Thank you very much. I appreciate the opportunity the committee has given me to give my thoughts and the thoughts of the International Crisis Group about the situation in Sri Lanka.
I will focus on the current situation and the upcoming session of the UN Human Rights Council, which will be meeting next month in Geneva, and to what degree the Sri Lankan government has abided by the requests of the council last year and its resolution on promoting reconciliation and accountability in Sri Lanka.
Unfortunately, the simple answer is that the Government of Sri Lanka has comprehensively failed to comply with last year's UN Human Rights Council resolution. This is most obviously, but not only the case with respect to accountability for alleged crimes in the final phase of the civil war.
The International Crisis Group remains concerned that the absence of accountability regarding the end of the civil conflict, the lack of devolution of power, ongoing militarization of the north and the east, and the deepening authoritarianism of governance throughout the country are all increasing the risks of future conflict. Given the Sri Lankan government's failure to address these issues domestically, the Human Rights Council and the international community as a whole have an important role to play.
The Government of Sri Lanka claims to be pursuing reconciliation and accountability through its national plan of action to implement the recommendations of its Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission, known as the LLRC. In fact, it has ignored the LLRC's core recommendations which focused on re-establishing the rule of law and independent checks on executive and military power. The government has failed to heed the LLRC's recommendations and widespread public demands to restore the independence of key oversight bodies, for example, the police, human rights, and public service commissions, whose autonomy was removed by the 18th amendment to the Constitution in 2010.
The Sri Lankan government has also effectively nullified what remained of the judiciary's independence in January 2013 with the politically motivated impeachment of the chief justice. A series of arbitrary actions and political statements by the replacement chief justice, former presidential adviser Mohan Peiris, have further weakened the institution and confidence in it.
The government has also made no meaningful progress in investigating or prosecuting even the limited number of human rights cases that it claims to be pursuing.
First, there have still been no arrests or indictments in the 2006 massacre of 17 aid workers with the French Action contre la Faim humanitarian organization.
There have been no indictments in the Trinco-5 students' murder case. Twelve police officers were arrested at the magistrate's level last year, but they remain free on bail.
The government still refuses to release the 2009 report of a previous commission of inquiry, which looked into both the ACF and Trinco-5 cases, despite the LLRC's recommendation that it release that report.
There have been no successful prosecutions and few serious investigations into any of the dozen murders and violent attacks on journalists under the current government.
The commission appointed in the middle of 2013 to look into missing and disappeared persons, which the government claims is one way that it's implementing the LLRC recommendations, has in fact too broad a timeframe and too limited powers to be effective.
In addition, reports we are receiving from northern Sri Lanka at this very moment indicate the commission is not functioning in a fair and procedurally correct manner. Reports detail active involvement in the commission's work by the military, and other significant conflicts of interest.
In addition, the government has refused to release the reports of two previous disappearances commissions appointed by President Rajapaksa, has failed to implement the key recommendations of a half dozen previous commissions of inquiry into enforced disappearances, and has failed to agree to repeated requests for country visits by the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances. The repeated denial of the rights of the families of the disappeared to travel to Colombo and engage in public protest makes clear the government's lack of interest in uncovering the truth in these issues.
Finally, the government has still not presented to parliament its witness and victim protection bill, despite repeatedly promising to do so, generally just before some UN body meets. Since 2006, it has been promising this. There is still no action.
The entrenchment of impunity was particularly clear with respect to the credible allegations of serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law at the end of the war in 2009. The government has conducted no independent investigations into any of the alleged crimes committed by its troops or by the LTTE, including where strong prima facie visual evidence of extrajudicial killings exists.
The report of the Military Court of Inquiry, appointed in 2012, which the government says exonerated military forces of any responsibility for civilian deaths, has still not been released. Its methodology remains unknown. There is no publicly available information about the second Military Court of Inquiry, which reportedly is investigating allegations contained in material made public in films by channel 4. No suspects have been named, and none have been detained.
The politicization of the police and impunity for pro-government violence has encouraged new forms of communal violence throughout 2013 and into 2014. Radical Buddhist nationalist groups, like Bodu Bala Sena, the Buddhist Power Force, and Sinhala Ravaya, the roar of the Sinhala people, continue their regular violent attacks against Muslims and Christians and their places of worship. The failure of the police to prevent or arrest any of those responsible for the more than 100 such attacks supports the widely held belief that the violence has had the blessing of the government.
Despite the government's oft-stated commitment to the full implementation of the 13th amendment to the Constitution, the government is refusing to allow the newly elected Northern Provincial Council to establish an effective administration. The governor, an ex-general, appointed by and working for the president, has blocked council attempts to appoint key officials and constitute needed administrative departments within its constitutional powers. The government has shown no willingness to relinquish any of its effective control over the civil administration in the north.
The UN Human Rights Council's call for the government to "reach a political settlement on the devolution of power to the provinces" has also been undermined by the Rajapaksa government's insistence that issues of devolution and constitutional reform can only be addressed through the government-dominated Parliamentary Select Committee that it has appointed, despite the process being rejected by the main party, the TNA, and all other opposition parties.
There has been no apparent or verifiable reduction in the numbers of troops stationed in the north and east, or in the military's regular interference in civilian affairs in both provinces, despite the Human Rights Council and the LLRC both calling for demilitarization of the region.
That's not a terribly positive balance on this series of questions, but the government's refusal to conduct a credible, independent inquiry into alleged war crimes is particularly problematic, especially in the context of its deliberate dismantling of domestic rule of law institutions and the exhaustion of other forms of domestic remedy. All of this makes it incumbent on the Human Rights Council to establish an international commission of inquiry.
The International Crisis Group believes that the Human Rights Council should build on the positive experience of previous international commissions by ensuring that the inquiry includes the following key elements in its mandate: first, to investigate all alleged violations of the international humanitarian and human rights law committed from September 2008 through May 2009, both by the Sri Lankan government forces and fighters of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or LTTE; second, to establish the facts and circumstances of such violations and of alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity; third, to identify those responsible; fourth, to provide witness protection as required; fifth, to preserve evidence of alleged crimes; sixth, to be empowered to investigate continuing consequences of the events of 2008 and 2009, including alleged abuse of detainees, enforced disappearances, sexual violence, and the continued heavy militarization of the north and east, much of which appears designed to destroy evidence and intimidate potential witnesses; and, finally, to have the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights provide the administrative, technical, and logistical support necessary to allow the commission to carry out its mandate.
While the commission is likely to be denied entry into Sri Lanka, it should be able to gather and verify, to a high standard, a large body of evidence beyond what has already been gathered in 2010 and 2011 by the Secretary-General's panel of experts on accountability. Credible and important evidence has continued to emerge in bits and pieces, but more would be available if witnesses could address a UN inquiry tasked and resourced to receive and protect evidence.
To close, let me explain why we think that an international investigation is essential to underscore the unacceptability of war crimes and crimes against humanity, to hold accountable those responsible, and for other political benefits for the long-term health of Sri Lanka.
First, it would challenge Sri Lanka's institutionalized impunity, which is a necessary step for long-term democratic stability.
Second, it would establish a more complete record of the scale of civilian suffering, an account grounded in an intergovernmental mandate, and thus one less easily dismissed by the Sri Lankan government and its supporters.
Third, it would establish evidence of the LTTE's abuses in a form that is harder for Tamils and Tamil organizations to deny, thus discouraging the further romanticization of the LTTE.
Fourth, it would reassure survivors of wartime abuses that they haven't been abandoned by the international community, and would undercut growing demands by some Tamil diaspora organizations for more radical measures.
Fifth, it would uphold and restore the credibility of international humanitarian and human rights law, which has been badly damaged. It would also preserve the credibility of the UN Human Rights Council in the face of Sri Lankan government refusals to respond positively to its previous resolutions.
Finally, it would partially redeem the UN system as a whole after what the Secretary-General's internal review into UN actions in Sri Lanka described as its systemic failure in 2008 and 2009.
Ultimately, much more needs to be done, of course. An international commission of inquiry won't solve all of Sri Lanka's problems. The island's crisis of accountability and democratic governance runs too deep and is too complex to be solved quickly.
I'd be happy to discuss with the committee other actions the Canadian Parliament and its international partners can take to encourage lasting peace in Sri Lanka.
Thank you very much.
