Interestingly enough, I can't answer would they have, but we, in our report, were rather critical. We had a section on international. Time prevented me from getting into it in any detail, but we were very critical that the OAS moved as quickly as they did in expelling Honduras. The secretary general of the OAS came to Honduras within 24 hours of the coup, but refused to meet with anybody except for the judiciary. Therefore, he wasn't able to have—and he was prevented by a decision of the council of the OAS to enter into—any discussions with anybody perceived as being in charge of the coup, i.e., the legislature, Micheletti and company, or the executive branch or the head of the legislature of the party.
He was not able to provide a dialogue, and of course those people in charge, if they weren't able to dialogue with the OAS and couldn't talk to them...it meant that the OAS was not in a position to broker any kind of an arrangement. To some extent, it reinforced the isolated, almost paranoid, feeling of this small country, when the big countries like Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina had obviously worked the council to stop any kind of communication or mediation type of role.