure you know. Foreign journalists are essentially barred from operating within Iran. Domestic journalists are being arrested, and we have received word that many are on their way out of the country. Some have already managed to leave the country. This is not a good sign.

In September, three organizations that were investigating prisoner abuses were closed down: the Association to Defend Prisoners Rights, as well as the two campaign offices of the two major opposition figures, Mousavi and Karoubi.

We see four areas of concern right now. These are not new to Iran, and that's one thing I'd like to say, that how the Iranian government is reacting to expressions of dissent and calls for more democracy is not surprising. These are methods that they've used since the revolution—and probably before. The four areas are the demonstrations, the arrests and imprisonments, the trials, and the executions.

The demonstrations, of course, went on pretty much until the end of July. There have been a few after that. They were brutally put down: people were killed, people were hurt. The Government of Iran states that 27 people were killed in connection with the demonstrations. Reliable sources put the number at 72. We believe it's probably actually much greater than that.

Many demonstrators were arrested. However, other people were also arrested and continue to be arrested. Journalists were arrested; lawyers were arrested; leaders of human rights organizations, women's rights organizations, and Kurdish rights organizations were arrested; and students were arrested. Recently, earlier this week, 60 members of the Islamic Iran Participation Front were also arrested. This is not even a party; it's an opposition movement. So we're still watching these arrests go on.

Once people are in prison in Iran, the political prisoners are subject to very harsh conditions, often including torture. They're interrogated. They spend lengthy periods in solitary confinement. They often are not allowed to speak with their lawyers or their families. We're seeing a lot of pleas and demonstrations lately by family members and lawyers asking to have contact with their clients.

People do die in prison in Iran on a fairly regular basis, I hate to say it, for lack of medical care and because of the treatment they've undergone.

Many people are forced to confess. That is the goal of a lot of these treatments. And there have been, of course, a series of demonstrators and other activists “confessing” on Iranian television. Many of them, even after they confess, are still kept in prison.

We saw, beginning on August 1, some mass show trials. On August 1, a trial of about 11 men was shown on state television. It was a picture of men in pajama-like prison outfits, looking emaciated, some dazed and some confused. A document called an indictment was read. It wasn't a legal indictment as we or the Iranian judicial system would recognize, but more of a political statement about their fomenting velvet revolutions and corresponding with foreign human rights organizations and foreign governments.

The second trial took place on August 8. It was much the same event. There was a second indictment.

After that, apparently the show trials did not have the desired effect and they have not been public since then. We believe there have been three sessions after the initial sessions at the beginning of August. However, people have been sentenced.

The first sentences came down last week. The first four were for executions, and those sentences were not for demonstrators. Three of the men had been arrested before the presidential elections. The first three were sentenced to death for allegedly being members of a monarchist movement. One of them, a man named Ali-Zamani, gave a televised confession on Iranian television stating that he had travelled overseas and met with monarchists and had come back to Iran with a goal of fomenting trouble and so forth. But he never did anything and was arrested before he actually did anything.

The fourth person is allegedly a member of the Mojahedin-e Khalq, a movement that has been fighting the Iranian government since the revolution, sometimes violently.

I believe there are about 20 people after that who have been sentenced that we know of thus far. They have various terms for imprisonment and whippings. One, of course, is the Iranian American scholar, Kian Tajbakhsh, who was sentenced to 15 years based largely on the fact that he had at one time received money from George Soros.

Lastly, I just want to mention something that gets lost sometimes in the conversation about the post-election upheaval, which is that executions are not new to Iran. It is the country with the second highest number of executions after China. But these really escalated between the presidential elections on June 12 and President Ahmadinejad's inauguration on August 5. The government announced that it had executed 115 people in that time. It did not name them, so we don't know who they were. At that time, or soon thereafter, a moratorium was supposedly put on executions. However, earlier this month, a young man was executed for a crime that he committed when he was under the age of 18. He was reportedly actually hung by the mother of the young man whom he had killed in a street fight.

So I would urge this committee as well as the Canadian and U.S. governments to not forget about human rights when we are in dialogue with the Iranian government. This situation has not gone away; it's just more underground.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

Thank you very much, both of you.

We have 35 minutes left, and if we are very diligent in sticking to our time limits, everybody will get a chance to ask a question, seven minutes for the first round and five for the second.

We begin with the Liberals, and Mr. Cotler.

[Irwin Cotler, Liberal, Mount Royal, QC]

Thank you.

I'm going to put my question to both of the witnesses, although I think the issue was more directly addressed by Professor Mahdavi in a more conceptual sense in his remarks. That is, much of the witness testimony before this committee and much of the discussion outside this committee by decision-makers, policy-makers, scholars, Iranian human rights activists, and the like, has identified four distinct but interrelated threats emanating from what's called Ahmadinejad's Iran. I want to distinguish the latter from the people and public in Iran who are targets of massive domestic repression. I think what you said, Professor Mahdavi, is important in appreciating the century-old, and even longer, civilizational underpinnings of Iran and its important historical role.

The question with respect to these four interrelated threats is what is to be done. I would agree with you that the military option should not be on the table. I would also agree with you—though maybe not fully—and maybe with Ms. Redman as well, by inference, that it's been a mistake in Obama's engagement with Iran, which I support, to focus on the nuclear issue. While I understand the focus and I understand why the nuclear threat, for all the reasons you appreciate, which I need not go into, is seen as being serious enough to focus on, I think it has had the effect of marginalizing, if not sanitizing, the other threats, in particular the massive domestic repression.

Having said all of that, we come to the question of what is to be done. Many of the Iranian human rights people with whom I speak and work—some of whom have appeared before this committee—have in fact said that while initially they did not support sanctions, they now do support sanctions, let us say, since June 12. While initially they felt that Iran had the right, like any other country, to the peaceful uses of atomic energy, they are concerned that what might be called the “serial” violations of UN Security Council resolutions by Iran and its accompanying deceit may have in fact invited the sanctions that would not otherwise be there to hurt Iran.

I was just at part of a conference this morning where two Iranian human rights people made the point that Iran is now at a tipping point. In their view, while the change would have to come from within, this regime change could be facilitated by targeted sanctions, directed not against the Iranian people but against the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, for example, who now control 80%, let's say, of Iranian commerce and the underpinnings of the energy infrastructure, the petroleum industry, and the like. So they are in favour of targeted sanctions directed against the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and the companies that help facilitate what the Revolutionary Guards are doing, whether it be the sale of surveillance equipment or the like. These kinds of targeted sanctions may help to bring about what all of us would like to see, an indigenous people's movement that would succeed in restoring Iran to the civilizational roots that are at its core.

That's my question in that regard.

[Dr. Mojtaba Mahdavi]

Thank you very much for a very thoughtful and interesting question.

Here are a couple of points. I see your points on the targeted sanctions. It's different with the blanket kind of sanction that western countries, particularly the United States, imposed on Iraq and other countries, for instance, which was quite destructive. On the targeted sanction, first of all, how can we be sure Russia and China would be a part of this sanction? If they are not cooperating with the sanction, again, it will be irrelevant.

The second point is how we can know what exactly to do about the so-called Revolutionary Guards, companies, or the financial resources. What source of reliable information do we have to get this kind of information and to be really targeted on it, right to the point?

The third point is that I guess any kind of economic sanctions would play into the hands of, again, the Revolutionary Guards, because they have already created a kind of mafia economy, a black market economy. Again, another round of economic sanctions, in my view, will play into the hands of the Revolutionary Guards in different ways, because there is always one way or another to exploit Iran's economic resources and get out of these so-called sanctions. But if we can find, perhaps, specific names or institutions with really, really reliable information, this might have some sort of positive impact on Iran's democratic movement.

On the issue of nuclear policy, if I may say a few words, from the Iranian perspective, I think this is what they simply argue. They suggest Iran has a legitimate right to pursue its nuclear policy for three major reasons. The first one is national prestige. Iran is the regional power, no matter whether shah or sheikh, ayatollah or zellolah, Islamist or post-Islamist governs the country. Iran is a major regional power. It's for this very reason. Nuclear science is the cutting edge of science at this point, and sooner or later Iran needs to get to this point, from the national prestige concern.

The second line of reasoning is for an alternative source of energy. We know that at this point Iran imports refined oil, which is quite a shame for some of the Iranians, they say. Iran is a big exporter, and at this point, thanks to the economic sanctions, and to some extent targeted economic sanctions in the past 30 years or so, Iran desperately needs refined oil. For this reason, they simply think they need another kind of alternative source of energy, and at this point they think that nuclear would be the first and the most important alternative source of energy.

The third line of reasoning for justifying Iran's nuclear policy is the security issue. For the security issue they have three reasons. The first one is that the longest war in the post-Second World War period, the Iran-Iraq war, was imposed on Iran for eight years. Iran was targeted by chemical weapons, and no one really cared about Iranians' complaints during the eight-year war because Saddam Hussein was instrumental in getting rid of the ayatollahs, and of course many western countries and even the Soviet Union were not happy with the Iranian government and they simply didn't care about their demands.

The second security concept, they say, is the fact that under President George Bush the U.S. had a regime change policy—the issue of the axis of evil—and was constantly threatening for regime change. Of course, they simply suggest that Iraq was not a nuclear power but was invaded, whereas North Korea, which was a nuclear power, was safe and was not invaded. So this gives some sort of realpolitik, rationalist and realist kind of thinking.

The third line of reasoning on the security issue is—

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

Try to keep that brief, because we're running over our time in this round.

[Dr. Mojtaba Mahdavi]

Sure. This is the last point.

Iran is in a very dangerous neighbourhood. Almost all neighbouring countries are nuclear powers: Russia, China, Pakistan, Israel, and the United States.

They suggest that they do not want to make a bomb; they want to follow what's known as the Japanese option, which is that currently over 30 countries in the world, including Japan, Canada, Brazil, and South Africa, have the capability of making a bomb but they are not necessarily making it. Their logic and rationale is different, and that's their argument.

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

Madame Thi Lac, s'il vous plaît.

[Ève-Mary Thaï Thi Lac, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot, QC]

Welcome everyone and thank you for joining us today.

Mr. Mahdavi, you spoke at some length about the nuclear industry and I'd like to ask you a question about this subject. In “Iran in the World: The Nuclear Crisis in Context“, a book that you co-authored, Mr. Huntley discusses the unique situation that prevails in Iran and the reasons for the country's nuclear ambitions. He explores this issue from the state's perspective and underestimates the importance of the nuclear program to the country's regional politics. He explores the link between this program and Iranian nationalism.

The program is understandably highly symbolic for Iranians. I know you talked about it at considerable length, but I'd like you to briefly touch on the reasons for this program.

[Dr. Mojtaba Mahdavi]

Thank you.

Very briefly, the issue is nationalism. As I mentioned, this is a great civilization, a regional power, and they really want to be on the cutting edge of science, technology, and political power. For this reason, we know that some political authorities play the card of nationalization of the oil industry--Mohammad Mossadegh, in the 1950s--and make a comparison between oil nationalization and the current nuclear policy. They simply suggest that it's about national prestige, national identity, and security for the state.

Almost all the people, even the opposition, support national rights for having a nuclear capability. No matter whether they are reformists or hard-liners, or even some of the opposition, they suggest this is a national right and that it is based on NPT's articles. They suggest this is a legitimate thing with respect to nationalism.

My point is that Iran has a legitimate right to the enrichment of uranium, but at the same time Iran has a legitimate right to enrich democratic values and institutions. We should not sacrifice one type for the other one. We should follow uranium enrichment, which is a national right, and also enrichment of democratic values and institutionalization of democracy.

Even some realists in the United States suggest that sooner or later the world will be facing a nuclear Iran. Of course, I'm not supporting this personally. I'm a big believer in pacifying the nuclear issue. A nuclear-free Middle East would be the perfect and ideal policy. For the people of Iran, even a great number of the opposition, the nuclear issue is not the first and foremost priority, but at the same time it's a nationalist issue and they support Iran's legitimate right for this.

[Ève-Mary Thaï Thi Lac, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot, QC]

My question is directed to both witnesses. Realistically, what kind of influence can Canada have on the Iranian government in the area of human rights, given the current context of the negotiations within the international community on Iran's nuclear program?

[Renee C. Redman]

I'm not privy to the negotiations between Canada and the west and Iran, but I firmly believe, and my organization believes, human rights has to be part of that dialogue. You can't have a negotiation with a country and completely ignore the brutal suppression of any form of dissent within that country.

[Dr. Mojtaba Mahdavi]

I think we need to have a tough dialogue. Military attack is not an option. Economic sanction, at least a blanket economic sanction, is not an option. Boycotting dialogue again is not an option at this point.

We have to be realistic and choose between bad and worse. The bad thing is having dialogue, but the worse thing is just boycotting dialogue. At least with dialogue you have some instrument to put pressure on the Iranian government. Human rights should be the first and foremost priority.

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

Mr. Marston, please.

[Wayne Marston, NDP, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

Thank you.

I want to welcome you here today. We're very pleased to hear the comprehensive view you laid out there and the context you put it into.

The members of this committee are going to get tired of hearing this, but I was in Saudi Arabia in 1979 during the revolution. The impact on Saudi Arabia at that time was such that you could literally see the fear in the eyes of the elite people in Saudi Arabia, everywhere you went. When the King moved at all, the guards were tripled. I'm sure they're shaking over there still, to this day.

You mentioned that the supreme leader is unwell. Or maybe I just heard that someplace; I've had 11 e-mails while I've sat here today. It's getting interesting.

But you certainly mentioned a tipping point. If Khameini is ill, is there a natural leader out there anyplace who's going to stand out and galvanize this situation?

From everything we've heard and from what we've seen on the clips that come out of the country, the youth there are far beyond ready. You can see that. They have to be literally beaten back, and in some cases actually destroyed as a result of it. But is there a natural leader?

You've talked about targeted sanctions and the Revolutionary Guard. It brings to mind another question. When I hear Revolutionary Guard, I think solely military-style people. It's beyond that, is it not? It's into the more professional side of the community as well.

Perhaps you could deal with those first. Then I have another quick one.

[Renee C. Redman]

I'll let him address whether there's a natural leader.

I will say, though, that it's more than students who are looking for change. We also see that people who are looking for change are not looking to overthrow the government; they're looking for change within the government structure right now.

Again, we don't know the details, but there is definitely a power struggle going on within the clerical establishment. Much of that is based on old grievances and fights that have happened over the last 30, 40 years. One reason it may be escalating is that Khameini is apparently unwell.

[Dr. Mojtaba Mahdavi]

What is happening in Iran should be analyzed on two levels, a state level and a societal level. At the state level we have factional politics, divisions and power struggles between reformists, conservatives, and even within the conservatives--traditional conservatives versus neo-conservatives in Iran, run by Mr. Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Khameini, the leader, who he's aligned with, and the Revolutionary Guard people. On the societal level, as I mentioned, it goes back to over a century ago with demands for democracy and democratization.

What is happening today in Iran is unique in a number of ways. There is an epistemic shift in the discourse of people, which means they simply want a peaceful democratic evolution; they don't want to use violence. They're very civilized, with new and novel methods, and I've learned quite a lot from this new generation. Of course, they don't really descend to any charismatic leader, unlike my generation and even the generation before; they don't need a charismatic leader.

I received a letter from Iran, and I'll just read one sentence from it. It talks about this new generation, this movement, and it says that in the history books of the 21st century, the first chapter will be about them, the Iranians. In the introduction they might write that important events have happened before them, events like 9/11 and wars on Iraq and Afghanistan, but those were the odds and ends of the previous century, with an outdated language, and with 20th century tools--which means airplanes, bombs, and bullets. The letter goes on to say that this is a new thing, and they are true children of their time, 21st century Iranians. It will be written that they were the social movements in which all of them were leaders and all of them were the organizers. The letter went on to describe how a movement without a command centre was acting so well orchestrated, and how amazing this movement was.

At this point, the social democratic movements in Iran are far ahead of Mr. Mousavi and Karoubi, two leaders. At the same time, these people are playing a positive role, and we should really appreciate that.

I don't think we have a charismatic, unique leader at this point, but in the future we may or may not. We will have leaders, and the leaders will come from within, definitely. That's the point. Of course, Ayatollah Montazeri is one great source of irritation, the grand ayatollah who's opposing the current leadership. He may or may not be a potential leader at this transitional moment.

My understanding of the social movement, the current movement, is that we have to be patient. It's not going to solve the issue in a few weeks or months. It takes time, and it will be more and more mature. That's the first thing.

What was the second question?

[Wayne Marston, NDP, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

Really, I don't recall it being so much a second question as a comment as I was going through.

Do I have time left, Mr. Chair?

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

You have one minute exactly.

[Wayne Marston, NDP, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

One of the things I was going to question is about the struggle internal to the government. Is that to remove the clerics, or is it just a more aggressive view, perhaps?

[Dr. Mojtaba Mahdavi]

The new thing that's been happening since the 2005 presidential election is that we have a new generation of Revolutionary Guards, military men, who are coming to power. Some people argue that they simply want to change the political structure of the regime and get rid of the clergy, and we'd have a kind of Pakistani-style of authoritarian politics.

In my view, Iran is not Pakistan. This is wishful thinking for these guys. This is not going to happen, thanks to the rich history of the democratic movement. But for some reason some of them really want it. On the other hand, we know how powerful some of these clerics are and we know the power struggle between Iran's neo-conservatives, led by Ahmadinejad and Mr. Khameini, versus traditional conservatives, as well as Hashemi Rafsanjani and others.

I don't think they can get rid of the clerics at this point.

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

Mr. Hiebert, and then Mr. Sweet.

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

Thank you both for being here today. I really appreciate your testimony.

You mentioned what we should not do as a state, and part of what we're doing as a committee is looking at things we can do. In our report we're looking for recommendations we can make to the government. We've heard a number of suggestions, like sanctions. But on the other hand, people say Iran can get everything it needs through shell companies, importing the products through neighbouring countries. We've heard about dialogue, which is what the U.S. seems to be focusing on. But then other people say it's ineffective and it's a stalling tactic used by Iran. Some people have said we need to use the levers that are available through the United Nations. Other people say that's also a stalling tactic. It's also been suggested that Canada take action through the International Court, I think through the genocide provisions. Maybe we could provide some other support for the democratic movement.

These are the kinds of things we've heard. I'd be interested in knowing what you would recommend Canada do to address the problem of promoting human rights in Iran.