That's a good point. Thank you for the question.
There is a significant worsening of the situation across the board, particularly when it comes, in this context, to the Uighur situation—as well as the Tibetan situation, by the way. Exactly what he did in Tibet—and I'm talking about Chen Quanguo—was to squeeze Tibetans and their economy wishes and import some of those same methods into Xinjiang. That is why, as I was mentioning earlier, he was sanctioned last week by the American Congress.
In general, the kind of state that Xi Jinping has been trying to build in China since December 2012 has involved forcing upon non-Han Chinese whatever form of Han Chinese-like identity he can. That, of course, technically would start with the language. That is why there is pressure, constant pressure, regarding instruction in a variety of ways, not only in schools but also by bringing Han Chinese into Uighur families so that those Han Chinese can train their families, if you will, in the Chinese language, and of course in Chinese nationalism, which has become extremely strong again since December 2012. The same kind of policy can be seen in Tibet as well.
When we talk about the difference between Uighur tradition and Chinese tradition, this is something we cannot overlook, and it is very fundamental. When we talk about a very significant aboriginal group like the Uighurs, who are monotheistic, and the Chinese tradition, which is not only non-monotheistic but one in which religion has always been—at least for 2,000 years, if you will, in the context of Confucianism, which is not a religion—totally subservient to the state, there's a clash of values, for want of a better word, that comes to the fore every single time and that is going to make for a very significant difficulty going forward in trying to find some more humane modus vivendi, if you will, between the Chinese Xi Jinping regime and the Uighur aboriginal population of Xinjiang.
I'm not considering the future in very positive terms, not at all.