Thank you.
For those who engage in primary research on the organ harvesting of prisoners of conscience in China, this hearing comes at the end of a particularly ominous year.
Winter saw the fatal collapse of two years of medical engagement with Chinese medical authorities. Spring brought new evidence that the mass harvesting of prisoners of conscience was not only continuing but accelerating. Fall carried with it the first reports—unconfirmed, yet surprisingly consistent across China's provinces—that the Chinese authorities are no longer taking DNA swabs and blood tests consistent with tissue-matching from Falun Gong just in prisons and labour camps, but in their homes.
In short, the history that I'm going to condense for you today is still being written.
Let's begin the slides in the mid-1990s with one of these men who have just carried out an execution. The enlisted armed policeman on the left of the screen tries to look official. In the foreground, a supreme procuratorate officer, wearing a white rag against back splatter, meets our gaze defiantly. These are the eternal faces of routine execution. Blur the racial features and we see the same uneasy postures in many authoritarian states. In fact, the man in the front is actually wearing a white rag to protect against back splatter as he fires the gun.
Yet from an official Chinese perspective, there is nothing surreptitious taking place in this photograph. The signs on the executed prisoners indicate that they were duly convicted of capital crimes: murder, rape, drug sales, etc. Their bodies will be gathered into medical vans and harvested for their kidneys and livers. That's not secret either. Since 2006, Beijing has admitted that the vast majority of the organs that Chinese hospitals transplant into aging western organ tourists and rich Chinese are from death row prisoners.
Twenty years later—now—most executions are carried out in secret by surgeons. In the photograph shown here, they carry freshly extracted organs. The critical change since the mid-1990s is that the majority of retail organs in China are not extracted from death row convicts, but from prisoners of conscience—again, political and religious prisoners—who cannot be sentenced to death even under the vagaries of Chinese law: Tibetan monks, or a Uyghur activist who openly shook his fist in a demonstration, or a Falun Gong woman who passed out leaflets on the street.
The Chinese medical system is said to generate approximately 10,000 transplants per year. As Damon said, the number of legally executed prisoners is well below 5,000. Voluntary organ donations are negligible, and this suggests another source, but the fact is that we don't have to rely solely on mysterious numerical gaps. We can bracket this 20-year transformation through reliable medical witnesses such as this one.
I've supplied a map to you—I think you have it in your hands—that includes major police and medical installations throughout China that were involved in organ harvesting. It's not a comprehensive map; the sites are the ones that I established through personal interviews in my new book, The Slaughter. At the northwest corner of the map, you'll find Urumqi Railway Central Hospital.
In 1995, one of the hospital's surgeons, Dr. Enver Tohti, shown on the screen here, was driven to the Western Mountain Execution Grounds. Following an apparently routine mass execution, a prisoner was singled out for harvesting. The man was alive. The gunshot was deliberately aimed to the left of the side of the chest to produce shock that could act as a natural anesthesia. Dr. Tohti was told to remove the man's kidneys and liver. Following the prisoner's single reflexive contraction, Dr. Tohti performed the extraction. Based on the pulsing blood, the man's heart was beating until that. Now, this was a medical advance. Live organ harvesting promotes a lower rate of rejection by the new host.
Hard-core criminals also have a lot of health problems, particularly hepatitis. Two years later, Xinjiang was the staging point for a second change in medical ethics. The first organ harvesting of Uyghur political prisoners was carried out in Urumqi on behalf of five high-ranking Communist Party officials who had come in search of healthy young organs. Live organ harvesting would become routine through China, but the harvesting of prisoners of conscience who had not been convicted of capital crimes was initially confined to Xinjiang.
In 1999 the Chinese state security launched its largest action of scale since the cultural revolution: the eradication of Falun Gong. Yet by 2001, the blitzkrieg had become trench war, and Chinese military hospitals began targeting select Falun Gong prisoners for harvesting.
There are many points of evidence for this. As Damon said, Kilgour and Matas list 52 of them. I’ll present just one: Dr. Ko Wen-je, chairman of the Traumatology Department, National Taiwan University Hospital. Ten years ago Dr. Ko went to a mainland hospital to negotiate reduced kidney and liver prices for his department’s elderly patients. After a friendly banquet, Dr. Ko was given the Chinese price, which was about half of what a foreigner pays. In response to Dr. Ko’s concerns about unhealthy criminal organs, the Chinese surgeons assured Dr. Ko all the organs would come from Falun Gong: these people don’t drink; they don't smoke; they practise very healthy qigong. We appreciate your discretion.
Dr. Ko is now the leading candidate to be mayor of Taipei, largely due to the perception that he is a man of integrity. I’ll go further. Dr. Ko’s testimony has done more for this investigation than all the world’s health organizations put together.
The larger point is that the organ harvesting of prisoners of conscience did not begin with Falun Gong. It evolved organically. The central decision to exploit prisoners of conscience on a mass scale was little more than a legal blurring around the edges. Yet why would the Chinese Communist Party, so rich in resources and power, so eager for international acclaim, take such a risk? Thus the investigative problem becomes one of motive, of plausibility. It is not just the how, it is the why, and that question dominates six out of ten chapters in my book. I’ll just touch on it here.
You may have heard it said that the party’s decision to crush Falun Gong was driven by its size. At 70 million, there were five million more practitioners than party members. That’s true, but it is also germane that Falun Gong came from the Chinese heartland with no western intellectual or foreign trappings. So the party’s fears had more to do with that little boy in the picture in the front.
That boy could grow up to be a man and perhaps a soldier of the People’s Liberation Army like this one, and most of all they feared this woman Ding Jing. She lives in Toronto. She's in the hospital, I believe. As a Falun Gong coordinator, she taught the exercises. She carried plastic garbage bags around to make sure that practice sites stayed tidy, and she looked after three sites. The first was for China Central Television. The second was for the Public Security Bureau, the secret police of China. The third was for the high-ranking Communist Party officials and their wives.
For the party, Ding Jing’s tidy sites seemed to spring out of the Marxist template for seizing power. Start up in the heartland, infiltrate the intellectuals, then the military, and the leadership itself. For the nationalist elements of the party who believe this is China’s century, Falun Gong’s belief in truth, compassion, and forbearance suggested an earlier China: passive, weak, easily dominated.
Their theory was wrong. Falun Gong’s resistance in the labour camps and indeed globally was not passive. It was extraordinary, as was the party’s ferocious response. I won't show you pictures of labour camps and atrocities, but I will show you this picture of Falun Gong refugees, because if you take out this guy in the middle, this is a pretty good numerical representation of my findings. All these women were in labour camps. All were tortured. One of them was sexually abused. And the woman on the left was given a series of physical examinations aimed exclusively at assessing the health of her retail organs and tissue matching.
From a sample of 50 refugees, I conclude that half a million to one million Falun Gong are incarcerated at any given time. By 2008, approximately 65,000 Falun Gong practitioners had been harvested for their organs. My calculations are published in two books, The Slaughter and also State Organs, and my estimate is used as a baseline calculation in the text of U.S. Congress House Resolution 281. Your own Kilgour and Matas study, extrapolating from official Chinese numbers, estimate that approximately 60,000 Falun Gong organs were harvested by 2008. That’s an apples and oranges comparison, but clearly we are looking at fatalities above 50,000.
Although the numbers are much smaller, many Tibetans, Uyghurs, and even some house Christians received the same testing as Falun Gong. Enforced disappearances of Uyghurs are particularly dramatic. I won’t estimate that fatalities at this time. I can only say that two Tibetans came back alive.
I have some brief, final points. Any pretense that harvesting was not state controlled evaporated with this discovery that in 2012 these photographs of Wang Lijun are of the protege of former politburo member Bo Xilai. In fact Wang Lijun is directing live organ harvesting. Wang was given a public award for using a new lethal injection method on thousands of harvested prisoners. That discovery led the Chinese medical establishment to attempt to create a public picture of a rapidly reforming transplant system. Perhaps some of you have heard of these promises. In the west, the Transplantation Society played along by politely refusing to acknowledge the harvesting of prisoners of conscience, even if many members privately believe the allegations to be true.
Earlier this year the Chinese explicitly reneged on those promises of reform, leading the Transplantation Society with nothing but this now-embarrassing snapshot. We, in turn, have been left with a policy vacuum.
One component of that aborted reform was a supposed ban on western organ tourism. Actually, it never ended. Three months ago these Chinese organ brokers were still advertising openly on the Web.
The harvesting of Falun Gong did not end either. At this time I can't supply a Falun Gong fatality count after 2008, but this Falun Gong labour camp refugee was tested for her organs, along with 500 other prisoners, mainly practitioners, one year ago.
What should Canada do? I urge you to read my book with a critical eye. I am confident in my conclusions, in part because I don't go much beyond the findings that I've just presented. I did not write my book to tell you how you should think about the Chinese state.
If you believe that China is a good investment, well, perhaps it is. Yet the history I've described is also true, and that history is still being written even in this hearing today. I do not ask you to follow the path of divestment or trade war. I ask that you follow your own values. How can any Canadian citizen be complicit in a scheme where an innocent person will be killed so that a Canadian might live?
Canada has the power to stop this. The basic mechanism of criminalizing organ tourism is straightforward. If you go to China and you come back with a new organ, you will be incarcerated. Until the Chinese authorities provide a full accounting of this crime against humanity, I believe this is precisely the model that Canada should follow.
Thank you.