Subcommittee on International Human Rights Committee on Dec. 8th, 2011

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

Today is Thursday, December 8, 2011 and the 14 ^th meeting of the Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development is called to order.

Today I want to remind members of the subcommittee that we are televised, so keep that in mind. You're always on camera.

We have today as a witness retired Colonel Wesley Martin of the United States Army, to talk to us further on our study of the situation in Camp Ashraf. Colonel Martin was the commandant of the camp and had additional experience in Iraq as well as in other areas. He is in a position to provide us with considerable light on this subject.

Without further ado, Colonel Martin, I'll turn things over to you.

We'll allow you to make a presentation, and then we'll take questions. Depending upon the length of your opening statement, that will determine the length of the questions. We hope to give every member of the subcommittee a chance to ask you at least one question prior to wrapping things up.

Please feel free to begin.

[Colonel, Retired) Wesley Martin (Colonel (retired), United States Army, As an Individual]

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you the situation in Camp Ashraf, Iraq, and the former National Liberation Army of the Mujahedin e-Khalq, the MeK.

Before I proceed, there is one thing that must be stated up front. As the first anti-terrorism force-protection officer for all coalition forces in Iraq, as the former operations officer for Task Force 134, detention operations, and as the first full colonel to command Camp Ashraf, I cannot say with enough emphasis that the MeK is not a terrorist organization. As a matter of fact, I found just the opposite when I was the camp commander of Camp Ashraf—they were my allies.

President Obama has announced the removal of all U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of the year, minus the embassy security detail. He has received criticism for leaving Iraq in a dangerous situation. In fairness, though, he had no choice. Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki’s requirement for U.S. forces to be subject to Iraqi law is unacceptable. Prime Minister al-Maliki knew this when he set the standard. He and his ally Moqtada Sadr want American forces out of Iraq so that the consolidation of power can be completed. In the end, the final outcome of the coalition invasion of Iraq is to replace one brutal regime with another, this time one that is aligned with Iran.

Last April there was a brutal attack on Camp Ashraf that was well documented in a video. I hope everybody had a chance to see the video. If not, I would recommend that you take a look. Viewing that video, we witness unarmed people being run over by American-made military vehicles and gunned down in cold blood by Iraqi soldiers. There is something else that warrants our notice and respect: Ashraf residents are rushing to the aid of their fallen comrades, braving the bullets and vehicles, knowing they may be the next to die. Having worked with the Iranian mujahedin, I see something further—I see the people I served beside. I recognize that if either I or the American warriors with me at Ashraf had been under such an attack, the residents of Ashraf would have been rushing equally fast to our rescue. Although unarmed, they were on our flank, and I was honoured to have them there. Yet my own government lists them as terrorists. Ironically, Moqtada Sadr’s Madhi Army and Khamenei’s Quds Force are not listed as terrorists.

We hear all the rumors about the MeK. We are told any number of things: they are a cult; they are Marxist-Leninists; people are held there against their will; they attacked the Kurds; they have American blood on their hands; they supported Saddam. Detractors take and twist the information back to 1965 and the founding of the MeK. They never go back to 1953 and the CIA-backed coup that placed the Shah in power. I hope we will have time to discuss these accusations in detail.

Last February Ambassador Jeffrey testified to Senators Levin and McCain that he was certain al-Maliki would keep his word and protect the residents of Ashraf. Al-Maliki's forces had already attacked Ashraf once. Two months later came the April attack. As we speak, al-Maliki has Ashraf residents under continuous psychological torture, with loudspeakers denying residents sleep and forcing them to listen to messages of impending doom. Logistics and medical support are being denied entry to the camp. The victims of the attacks, with open wounds and broken limbs, must endure the pain with no sedatives or medicines to prevent infection. Last month, in writing, al-Maliki stated his intentions to the European Union. A copy of that document is provided with my testimony.

The United Nations has recognized the residents of Ashraf as applicants for refugee status. But Maliki has blocked any actions from taking place, just as he blocked Congressman Rohrabacher’s delegation from visiting Ashraf. One tool he continually uses to justify his actions is the terrorist designation.

Maliki has stated that Camp Ashraf will be emptied of the Mujahedin e-Khalq by the end of the year. He has already renamed the compound Camp New Iraq.

Should Maliki be allowed to overrun Camp Ashraf and transport the survivors back to Iran, where they will face prison and the gallows, the fight for democracy in Iran will take a severe blow. It will not die, any more than the cause for liberty in Texas died at the Alamo. Ashraf will become a rallying call: “Remember Ashraf”.

Eventually democracy will come to Iran. Iranian citizens are too wired into modern technology and western communications for progress to be permanently denied. Unlike the western world, the Middle East did not have four centuries to go through an age of exploration, religious reformation, great awakening, and the Industrial Revolution. They're getting it all at once. They will come out of it. Iran will one day be a democracy. The question is, what role will the western world have in that? Right now it is not looking good.

The residents of Ashraf need to be pulled from Iraq as soon as possible. Many people have called upon Maliki to end the December 31 deadline and allow UNHCR representatives into the camp so they can complete their work on relocating the residents. Until that time, peacekeeping forces need to be on the ground with them. That stated, I don’t believe Maliki is going to wait until December 31 to attack Ashraf for the final time. I predict he will attack any time after December 15. His attacks in 2009 and 2011 immediately followed visits with U.S. Defense Secretary Gates. Next week he visits President Obama. The sooner he does it following his return from the United States, the more he can make it appear as a U.S.-government-sanctioned operation.

Unfortunately, we entered Iraq without a good understanding of the region. We have replaced one brutal regime with another. This time the government is becoming more and more aligned with Iran. Khomeini once stated, “The road to Jerusalem is through Karbala”. We have played a critical role in opening the passage. We've made a lot of mistakes, and many people have paid the ultimate price for those mistakes. Unless positive steps are taken very quickly, 3,400 residents of Camp Ashraf will be the next to pick up the tab.

Thank you for this invitation to speak, and I look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

Thank you very much, Colonel Martin.

We'll begin with a questioner from the government side. Given the time—it's now quarter past—I think we can get away with having seven-minute rounds, but I'm going to be pretty abrupt in cutting them off, making sure we stick to that. If we do that, we should have enough time.

Mr. Hiebert, please.

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

Thank you, Colonel. We appreciate your testimony here. It's nice to have somebody who has been on the ground and seen it firsthand, and you've clearly done that.

In your testimony you talked about the arguments that others make. You briefly commented that they have been identified as a cult, as former terrorists, Saddam supporters. For the benefit of our committee, can you go over all the arguments that have been made to buttress the case that they should be listed as a terrorist organization and address those concerns for our committee? What is your perspective on those concerns?

[Col Wesley Martin]

Right.

The first one we should probably raise is the founding of the MeK, and that's what people like to go to and call it a Marxist-Leninist organization. The MeK was founded in 1965 by a group of students who did some study, and what they came up with was that there should be equality between the leaders and those being led, clerics should not have final say over the interpretation of the Koran, and clerics should not expect blind obedience from the congregation.

Okay, that does sound like Marx and Lenin, but that also sounds like Jefferson and Madison and the writing of our own Declaration of Independence and our own Constitution. Also, Ronald Reagan would not have had any problems with those three philosophies. I think we can all agree that Ronald Reagan was no communist. So when they say they're Marxist-Leninist, no, the original mujahedin was not.

There was a split that came in the seventies. There were actually two mujahedins at that time. There was a Marxist mujahedin and there was the People's Mujahedin of Iran, and they were fighting each other as much as they were fighting the Shah's brutal government.

That's where we get into the comment about there being American blood on mujahedin hands. Colonels Shaffer, Turner, and Hawkins were not killed by the organization represented by Maryam Rajavi and by the former national liberation army people of Ashraf who we know today. Two of the people who had killed Shaffer and Turner were captured by the Shah's police and they confessed they were from the Marxist mujahedin. The person who killed Hawkins later wrote that he was the one who did it, and he was Marxist, and the same thing went for the three contractors. Yesterday, in front of Congress, the State Department representative ignored this long-known knowledge that there were two mujahedins and he blamed Maryam Rajavi's organization, and then later Ambassador Bloomfield pointed out that was not the case.

We move to the fact of its being a cult. One of the accusations that came out recently is that Maryam Rajavi is a very charismatic leader. This is true. She is very professional in her approach. People like her style and they are very loyal to her. I have watched Maryam Rajavi viewing the video tape of the massacre at Camp Ashraf, and even though she's had to review it many times, I saw the wincing in her eyes and I saw the uncomfortable feeling when she was watching people being killed. Cult leaders don't feel pain every time they see one of their people being killed. So I could see the loyalty that people in the MeK have towards her. She has that same loyalty to them, and you don't find that in cults.

One of the comments made, especially at Camp Ashraf, is that they wear all the same clothing. But we are talking about the national liberation army. Of course all armies wear the same clothing. But now the men do not wear all the same clothing; they wear civilian-type clothing because the national liberation army does not exist any more.

Then comes the issue that, well, they divorced and they live separately of each other. Considering what's going on with the MeK right now at Camp Ashraf, it's a good thing. Massoud Rajavi saw the intensity of the problem and the fight ahead, and if he had a bunch of children to deal with during all these pending attacks and things that were going on, it would make the problem even more complicated. We're fortunate there are no children at Camp Ashraf. We're talking late teenagers, maybe. One of the young ladies killed and shown in the video was 20 years old, but that is pretty much the younger part of it.

Jesuit priests don't marry, but we don't call them a cult. So when we start to peel back the different accusations against them, they pretty much start falling apart. Unfortunately, we have seen cases where, no matter what you say--it's almost like the old Simon and Garfunkel song, The Boxer : “Still a man hears what he wants to hear and disregards the rest”. Those are some of the things we're facing.

Also, they've been accused of supporting Saddam. Congressman Filner yesterday pointed out that so did the United States, during that time in the 1980s. When Iran and Iraq were slugging it out in the late 1970s, the United States was supporting Saddam. Congressman Filner then asked the State Department representative, “Does that mean we're also terrorists?” So when you start peeling them back they fall apart.

There's another rumour that they're being held against their will. I went through all the compounds when I visited them, and sometimes those visits did not have much notice to the PMOI, the People's Mujahedin Organization of Iran. I'll explain in a minute. I would shake the hands of as many people as possible. If they wanted to leave, they could hold the hand and all we had to do was walk out.

We also had two written agreements. The MeK did not want to keep people who wanted to leave. They used the same philosophy that was used the night before the battle of Karbala: we will put the lights out, and if anybody wants to leave, they can. We had a facility set up for them to come to, and we had two written agreements to go ahead and accept them.

The last rumour to address was one of the many I ended up debunking myself. I got a message from the State Department. I had just returned from Germany. The MeK had a training site on the compound, and it was at this exact location. They were recruiting Iraqis at that time to be in it. I ordered my Marines to mount up, and we were ready to go straight to that compound. One of the liaison officers said I was welcome to go to any of their compounds any time I wanted; I didn't need to bring my Marines and force my way in. I said, “Okay, tell you what, I'm bringing one lieutenant with me and we're going to that compound now, and if what the State Department has told me is true, the rest of the Marines are coming.”

We went to the compound and found a training site.... Excuse me; now I'm getting confused. It was a site where workers lived, and they hired a lot of local labour. The local labour would come in on Monday and they'd work through the week. If they came and left every night and came back the next morning, they had greater chances of one of the real terrorist organizations--al-Qaeda, Badacore, Mahdi Army--catching them and executing them. So for their own safety they had a lodging arrangement set up. I went through, and there weren't hundreds; there were somewhere between 50 and 80 at the most.

I went through every building in that compound except one, and when I was walking out the liaison officer said to me, “Colonel, you haven't checked this building yet.” I said I had seen enough and that I knew what was not going on there. He asked me to do him a favour and check the building. I checked the building, and sure enough, it was just where workers were being allowed to live safely so they weren't putting themselves at five times the risk. If they had anything to hide, he wouldn't have asked me to check the other building.

I came back feeling totally stupid that the State Department report had got me into mounting up my Marines, ready to make a crash into a compound. I learned a lot that night.

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

We have to go to our next question.

Mr. Marston, please.

[Wayne Marston, NDP, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

Thank you.

Colonel, I really appreciate hearing your testimony, because it's matching testimony we've previously heard.

One of the things that came up here, which you indicated very early in your remarks, is the heavy influence that Iran now has in this area. When we go back to the MeK and the revolution and how you were referring to the students at that point, in my understanding, it was a student-led revolution that got hijacked by the clerics in Iran. Do you see a division along tribal lines, the tribes of Iran aligned with their own tribes in Iraq? Is it following that kind of path, sir?

[Col Wesley Martin]

From what I've seen, it's not tribal in Iran and Iraq. But at this point in time, it is religious, and at this point in time, there are a lot of opportunists.

I'll drop back to my role as the anti-terrorism officer for all of Iraq. The United States, before it invaded.... First off, our State Department had paid Chalabi $33 million to provide information on Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction and his other great technologies. The Defence Intelligence Agency had also provided him with double-digit millions. Basically, Chalabi made about $100 million off the American taxpayer to give us misinformation.

Then the State Department had Chalabi go to Tehran to make sure that it was okay with them for us to invade Iraq and bring down Saddam Hussein. Well, of course it was. But one of the conditions the State Department received and the American government received was that it also attack the Mujahedin-e-Khalq.

As the American forces and the British forces moved in--and I saw this personally--the Iranians were setting up. They already had Hakim's Badr Corps and Hakim's Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. They were already established in the country. As we went through dropping Saddam's forces.... Well, dropping? They disappeared on us, with the exception of the Fedayeen in Nasiriyah. As his rule was dropping, I came to realize, when I got there, that the Iranian government had come up and had started replacing the governments.

We talk about the Fallujah triangle, which is basically from Tikrit down to Fallujah and over to Baghdad. I developed another expression, and that was the Iranian wedge, which I was witnessing. It went from Al-Kut to Al-Diwaniyah to An Najaf up to Karbala and over to Al-Hillah and back. I could see this great--it was almost like a tidal wave--struggle in that location at that time. Diwaniyah was really the centre of gravity, because the tribal chief there was determined not to come under the control of Iran and he was also not coming under the control of al-Qaeda. He mobilized his tribe to try to secure the city. Unfortunately, that success fell. But that was the main area where I was having to deal with the Iranian influence as the anti-terrorism officer.

I came back to the States, and then I was, by name, requested to go back to Iraq to be the J-3 of detention operations. I started seeing that the influence had jumped from Iran, through Baghdad, and was now being struggled for in Diyala Province. What Iran was pushing for, if the country fell and went into three sectors, was this: Kurdistan would be up north; Al-Anbar Province would probably end up going to Saudi Arabia; and the Iranians would gather as much as they could of the Shia areas in the rest of Iraq.

Diyala was really the fight. Because in the 1920s, Baghdad only had about a 20% Shia population. By the time we arrived, it had jumped to 50%. In part, that was because of the Industrial Revolution, but in part it was because Karim Qasim, the general who took control of the government from the monarchy from 1958 to 1963, really wanted to do good things. He saw great poverty, so he built what is now Sadr City. It used to be Qasim City and then Saddam City.

By then, by the time I came back, that Shia population had pretty well taken control of a lot of the Baghdad area. Now we were finding that they were going after Diyala Province. Also, and I had to deal with this several times, in one case in particular, we got word that the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, which was a very corrupt organization, was moving their forces into villages and telling the villagers that they had one hour to clear.

[Wayne Marston, NDP, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

Could I interrupt you for a moment, sir? I'd like to come back a little more to Camp Ashraf.

[Col Wesley Martin]

Sure.

[Wayne Marston, NDP, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

One of the concerns that came through in the testimony we had here left me with the feeling that there was an orchestrated campaign to malign them. The second thing that came through was that we were astounded by the number of American officials who were saying that they had to be protected. Yet the government in the U.S. has seemed to be ignoring a plethora of people, across the board, who understand the situation and understand the gravity and the risks to these people. I hate to say this, but it almost sounds as if the U.S. government is prepared to sacrifice them.

[Col Wesley Martin]

I smile with a feeling of pain, almost, but I am very pleased that you have totally captured it.

Let me hit the second point first.

The people who are speaking out.... Tom Ridge, the former Director of Homeland Security, is saying that there was not a single document that came across his desk during his tenure. Louis Freeh, the former FBI director, told me himself that when he was in charge of the FBI, the State Department tried to get his organization involved in blessing that terrorist designation, and he refused. John Sano, former CIA director, has personally told me--and I've been with him when he's publicly stated this--that the Mujahedin e-Khalq was not a terrorist organization, and it was wrong.

Then you move to all these other generals. You have three former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. You have Wesley Clark. You have former Commandant of the Marine Corps, Jim Conway.

[Wayne Marston, NDP, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

Perhaps I might jump in again, sir, because we've heard the testimony of the list of names here. At one point or other, because of the invasion of Iraq and the stories that many people felt were built up about weapons of mass destruction, which some people believed were there, and others did not believe were there, and the evidence seemed to support them.... It almost feels like the MeK has been sideswiped by the original campaign of misinformation that seemed to have come out of the Bush era.

The shocking thing to me—

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

Do you have a question? We're actually past your time already.

[Wayne Marston, NDP, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

Okay.

The shocking thing to me is how that seems to have carried over to the current administration.

[Col Wesley Martin]

That's a good point.

I've said publicly many times that I centre the problem down towards the State Department. I've said that this State Department is serving Hillary Clinton no better than they served Colin Powell when they sent him to those “weapons of mass destruction” speeches.

The MeK did get sideswiped during this. You pointed out all the disinformation towards them, and I pointed out all the rumours and everything else. There has been a lot of disinformation, and a lot of it has been to please Iran. I have yet to figure out why our State Department is so determined to please Iran, but they're doing it continually. Any rumour that Iran tells about the MeK is accepted as a fact--except the last one. And I was glad to see, finally, when the Quds Force was detected on their plan to kill the Saudi ambassador inside a busy restaurant, and it was discovered. The first thing that was said by the Iranian government was that it was the Mujahedin e-Khalq. Finally, the United States came back and said no, it wasn't. That was the first time that that slander wasn't allowed.

At the same time--and I'll deviate for a second--our own State Department stumbled twice. They stumbled when they said we need to figure how high up in the Iranian government this went. As the former anti-terrorism officer for all of Iraq, I can assure them, and I could have saved them some time, that something of that magnitude would not have been planned had not Khamenei and Ahmadinejad personally approved it.

The other thing is the State Department came out and said we need to place Iran on increased diplomatic isolation. Louis Freeh turned to me and said, “What is that?” I have a military police sense of humour, and I said, “Somebody at the State Department spent their college youth watching the movie Animal House, and now they want to put Iran on double-secret probation.”

There was a third question you asked, sir.

[Wayne Marston, NDP, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

We don't have time for that one, but thank you, sir. That was a very comprehensive answer.

[Col Wesley Martin]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

We're actually out of time.

Mr. Sweet, you're next. I may have to shorten the rounds. It looks like we're running out of time, but right now you still have seven minutes.

[David Sweet, Conservative, Ancaster—Dundas—Flamborough—Westdale, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Colonel, I just wanted to say thank you very much for your service. We appreciate the role that the armed forces play here in Canada, and I know that your people appreciate your service as a protector of the people of the United States of America, as well.

You've mentioned entering Camp Ashraf--you called it a compound--to check regarding this abduction of Iraqi citizens. Could you just explain a little bit more? What was the nature of your exposure? Because of the experience that you've had as an anti-terrorist officer, how much exposure did you actually have to these people? How much interaction did you have, and for what period of time?

[Col Wesley Martin]

With the Mujahedin e-Khalq it went over a period of years. When I was the anti-terrorism officer I went to the commanding general over all detention operations in October 2003, because I had a serious problem I had detected and needed to talk to her about. That was that she had a total lack of adult supervision at Abu Ghraib. She and I went though officer basic course together. During that conversation--and unfortunately, nothing was done about what I had reported, and you know what happened there--we talked in detail about the mujahedin, and she told me she couldn't get people to understand that they were not part of the problem and they were a good source that we should be using both for information and as an ally. We went over in great detail about what they are, and I realized this is not a terrorist organization. So I was able to focus my attention on the other threats that I mentioned earlier.

Later, a report came in that they were building fighting positions up there. Okay, I checked into that one along with Major General Tom Miller. What we immediately realized was that they weren't building fighting positions. They were building trenches, but they were sewer and water trenches because of the sudden increase of population. It's a very sanitary organization, a very sanitary place. So those were the types of rumours we were putting out.

Later, when I became the J-3 of detention operations, the mujahedin Camp Ashraf was one of our five camps. I did pay attention to it there and I was dealing with issues concerning it.

[David Sweet, Conservative, Ancaster—Dundas—Flamborough—Westdale, ON]

So would you be exposed to the MeK folks on a weekly basis?

[Col Wesley Martin]

When I became base commander I was exposed to them on almost an hourly basis.

[David Sweet, Conservative, Ancaster—Dundas—Flamborough—Westdale, ON]

I want to make sure that we get your great expertise on the record, so I ask you, has there been any other group of 1,000, 2,000 or 3,000 people that has been able to fool you in your career, that all of a sudden you, under security, found out that they actually were terrorists when you thought they were innocent people?

[Col Wesley Martin]

I had individuals who fooled me greatly, but as to an organization of that magnitude that I personally dealt with over that period of time, no.