I think you know very well, Professor Cotler, the CPA, the comprehensive peace agreement, was not comprehensive. It was not comprehensive in the way that the CPA did not solve the problems in South Sudan, but created more problems in Sudan.
First, when John Garang died he had many officers from the Nuba Mountains, from Blue Nile, and from the Angasina hills who fought with the SPLA in the south for many years. John Garang died and South Sudan became independent. Now what happened was that the soldiers who were in the bush with the SPLA for over 20 years were left to the mercy of the Khartoum government. There was no mechanism within the CPA, should South Sudan become independent, as to what would happen to the entities from Blue Nile, the Nuba Mountains, and the Angasina hills. What will happen to them? That was not put forward and the international community was short on that. That was one of the weaknesses of the CPA.
Second, the CPA was also short. In 2010 I was in the United States with Ambassador Lyman who was the peace envoy for the U.S. I told him that we should not only be focusing on the referendum, but we should put in place the mechanism on how South Sudan will govern itself after the independence of South Sudan. It is very important. South Sudan has 66 tribes. If we do not put in that mechanism for the sharing of the power, the governance system, then we will go back to square one.
They said no, let us get the independence. Once we get the independence we will sort out the rest. Last year I was with Ambassador Lyman in Washington at the same place and I asked Ambassador Lyman what we got out of that approach. That was the thing. The CPA was not inclusive. It was not comprehensive. Now Khartoum uses this weakness of the CPA to punish the Nuba Mountains, the Nuba who participated with the SPLA, because it says, you allowed South Sudan to get separated, you supported the separation of South Sudan, and now you have to pay for it.
It is the same thing with those in Blue Nile and the Angasina hills. They will now pay for the cost of their participation in the separation of South Sudan, yet the government of South Sudan cannot support them. The government of South Sudan cannot support its own citizens in South Sudan.