Subcommittee on International Human Rights Committee on Dec. 13th, 2011

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

Welcome to the 16th meeting of the Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development. Today is Tuesday, December 13, 2011.

We are continuing our study into Camp Ashraf. We are going to go directly to our witnesses.

We have with us today witnesses from the foreign affairs and international trade department, specifically Barbara Martin, who is the director general of the Middle East and Maghreb bureau, and Michael Walma, who is the director of the international crime and terrorism division.

Welcome.

As well, from Public Safety, we have Michael MacDonald, who is the director general of the national security operations directorate.

I'll just invite our witnesses to begin.

I'm sure you have already discussed the length of time the presentations ought to be. We always encourage people to be as brief as possible because we find that the most fruitful discussions come from the questions and answers, but obviously your facts are out and you're all grown-ups. You've probably all done this before anyway. Why don't I turn things over to you?

Who would like to go first?

Ms. Martin, go ahead, please.

[Barbara Martin, Director General, Middle East and Maghreb Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

It's a great pleasure for us to be here today. I will say that I am the only one with a prepared statement, so we will move to questions and answers as soon as I finish.

I'd like to begin by emphasizing the importance the government attaches to the situation at Camp Ashraf. Officials in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade have been following developments in the camp for many years, and we are deeply concerned about the future well-being of the residents. In addition, the Minister of Foreign Affairs has shown a keen interest in the situation. He has been monitoring the developments closely and has instructed officials to take a number of actions, which I will allude to later in my remarks.

I'd like to start by saying a few words about the MeK so that we have a shared understanding of the context. The Mujahedin e-Khalq, the MeK, or the People's Mujahedin Organization of Iran, the PMOI, was founded by Iranian Marxists in the 1960s to oppose western influence in Iran and to overthrow the shah. After the Iranian revolution in 1979, the MeK's Marxist ideology ran counter to the new regime under Ayatollah Khomeini. Its leadership was executed and the group was driven from Iran.

In 1986, at the height of the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam Hussein welcomed the MeK to Iraq, owing to their shared opposition to the Iranian regime. It established its new headquarters at Camp Ashraf, and the MeK, from there, carried out armed operations against Iran and cooperated with Saddam in suppressing uprisings of Iraqi Kurds and Shiites in southern Iraq. Many of MeK's terrorist attacks, which included assassinations, hostage takings, and hit-and-run raids, were aimed at government buildings in crowded cities where civilians were caught in the crossfire. Included among the MeK's litany of terrorist acts are the near simultaneous attacks in 1992 on Iranian government properties in 13 countries.

Canada was one of those countries, with 40 MeK supporters wielding sticks, crowbars, and mallets in an attack against the Iranian embassy here in Ottawa that left several people wounded. Members of the MeK leadership are widely believed to have used intimidation tactics and false pretenses to recruit new members to the camp, who in turn were forbidden from communicating with family members outside the camp.

The MeK has historically refused to cooperate with the Iraqi government or to allow Iraq to exercise its authority inside the camp. The MeK was added to the U.S.'s list of terrorist entities in 1997 and to Canada's in 2005. In December 2010, the Government of Canada completed its two-year review of terrorist entities listed under the Criminal Code, at which time the Governor in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Public Safety, decided that the MeK should remain a listed entity.

The Government of Iraq first announced its intention to close Camp Ashraf two years ago, later deciding on the end of 2011 as the deadline. The decision is based on article 7 of the Iraqi constitution, which prohibits the presence of any terrorist entity in Iraqi territory.

Iraq sees the MeK not just as unconstitutional but also as a threat to its national and regional security. The Government of Iraq contends that no government would agree to allow an organization to remain in its territory against the will and laws of the host state. Despite the international outcry voiced by Camp Ashraf's well-organized Paris-based lobby of international sympathizers, the camp's closure is supported by many Iraqis. These Iraqis are not limited to defected MeK members who understand the harsh living conditions in the camp but also include regular Iraqis who associate the MeK with Saddam Hussein's outlawed Baath Party and who have not forgotten its acts of terrorism against Iraqi Kurds and Shiites.

The Iraqi government has provided repeated assurances that Camp Ashraf residents will not be forcibly transferred to a country in which they would face persecution and that they will be humanely treated in accordance with Iraq's laws, constitution, and international obligations. The April 8, 2011, raid by Iraqi security forces that left 36 members of the camp dead was deeply troubling and completely unacceptable. This episode of recent history must not be repeated. However, in the months since then, the Iraqi government has cooperated with the international community to ensure that the security and humanitarian needs of the camp's residents are met. Since the announcement of the closure, the Iraqi government has demonstrated its willingness to cooperate with EU states, the United States, Iraq's neighbours, and Iran in order to resettle Ashrafi residents outside Iraq.

Some 3,400 people reside at the camp, including families with children. A significant portion of the residents who hold dual nationalities have already left Iraq, including nine of eleven Canadians who were repatriated on November 16 and 17. Canadian embassy staff have experienced the Iraqi government's compliance first-hand and attest to the willingness of the government to facilitate the safe transfer of residents to the airport.

The Government of Iraq has also allowed international organizations such as the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, UNAMI, and the International Committee of the Red Cross to visit the camp on a very regular basis. In fact, UNAMI has been visiting weekly of late. These groups monitor living conditions, facilitate communication with family members, and provide supplies for the residents.

However, some of the camp's residents, including two Canadians, still refuse to leave. The Iraqi government is participating in talks with the United Nations on how to move these remaining residents to another location in Iraq, as an alternative to expelling them from the country.

Many of the remaining residents do wish to leave and are applying for refugee status. They are being assessed on a case by case basis by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The UNHCR has been working tirelessly with the Iraqi government to process asylum requests. The commission eased an original condition for applicants: they are now required only to renounce violence, rather than the MEK specifically. But with less than a month left, time is running out, and UNAMI expects that a large number of applicants will not be processed in time.

Recognizing this, the UNHCR has asked the Iraqi government to postpone the closure of the camp to allow sufficient time to process all the applications. In his latest report on the situation in Iraq, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon appealed to the government of Iraq to allow more time and to find neutral space for that processing to be done. He also urged the leadership of camp Ashraf to be flexible and cooperative in finding a lasting solution.

Canada, the U.S., and the EU have been echoing these requests.

So far, the government of Iraq has refused to grant this extension.

Canada, through our embassy in Jordan, has followed the developments in Camp Ashraf closely through regular visits over the past few years. While the 11 Canadians in the camp had long denied Canadian offers of consular assistance, they finally expressed their desire to leave in June of this year. Officials from DFAIT and Passport Canada worked together last month to facilitate the repatriation of nine of these Canadian citizens from Camp Ashraf. The remaining two decided to remain in the camp.

Our efforts at Camp Ashraf go beyond simply providing consular assistance. Embassy staff members have made numerous visits to the camp, monitoring the living conditions, listening to concerns expressed by residents, and reporting on key events.

I would add that those visits are made despite the considerable risk to the security of our officials given the security environment in Iraq itself.

The most recent visit was on September 26, and an official from our embassy in Jordan will visit the camp again tomorrow, December 14.

DFAIT officials have used opportunities to raise concerns about the safety of camp residents at the United Nations, with European and American colleagues, with officials from neighbouring states, with Iraqi officials in Baghdad, and with the Iraqi embassy here in Ottawa.

Our ambassador to Iraq, who is based in Amman, raised the issue of the camp with Iraqi officials during a visit at the end of November. Minister Kenney raised it with the Minister of Displacement and Migration during meetings in Geneva earlier this month. Our ambassador to the European Union discussed our concerns with the EU special adviser on Camp Ashraf as well. And I and my officials have met several times with the Iraqi ambassador in the last few weeks alone.

Our concerns are in avoiding the forcible refoulement of Ashrafi residents to a country where they would face harm or persecution, and avoiding the possibility of violence around the camp's closure.

We are discussing—with our allies, UNSC members, the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, and other UN agencies—the best ways to ensure the residents of Camp Ashraf are in fact safe, including such options as stepped-up monitoring, a protection force, or international human rights observers.

CIDA has played an important role, too. In addition to the $300 million that Canada provided to Iraq's post-war construction, CIDA has provided support to the International Committee of the Red Cross, as well as to the UNHCR.

In the remaining weeks leading up to the closure, DFAIT officials will continue to urge the Government of Iraq to extend the deadline to allow the UNHCR sufficient time to process refugee claims. We will also seek to ensure that the human rights of camp residents are protected during and after the camp's closure.

We will urge the Government of Iraq to ensure that the camp is closed in a way that respects its obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law, and we will be continuing to monitor this situation closely in coming weeks and months.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

Thank you very much.

Am I correct that this is the only presentation and we'll now go to questions? Okay.

We'll start with the government, and I think we have time for six-minute rounds this time around.

Mr. Sweet, would you like to begin?

[David Sweet, Conservative, Ancaster—Dundas—Flamborough—Westdale, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for your testimony.

I take it that before you came here you reviewed the testimony of Colonel Wesley Martin, who is a retired United States military officer and whose testimony had quite a number of differences from what we've heard today.

He stated in his testimony that he was a terrorist expert and worked hand in hand with those people who are in Ashraf. He was fully persuaded, as far as he was concerned, that these folks did not fit the profile of terrorists at all. He mentioned that they had laid down their weapons years ago and had renounced violence then, and that he had always had unfettered access into the camp.

Some of the testimony I've heard here of some of the Ashraf residents refusing people access, etc.... Did you feel, after reviewing his testimony, that there were some inaccuracies in that, that he was not really characterizing the situation the way it actually is on the ground?

[Barbara Martin]

Thank you.

I'll start, but I'll ask my colleague from Public Safety to comment.

I think Colonel Martin was there during a particular period of time, and of course what we are looking at in terms of the behaviour of the MeK are incidents and situations that have happened over a much greater period of time. He is making his assessments from his encounters and engagements with the individuals at the camp; however, there are many factors that go into making an assessment as to whether an organization is actually engaged in terrorist activities or not.

But I'd ask my colleague from the Department of Public Safety if he could offer some comments.

[Michael MacDonald, Director General, National Security Operations Directorate, Public Safety Canada]

Thank you for the question.

I did read the statement. I read it with interest. I respect what the retired colonel was saying. Personally, I have never been on the ground at Camp Ashraf, so I would not speculate or comment on what he sees, or what he saw, or his feelings towards that. I can certainly take some time, now or later, to answer the question of...at least the part about listing a terrorist entity, if you prefer.

[David Sweet, Conservative, Ancaster—Dundas—Flamborough—Westdale, ON]

No, that's fine. I want to address something else now that came up in his testimony.

We see that today the Iraqi government is responsible for the safety for those in Camp Ashraf. Colonel Martin mentioned that the United States had listed them as protected persons and that they had taken full responsibility for their safety. I was not aware that under international law you could actually renounce that and then hand it over to some other government. Is it consistent with international law that they would be named protected persons by an authority and that then the authority would have the capability of leaving that responsibility to another?

[Barbara Martin]

Thank you. That's a good question.

In fact, the Geneva conventions define who is a protected person in a situation of armed conflict or foreign occupation. The parties to the conflict are responsible for implementing their obligations in that respect. The U.S., of course, had been the occupying power in Iraq after its engagement in that country. In 2009 it handed over jurisdiction to the Iraqi government, which is why the Iraqi government is now responsible for the protection of the individuals in Camp Ashraf.

[David Sweet, Conservative, Ancaster—Dundas—Flamborough—Westdale, ON]

Okay.

You mentioned in your testimony that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is not asking them to void any membership in the MeK, but simply to renounce violence. Is there some inconsistency in the way you feel they are being treated in that regard, with the UNHCR simply having them renounce violence? If they're listed in several countries, how are they going to find a country that is willing to take them?

[Barbara Martin]

The UNHCR is responsible for the resettlement of refugees from countries to third countries: those who have entered from their home country into another country and then are seeking asylum in another country. They have chosen to simply ensure the members of Camp Ashraf renounce violence, not necessarily membership in the MeK.

It is the conduct of violence that is the key criteria for determining a person's intent, not simply the membership in an organization, and therefore we have no difficulty with the UNHCR having done that. They are the ones who do the preliminary screening and then seek countries who would be willing to resettle these individuals at that point.

[David Sweet, Conservative, Ancaster—Dundas—Flamborough—Westdale, ON]

Are you confident, from the observations in Colonel Martin's testimony, as well as from all other sources, and also from our consular visits that have been going on regularly, that this group of people, particularly with the video that is available for the raid that happened to Camp Ashraf and those who were killed...? I mean, if there were any disposition to violence, they certainly would have used it to defend themselves when they were violently killed. Quite a number of them were killed—almost 40 of them, from what I understand—and quite a number of them were wounded.

Are you satisfied today that they pose no threat and that they have changed their ways entirely from those of the past, which you mentioned in your testimony?

[Barbara Martin]

I'm not in a position to make an assessment as to whether the individual residents of the camp have in fact renounced violence or not. Certainly, I too was appalled in watching that video; it was a very distressing situation to see unfold. It will be up to the UNHCR and then the authorities of each receiving country to determine on a case-by-case basis the situation with respect to each individual in the camp.

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

Thank you, Mr. Sweet. Unfortunately, that uses up your time.

We'll go now to Mr. Marston.

[Wayne Marston, NDP, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

I want to thank you for being here today. This is an extremely serious issue.

Having read the testimony, I would suggest to you, sir, that it's worth going online and watching Colonel Martin. He gave very compelling testimony here. It sounds as though, internationally, there are huge inconsistencies with Britain and other countries delisting the MeK.

It struck me, as I was sitting here listening to Mr. Sweet pose his questions, that the revolutionary army in the United States would have been called a terrorist group by the British crown. At some point, the acts of war and the things that have occurred reach an end point and people move on. Colonel Martin said that these particular people had given up their arms and renounced violence, and he described them as his best allies during the time he was there. I certainly don't mean to minimize the views you've taken in any way.

Tom Ridge of Homeland Security is calling for the delisting. It seems there is an almost endless list of people who believe that at this point in history this group should be delisted. A number of witnesses besides Colonel Martin testified that Iraq's leadership, which will be running the country following the U.S. withdrawal, is heavily influenced by the regime in Iran. The belief is that these people will either be murdered or be moved about in the country to make it easier to destroy them.

I find it very difficult to try to express this, because this is something that's going to occur within a few days. This isn't something that's down the road months away so that as a country we have the luxury of sitting here saying we'll wait to see what happens. I know you work for the leadership of our country, and you give them the best advice you possibly can, but is there not somebody prepared to say they believe that these 3,400 particular individuals, who were granted protection by the American government...? It strikes me as strange that the U.S. government would grant protection to people it truly believed were terrorists. There's a contradiction here.

Should we not, as a country, be calling for the delisting of these people by our country and the U.S.?

[Barbara Martin]

I have just a couple of points, and then, of course, my colleague from Public Safety is the expert on delisting.

You talk about the inconsistencies, and I think on the surface one could say there was inconsistency among the positions of Canada, the U.S., and a few others and that of some of the Europeans. However, I would point out that the decision among the Europeans to delist was made on the basis of a judicial review because of a procedural issue, in terms of the availability of evidence that was given to the MeK itself. I think European governments are still concerned about the intent and the activities of the group.

Secondly, you talk about acts of war. I'm not sure that attacking people, civilians, is considered justified in any context, even within war. I'm also not so sure that attacking the Iranian embassy in Ottawa is considered an act of war and is justified. So there are—

[Wayne Marston, NDP, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

I'd like to respond to that, because we're not talking about people who are in Canada or who are free to express themselves, and I certainly would not agree with anybody in Canada attacking either a civilian or a building or an embassy, but in this camp we're studying there are 3,400 unarmed people who are at the mercy of a government that has already previously attacked them and has supported attacks. It's very clear from the testimony we've heard that these people are at risk of being murdered.

Tom Ridge from Homeland Security would have had available to him in that position all the evidence necessary if he believed they should be sustained on the terrorist list. There was nobody else perhaps in the entire world who would have had the kind of access to information that he would have had. Again, the contradiction I'm talking about here is when persons of that rank in those positions—the colonel from the camp and all of the people who have come to the defence.... Even if they still are worthy of being on a terrorist list, if they're unarmed, they deserve the maximum protection that can be given to them, and we have to find a way.

I don't mean to be critical of you, because you're working from the evidence you have at hand.

The other gentleman, Mr. MacDonald, was going to explain.

[Barbara Martin]

Actually, could I come back on your point?

[Wayne Marston, NDP, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

Sure.

[Barbara Martin]

Because I think it's very important to keep the issue of delisting separate from the issue of protection.

You asked, why did the United States choose to protect a terrorist organization? It chose to protect those individuals because of its obligations as an occupying power to protect all individuals within that territory. Delisting is a very different issue.

Certainly with respect to the protection, we are urging the Iraqi government to provide an extension to the closure of the camp in order to allow the UNHCR to complete its work to resettle in a safe location those individuals who are in the camp as refugees. We are also urging the Iraqi government to honour its obligations and responsibilities to the camp, and we are encouraging the very regular weekly, as I said earlier, monitoring on the part of the UN organization.

So they're two rather separate issues: the protection and the delisting question.

I'll give the difficult question to my colleague.

[Wayne Marston, NDP, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

Thank you.

[Michael MacDonald]

All right.

Thank you for your comments. In particular, you've raised some points about listing and delisting and some of what our closest international partners have done. I would like to go over this just very quickly. I mean, this is a conversation that we could probably have for about an hour, but I'll make it short.

First and foremost, I think, is that countries around the world, and certainly our closest allies, have listing regimes. Those regimes are flexible. Those regimes meet domestic security needs of that particular country. Those listing regimes may be a joining of domestic and foreign policy initiatives and so on, so why one country lists and why one other country delists is not necessarily congruent to what goes on in Canada.

Listing is typically based on intelligence, as you pointed out, but what's unique about terrorist groups, and certainly a list...we approach the list as a living thing. Terrorist groups ebb and flow through time. They change, they morph, and the individuals within are not always static; therefore, a list as well ought not to be static. That is a concept you find in the Criminal Code, in the listing part of section 83.05, and I think that's an important part.

Now, in our domestic listing regime, there is a mandatory two-year review, which you may be aware of, in which the Minister of Public Safety makes a recommendation to the Governor in Council, who comes to a decision on whether or not the entities that are currently on the list ought to remain listed.

However, there are other ways in our domestic regime whereby an entity can become removed or delisted. One is that the entity can apply to the Minister of Public Safety. I'll note that the MeK has not applied in the Canadian case. They did apply in the U.K., the U.S., and the EU.

[Wayne Marston, NDP, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

Sir, can I interrupt you for a second?

We have 3,400 people in a camp in Ashraf, and whether or not they're going to apply, follow formalities, and follow.... They're under risk of their lives....

I see that my time's up. I'm sorry.

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

That's okay. I think that was in the nature of a comment rather than a question anyway.

[Wayne Marston, NDP, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

Yes.

[The Chair, Conservative, Scott Reid]

I appreciate that.

We'll go now to Mr. Hiebert. Following Mr. Hiebert will be Professor Cotler.