Mr. Chair, distinguished committee members, first let me thank you for inviting me to appear before you today.
I am honoured to appear before you again. I thank all of you for your long-standing commitment to making sure that the issue of human rights in Iran is not forgotten. I say so at a time when the nuclear question has all but eclipsed the question of human rights in Iran.
I would like to begin by addressing what has happened in the past two to three years under the presidency of Mr. Rouhani, the promises of reform, and the progress that has been made in trying to achieve some sort of solution to the nuclear issue.
Of course, nobody would say that diplomacy should not be given a chance. Nobody would say that war or sanctions are by any means desirable or viable solutions for solving this problem. But as I have said before this committee for many years, the problem in Iran is not that of nuclear capability but the nature of the regime. There are many countries in the world with nuclear capability about which we have very little concern. It's the nature of a regime that rules through terrorism, through violence, and through an extremist religious ideology that is cause for concern.
The question is this: under the shadow of nuclear negotiations and the wager that by ending Iran's isolation one will incentivize some sort of domestic political transformation—the empowerment of the so-called pragmatists moving Iran into the mainstream of international community—what has happened on the domestic front, even as President Rouhani, Foreign Minister Zarif, and others have engaged in their charm offensive and in making pragmatic concessions on foreign policy fronts?
I will begin by speaking about the human rights situation in Iran. To give you just a glimpse of what I believe is a summary of the reality of the human rights situation in Iran, one could say that, at best, despite all the promises of President Rouhani to adopt some sort of bill of rights and to relax many of the restrictions on Iranian citizens, at best the human rights situation remains as it was before under the presidency of Mr. Ahmadinejad. At worst, it has actually deteriorated. As the regime makes concessions on the foreign policy front, the message of the hard-liners to Iranian citizens has been that they should not get the false impression that the concessions that have been made to the international community will translate into meaningful reform at home.
The United Nations Universal Periodic Review made a number of recommendations to the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Islamic Republic undertook to accept 126 of those recommendations. According to reports prepared by reputable human rights organizations, of those 126 recommendations, five—only five—have been fully accepted. The reality is that the rate of executions in Iran remains alarming. It is still the highest rate of per capita executions in the world. This year the rate of executions is the highest it has been in the past 12 years. The execution rate today is worse, believe it or not, than it was under President Ahmadinejad.
My friend Marina asked, can things get worse? Well, apparently they have. Censorship and repression of the media and civil society remain as before. The imprisonment of the leader of the Green Movement, Mr. Mousavi, is still in force. He has been under house arrest for close to five years now, with no formal charges. The persecution of ethnic and religious minorities has intensified. I will address this issue in light of the broader regional context.
When we look at this reality, we have to understand what I would call the trilogy of human rights abuses, authoritarianism, and hyper-corruption in Iran.
It's remarkable that Mr. Larijani, head of the human rights council, recently warned those who exaggerate the extent of corruption in the government—this is from the report of the UN special rapporteur for human rights, Dr. Ahmed Shaheed—and instructed the law enforcement authorities to pursue individuals who expose corruption.
Now, why do I say this? I say this because while Canada is going before the United Nations General Assembly—commendably, as it has for so many years—sponsoring the resolution on human rights in Iran, Canada has become one of the biggest money-laundering centres for Islamic Republic insiders. You will recall some years ago the case of Mr. Khavari. Mr. Khavari for many years was the head of Sepah bank. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, Sepah bank is the “financial linchpin” of both Iran's nuclear programs and its overseas terrorist operations, including the operations of the Quds Force as well as Hezbollah.
Through a simple Internet search, you can see that Mr. Khavari was head of the Sepah bank during the years when he qualified for Canadian citizenship under the Immigration Act. How much does it take to figure out that, notwithstanding his very questionable past, he was not physically present in Canada for the minimum three years that is required under the Immigration Act? Why has the government not taken action against Mr. Khavari? What credibility do we have when we allow such massive corruption to enter our own shores? Do we not appreciate, human rights aside, the security implications of the tremendous network of influence that money buys in this country? This is an issue I've raised over multiple years. I've raised it personally with our Minister of Immigration and with our Minister of Foreign Affairs. We need to think long and hard about how seriously we're committed to dealing with this issue.
I want to briefly also address not just the human rights situation in Iran but the human rights situation in the region at a time when we've seen an alarming deterioration of the situation in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. All of this has happened under the shadow of the nuclear negotiations. It's under the shadow of the nuclear negotiations that Iran has expanded its influence throughout the region.
Now, we're not here to talk about geopolitics, we're here to talk about human rights. Countries have a right to extend their influence by legitimate means, not through atrocities against civilians. That is the only issue I wish to look at.
In the same way that the Islamic Republic rules at home through terror and violence, it is also extending its influence in the region through the same means through proxy wars, through allies and insurgents over which it has complete control, and through the direct operation of the Quds Force. The Quds Force is the branch of Iran's revolutionary guards that is involved in overseas operations—the same Quds Force whose banker is Mr. Khavari, a Canadian citizen, and the same Quds Force that was involved in the 1994 bombing of the Jewish cultural centre in Buenos Aires, in which some 90 people were killed. We saw recently what happened to the star witness in that case, who was mysteriously assassinated in Buenos Aires.
The question of Syria and Iraq from a human rights point of view directly implicates Iran. The United Nations independent commission of inquiry has on many occasions referred to the role of Iran's revolutionary guards and Hezbollah without which the Assad regime would never have survived and which forces have had a direct role in atrocities against civilians.
We are now all caught up with the story of the ISIS barbarians who like to advertise their beheadings on social media, but let us not forget that despite the barbarity of ISIS, the killing of civilians by ISIS is still a small fraction of the more than 200,000 civilians that the Assad regime has killed. Perhaps the Assad regime doesn't advertise its mass murder on YouTube, but it is still by far the biggest menace in terms of human rights in Syria.
The situation in Iraq also has to be considered in light of the fact that the Shia militia, such as the Badr Brigades, which are leading the charge against ISIS, are also implicated in human rights atrocities against Sunnis. That is certainly not going to be the solution to any lasting stability in Iraq.
Why do I say this? Because the Middle East is now at the precipice. What is happening, in effect, is a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia that is expressed through ideological extremism, through the instrumentalization of the Shia-Sunni and Persian-Arab divide. This will have catastrophic consequences.
Getting back to my what my friend Marina Nemat said, can things get worse? Things can get much worse as this cleavage between Shia and Sunni Islam does not just rip apart Iraq and Syria but spills over into the kind of ethnic religious politics that we see within Iran and Saudi Arabia. Let us not forget about the Arab minority in Iran. Let us not forget about the Shiite minority in Saudi Arabia.
I would simply appeal to this committee, while being most grateful that you continue to raise this issue at a time when it is being swept under the carpet in the name of so-called pragmatism, to appreciate that the situation could get far, far worse in the Middle East. Canada and the international community must broaden the conversation and not just look at ISIS and not just look at the nuclear issue. They must understand that until there's some sort of solution to this increasing radicalization and these wars of identity, we will be meeting here again in the near future with even more tragic stories to share.
Thank you.