Subcommittee on International Human Rights Committee on Nov. 6th, 2018

[The Chair]

Mr. Picard, your turn.

[Michel Picard, Liberal, Montarville, QC]

Good afternoon. My name is Michel Picard. My colleague gave me the rest of his time so I could ask you questions.

Mr. Niyongere, how likely is it that international intervention would lead to retaliation and therefore more severe consequences for Burundi's people?

[Armel Niyongere]

Could you please repeat the question?

[Michel Picard, Liberal, Montarville, QC]

How likely is it that international intervention could lead to even worse acts of reprisal against the people, because it would be seen as outside interference?

[Armel Niyongere]

Actually, I think the international community should try to stop the worst from happening, particularly in regard to the peacekeeping missions in Somalia and the Central African Republic. The international community should cease or suspend the missions because the money they generate is being used to pay the Imbonerakure militia to commit crimes and bully the population. The international community should really be taking swift measures to prevent the worst.

[Michel Picard, Liberal, Montarville, QC]

My next question is for Mr. Nininahazwe.

I had a look at your website and saw that some of the people listed have ties to opposition parties. Many are identified simply by civil status.

Are they individuals who openly oppose the regime and suffer the consequences? Also, is there a practice of singling people out and getting rid of them as a precaution?

[The Chair]

You have just 20 seconds to answer, so I'll ask you to keep it brief, please.

[Pacifique Nininahazwe]

Thank you.

Most of the victims whose cases we've identified through the Ndondeza campaign are opposition activists, usually members of the MSD party or Agathon Rwasa's FNL party. Most of them protested against President Nkurunziza's third term, in the city of Bujumbura and other parts of the country.

We have also observed that a very small number of CNDD-FDD and Imbonerakure members were the victims of enforced disappearances. These are individuals who were involved in extremely serious crimes. We believe they were eliminated so they wouldn't be able to testify to serious crimes perpetrated by the regime before the International Criminal Court.

For the most part, the victims are regime opponents, but they can be members of the ruling party.

[The Chair]

Thank you.

We'll have the next question from Ms. Hardcastle. You have seven minutes.

[Cheryl Hardcastle, NDP, Windsor—Tecumseh, ON]

Thank you very much, gentlemen.

I am going to be asking you both about the reform of defence authorities and what you think should happen.

I will start with Mr. Niyongere, please.

[The Chair]

I hear the interpretation now, but I believe we have lost Mr. Niyongere.

We are having some technical difficulty, so we can't hear Mr. Niyongere.

In that case, Mr. Nininahazwe can answer first.

[Pacifique Nininahazwe]

I'll answer in Mr. Niyongere's place.

The Arusha accord provided for the creation of defence and security forces [Technical difficulty—Editor]. Some of those security and defence forces are being ethnically radicalized, particularly the national intelligence service, which is the primary force used in the repression and is made up almost entirely of Hutus.

There are also concerns as far as the army and police go. The Arusha accord established the ethnic makeup of the two security forces, but we worry that it isn't being adhered to, especially since many members of the military and police who belonged to the former, predominantly Tutsi, army have disappeared or been murdered. A number of them have fled.

The reform of defence forces in Burundi should still be consistent with the Arusha accord. We'll have to see to what extent exiled military members are accepted back into Burundi's security forces, in order to break the cycle of violence. That's what will happen if they remain out there and are not integrated into the defence and security forces.

[The Chair]

Mr. Niyongere, did you have anything to add?

[Armel Niyongere]

I did not hear the question.

[The Chair]

Can you repeat the question, Ms. Hardcastle?

[Cheryl Hardcastle, NDP, Windsor—Tecumseh, ON]

Yes. I wanted to hear about some of the ways that Burundi could reform its authorities, its defence authorities in particular.

[Armel Niyongere]

When it comes to the defence reform, I think it is much more a matter of the army and other security services.

First, the authorities must align themselves with what was set out in the Arusha agreement in order to reassure all Burundians, given that those security forces have always been used to murder part of the Burundian population.

Second, it should be pointed out that many military members and police officers are currently in exile. Rebel movements are starting to form, but they're not even invited to participate in the dialogue on the Arusha agreement. It is important for the defence reform to integrate those elements that are now outside the country and will continue to disrupt Burundi's security if they are not integrated.

Third, training must be organized to have a professional army and police force that truly serve Burundians.

[The Chair]

Thank you very much.

I think we'll go to a second round, but we'll keep it very short, to three minutes per person.

We will begin with Mr. Fragiskatos.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I'd like to follow on Ms. Hardcastle's questioning. This was hinted at, perhaps, in the question about the defence forces and the answer on ethnic politics that was given, but I'd like to delve into that further. In what way is ethnic identity being politicized at the current moment by ruling authorities? What are the implications of that, if it is indeed being politicized?

[Pacifique Nininahazwe]

Thank you for your question.

It seems to us more and more that defence forces and security forces are politicized. A number of generals from the old CNDD-FDD rebellion are the real leaders of the party in power. When we list those in charge and those who really have power in Burundi, after Nkurunziza, there are always a number of CNDD-FDD generals who are deciding on the fate of Burundians today.

It is also wrong that only Hutus are at the most senior levels of the national military and police, but there aren't any members of Burundi's former army and former police. That is a serious violation of the Arusha agreement, concluded in 2000.

Moreover, the party in power today is led by a CNDD-FDD general, and we feel that CNDD-FDD military members and generals continue to heavily influence the Burundian population. As long as Burundi's politicians remain militarized, we will live in fear of a crisis situation, like we did during the era of military coups we thought was gone.

[Armel Niyongere]

To complement Mr. Nininahazwe's comments, I must say that defence and security forces are indeed politicized in Burundi. Recently, there was a three-month temporary suspension of international NGOs. That suspension was instituted by an advisory body, the National Security Council, which is made up of generals and chaired by the president of the republic, Pierre Nkurunziza. That body could not institute such a measure, but since it is made up of generals and former CNDD-FDD military members, it supplants an executive body. So we are seeing that the Burundian regime is a military regime. Military and security forces are politicized.

[The Chair]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Sorenson, you have three minutes.

[Kevin Sorenson, Conservative, Battle River—Crowfoot, AB]

I'm Kevin Sorenson, and I'm a member of Parliament from the western part of Canada.

I want to thank you for your testimony today and for what you do, fighting for freedom and human rights in a very dangerous place.

I have a couple of comments and maybe a question or two.

In Burundi, as in many such countries, it's almost like, if you control the military, you control the country. I have a colleague who spent some time in Burundi. The use of child soldiers was occurring in Burundi at the time. He met a young 12-year-old soldier whom he said had the most blank look you could ever imagine in a human being, and that young soldier admitted to killing over 25 people. I'm not sure, first of all, if this is still happening with child soldiers, but at that time, it was.

In regard to the economy of Burundi, some of our notes show that 400,000 people have been displaced, and I think the number you used was 500,000 people. That obviously disrupts the economy. I know that Germany, Pakistan and others are larger trading partners with Burundi than Canada is. We're about seventh on the list. As far as the economy goes, when you have people displaced, that is bad, but it can also be a real negative when they come back because they're returning without a job to go to and without a bank account.

I'm wondering if you can tell us a little bit about their state when they return. Are they coming back willingly? Are these part of the international arrests that they're promoting? If you could give the committee a bit of an idea in regard to the displacement and how some of the countries around.... Are they responding in alliance with Burundi, or are they recognizing the problems there and backing off on that?

[The Chair]

You each have 30 seconds to answer.

Mr. Niyongere, go ahead.

[Armel Niyongere]

Currently, Burundian refugees who are in countries bordering the region—for example, in Tanzania—are very threatened. Sometimes, they are forcibly sent back to the country without their consent.

That is why we are asking Canada to support the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees in its work with host countries to guarantee the civilian security of Burundian refugees. I am here referring to refugees in Tanzania, who are threatened and send us messages every day to alert us. So we are sounding the alarm and asking Canada and the rest of the international community to help the HRC in its attempt to guarantee the civilian security of Burundian refugees.