Subcommittee on International Human Rights Committee on Dec. 8th, 2011

[David Sweet, Conservative, Ancaster—Dundas—Flamborough—Westdale, ON]

Thank you, Colonel.

We've also heard from sources that these folks continue to this day to be armed. Could you tell me, did you have exposure enough to check the camp? Were there hidden arms there? What's the situation with the MeK?

[Col Wesley Martin]

You're correct, and I owe the gentleman beside you an apology. That's one rumour I forgot to mention. We did have those rumours that they were still armed. I did have the ability to check all the camps, and even before I arrived there were inspections of all the camps. We had the rumours that they had underground bunkers. Every time we debunked a rumour, then somehow people would say “Oh, then, it must be this way”.

The best evidence I can suggest to the fact that they were not armed was not only through my own inspections, but through the 2009-2011 videos. If they'd had arms, they would have gone and got them, and at least come into this with a fighting chance.

If I may, there's one other thing about them being held against their will: those 2009-2011 attacks prove they were not being held against their will, because what better time to escape than in the middle of an attack? And they didn't. They held firmly together. But no, they weren't armed.

[David Sweet, Conservative, Ancaster—Dundas—Flamborough—Westdale, ON]

Thank you, Colonel, because that was going to be in my next question. In all these manufactured opportunities that you gave them to leave, from what I understand--they could shake your hand for an extended period of time, the lights were out and they could walk away unmolested--did anybody leave?

[Col Wesley Martin]

Not through shaking the hands. We did have another facility that had about 190 what we refer to as defectors, and those were the two of the agreements. Julie Norman worked one just before I got there, and I worked a clarification of one. The people did leave. We had a couple of walkaways.

What the Ashraf leadership and I worked out.... They didn't mind the people walking away. As a matter of fact, they even tried to give one to me who didn't want to come to us but he didn't want to be with them any more. He was living in a kind of twilight zone where he had all the food, he had private lodging and everything else. But we did have some that came.

The only thing the leadership wanted was to make sure they didn't come with documents, and to get debriefed before they went. And if they happened to come across, we worked out the situation where if the defector did not want to visit with the leadership again, I would personally counsel the guy and then I would tell the leadership the results of the conversation. They always took my word and I never lied to them. “He did not bring any documents. He doesn't want to see you again.” And the leadership would accept that.

[David Sweet, Conservative, Ancaster—Dundas—Flamborough—Westdale, ON]

Colonel Martin, my time is limited, so I want to make sure I get as much as I can on the record.

In your opinion, what is going to happen to these 3,400 people when they shut down this camp?

[Col Wesley Martin]

That is the hardest of all. I have a philosophy that if you beat the enemy you feel good about it; if he beats you, you live with it. If we don't do something different we'll be living with their death. They will be rolled up by Maliki. We saw what was done in 2009, and it was more brutal in 2011.

Earlier I referenced the Alamo, where Santa Anna attacked twice. Maliki is going to attack the third time. It's going to be brutal, and the survivors are then going to be rolled up. Maliki has already put out in the press that he's going to take them to Nazária and Samaha. They may be going to the old Japanese camp, which is an awesome camp and could be used very effectively to not only keep people out but to keep people in. Then they'll be processed for going to Iran.

Maliki has not cooperated with UNHCR, as he claims he has. He has commitments to Ahmadinejad and Khamenei. When he attacked before, he attacked with Sadr. As a matter of fact, I need to mention this to emphasize my point. Maliki is not only Prime Minister, but he has maintained himself as the Minister of Defence and Minister of the Interior. He has eight special brigades assigned directly to him and nobody else, even if he wasn't Minister of Defence. He's going to use his forces, and he's going to use them brutally.

Maliki also has secret prisons all through his country. We used to go busting them all the time. I wish I had come out of Iraq with the meat hook we took out of one of his compounds. On the fourth floor of the basement of the Ministry of Interior he had secret detention facilities where people were being tortured.

He is going to do the same thing to the mujahedin. Then he'll say, as he said in a letter to the UN, that he tried to cooperate with us, but we are not cooperating. The mujahedin is being accused of not cooperating. Madam Parsai, the leader, is willing to cooperate with us in any way possible with reasonable means.

On this thing about wanting to take them out of Ashraf to put them somewhere else, they have the logistical support there. They have everything else they need. They're supporting themselves—life support. By taking them somewhere else you break them up. It's divide and conquer. It's going to be brutal.

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

The next questioner is Professor Cotler.

[Irwin Cotler, Liberal, Mount Royal, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I also want to express our appreciation for having a decorated colonel who has been on the ground and can come here to share his experience and expertise, as you have today.

Colonel, your testimony graphically describes the killings in Ashraf. Then there was the denial of logistical and medical relief for those who had suffered from previous attacks. Then there was reference to ongoing harassment and intimidation. But what stuck out for me in all of your testimony is the likelihood that Maliki will attack after December 15.

In two previous situations, in 2009 and 2011, the attacks came after meetings with Defence Minister Gates at the time. As you mentioned, Maliki will be meeting with Obama and is likely to launch an attack after that meeting and make it appear as if the U.S. was part of a government-sanctioned attack.

I find it almost shocking how a United States government—a powerful government—that undertook the protection of Ashraf from 2003 to 2009 handed it over to Maliki. I assume that either assurances were received for their protection, or at least they should have asked for those assurances. I don't know. The United States would be said to have a continuing type of obligation here.

Shouldn't the alarm be sounded in the U.S. in advance of that meeting with Obama so that Maliki can't come out of that meeting and launch such an attack? The United States will have been publicly forewarned by the people you've mentioned with the kind of expertise and respect they enjoy, whether it be Tom Ridge, Louis Freeh, Michael Mukasey, or yourself. They are people at the highest level of American decision-making with that kind of experience and expertise on Ashraf.

Why can't the alarm be sounded so that Obama, instead of just meeting with Maliki, or even before the meeting, will make it clear what the consequences will be should Maliki ever decide to attack, and prevent that type of thing from occurring?

[Col Wesley Martin]

Sir, that is an excellent question. Also, at congressional hearings with Congressman Rohrabacher yesterday those same issues were brought up.

Congresswoman Sheila Jackson pointed out to the State Department that she feels the condition you just described should be set down, and if it is not made clear to Maliki and Maliki accepts it, then the President does not meet with Maliki. The United States Congress has taken on the same exact quest you mentioned.

You also mentioned the written agreements, sir. Here is the packet of all the protected person status agreements processed and the personal folders and the protected person cards of all these people. These are the people who were executed in 2009 and 2011. They had real names, real faces, real lives, and protected person status. Their protected person status was revoked and their lives we're taken from them.

I'm more than willing to pass the packet around, although 2009 includes photos of the bodies, and it is hideous. One shows a man's face caved in by a forklift.

You had mentioned the surrender. Some people are trying to play with words, saying they didn't surrender but they surrendered their weapons. A warrior needs only two things to fight and engage the enemy: a weapon and ammunition. He can do it without food, water, sleep, and a whole bunch of stuff, but he cannot fight and engage without a weapon and ammunition.

When they renounced terrorism, which was a formality, in my opinion—they weren't terrorists, but they renounced it—they surrendered their weapons. They surrendered all their weapons. And we assured them protected person status.

No one despises war more than the warrior. And no one despises the violation of a condition of surrender, whether it's the weapon or the person, more than the warrior who worked to secure it and who enforced it. To have our bureaucratic executive branch of government come in and say, “We ignore that now, and by the way, we're turning you over to the friend of your enemies”, that was wrong.

[Irwin Cotler, Liberal, Mount Royal, QC]

Colonel, it seems to me that nobody can say we do not know what has happened already to the residents of Camp Ashraf, and equally, that nobody can say at this point that we cannot foresee what will happen to the residents of Camp Ashraf.

Your testimony today is yet another compelling warning of the need to act urgently to prevent this disaster from occurring. I have to say that while I believe we here in Canada, as parliamentarians, have to join in the sounding of the alarm and do whatever we can with respect to this almost responsibility to prevent and protect, I still believe it is the United States that has both the capacity and the principal responsibility. And I hope it will undertake the necessary action—what you've just said, really, congressional testimony. Either Obama gets a clear and express undertaking that can be sanctioned or he should not meet with Maliki but put Maliki on notice that he will be held accountable, criminally responsible for what will occur. The U.S. could even refer the matter to the UN Security Council for reference at that point to the ICC, if need be.

[Col Wesley Martin]

Sir, your comments are totally on target, and I agree with you 100%.

To show you how much Maliki is actually behind this, this is the magazine of his political party. The centre article is titled “MeK Organization: international terrorist from previous dictatorship and the depth of western hypocrisy”. It goes on to blast not only the Mujahedin e-Khalq, but the west, Europe, and North America.

The Iraqis rely on the fact that most Americans do not read Arabic, and I don't. But they also rely on most Americans not pursuing this kind of information. It's wrong on my nation's part. And you're right: we have the responsibility.

They surrendered. These are American signatures on these documents. My job was to enforce the agreements of my predecessors. That's why I took a loyalty towards this. We did enforce it, and the MeK worked closely with me. I also have the documentation showing that they supplied us with water and other resources. As I said, they were allies.

Also, because we're drawing down from Iraq, and we're drawing down soon from Afghanistan, we have the resources in the United States to house the MeK. The base realignment commission has gone through and identified a lot of sources. My old command headquarters in Albuquerque, New Mexico, could easily fit 500 of them. It has the shower facilities, the kitchen facilities, and plenty of room to rest, and it's already fenced in. We have the facilities in the United States. The problem is convincing our government to do it.

[Irwin Cotler, Liberal, Mount Royal, QC]

Thank you, Colonel. Again, your testimony is very much appreciated.

[Col Wesley Martin]

Thank you, sir.

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

Thank you.

We are actually just a few minutes away from our closing time, so I think we're going to have to dramatically reduce the questions. We have one left for each of the Conservatives and the New Democrats. I apologize to the members, but let's keep it down to about three minutes.

We'll go to Ms. Grewal, please, and then to Mr. Chisholm.

Mr. Hiebert, on a point of order.

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

I know that on occasion this committee has extended its time and has seen the clock as something other than what it is. Is that an option for us at this stage?

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

We never see the clock as different from what it is. The clock is what we say it is. But that remains an option now, as always. I won't see the clock as being at two o'clock until I get an indication from the committee that it ought to be the time we see it as.

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

The testimony is so valuable that I think we should extend the period of time we have for this committee to hear it, or at least everybody should have an opportunity.

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

All right, we'll make sure of that.

I still can't give you the full seven minutes. We'll give you four minutes, Ms. Grewal.

[Nina Grewal, Conservative, Fleetwood—Port Kells, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Colonel, for your time and your presentation, and thank you for your service.

Colonel, are you able to estimate the percentage of residents of Camp Ashraf who have likely been involved in terrorist activities? Could you please tell us?

[Col Wesley Martin]

I can vouch for every one of those residents. There are only two people in Camp Ashraf who were in the PMOI at the time of the killings of the Americans back in the 1970s. And as I mentioned, it wasn't even their organization. I can say the names of those two people right now. The problem is that when it gets televised, the Iranian intelligence agency is going to work. I'm already fearful that I'm about to lose 3,400 friends and allies, and I don't want to put their names at the top. The rest I've been in the field of combat with. We've taken an IED together.

If I ever had a problem with the MeK, it was that they wanted to put themselves between us and danger, and that violated our procedures. We had the guns and the armoured vehicles, and they did not. I remember one day when I had to counsel a group of them, because as soon as the convoy stopped, they went out first. I hauled them back. I told them that they had to let my soldiers clear this area before they went out, and they said “Yes, sir, you're right.”

I can personally vouch that they are not terrorists. As you can see, I have studied that organization and the environment around it. It's appalling that we're using this designation. When the designation of what constitutes a terrorist was originally assigned, it took three things: they had to be foreign and they had to be capable and have the intent of attacking the United States or its citizens. The MeK has not done that.

This thing is supposed to be reviewed and updated every two years. Even if they had been terrorists, after they surrendered their weapons and started working closely with the Americans, they certainly weren't terrorists. To say that they did this years ago, well, Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat both were self-proclaimed terrorists, and within 30 years of being self-proclaimed terrorists they jointly won the Nobel Peace Prize.

[Nina Grewal, Conservative, Fleetwood—Port Kells, BC]

Colonel, in your opinion, how could a durable solution be achieved for the residents of Camp Ashraf, and what would such a solution look like?

[Col Wesley Martin]

I think the solution that needs to happen is the United States needs to go into Balad, which is 20 miles from Camp Ashraf, with six or seven airbuses and have the residents of Camp Ashraf grab one bag each—and this would be pre-arranged, you're allowed to bring out one bag each—and then come across the Tigris. They would have to be lifted by chopper or go by a longer route. They have to be lifted out and brought to the United States. We have facilities. We've done it in Guam with refugees. We have other places, as I've mentioned.

Short of that, we need to allow the UNHCR time to do the refugee status review. My fear of doing that in Iraq is that it's only a matter of time before this government becomes more corrupt, and becomes more under the control of Moqtada al-Sadr. I don't think I have mentioned the death of Saddam Hussein yet, have I?

[Nina Grewal, Conservative, Fleetwood—Port Kells, BC]

Colonel, in your opinion, if the residents—

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

Let him finish.

[Col Wesley Martin]

Sir, for going over the time on the questions, I'm at fault. I'm the guilty one.