Thank you, Mr. Chair.
There are so many themes to draw on here.
One point I'm taking away from the testimony of Mr. Browder and Ms. Kanji is that it seems that, in international human rights work, we've identified these mechanisms like the Magnitsky act, like doctrines, like responsibility to protect, but all these mechanisms require executive action. In many of these cases, it's not about the tools being available; it's a failure of executive action. I'm wondering if we need to develop these doctrines a little bit by compelling executives more effectively to act in cases like this, introducing maybe automatic triggers that require executives to impose Magnitsky sanctions and recognize genocide to uphold their obligations when they happen.
It hasn't been mentioned, but in the U.S., the imposition of sanctions came about not as a result of the executive acting on their own, but as a result of legislative action through the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act, which required the Trump administration to respond.
I'd be curious to hear from Ms. Kanji and Mr. Browder about whether they think we need to move beyond just giving tools to the executive and compel executive action in cases where there is clear evidence of genocide or gross violations of human rights.
Maybe Mr. Browder can go first, and then Ms. Kanji.