Subcommittee on International Human Rights Committee on Oct. 17th, 2023

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

I call this meeting to order. Good morning to you all.

Welcome to meeting number 35 of the House of Commons Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

Today's meeting is taking place in hybrid format. Members can participate in person in the room or remotely using the Zoom application.

To ensure that the meeting runs smoothly, I'd like to make a few comments for the benefit of the witnesses and members.

Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking.

For those participating by video conference, click on the microphone icon to activate your mike and please mute yourself when you are not speaking.

There is interpretation. For those on Zoom, you have the choice at the bottom of your screen of either floor, English or French. For those in the room, you can use the earpiece and select the desired channel.

When members present in the room wish to speak, they must raise their hand. Those on Zoom should use the “raise hand” function. The committee clerk and I will manage the speaking order as best we can, and we appreciate your patience and understanding in this regard.

In accordance with the committee's routine motion concerning connection tests for witnesses, I am informing the committee that all witnesses have completed the required connection test in advance of the meeting.

Today we are meeting to resume our study of the situation of the Hazaras in Afghanistan. It is my pleasure to welcome the witnesses who have joined us this morning.

We have Dr. Niamatullah Ibrahimi, senior lecturer, international relations, La Trobe University, who is here as an individual, by video conference from Australia; Shabnam Salehi, visiting lecturer and researcher, University of Ottawa; and, from the Canadian Hazara Advocacy Group, Dr. Tahir Shaaran.

Each one of you will have five minutes for your intervention.

Subcommittee members will then be able to ask you questions. I'll let you know when one minute of your time is remaining.

Dr. Niamatullah Ibrahimi, the floor is yours for five minutes. Go ahead, please.

[Dr. Niamatullah Ibrahimi, Senior Lecturer, International Relations, La Trobe University, As an Individual]

Hello. Good morning. Thank you, Chair and members of the committee, all participants and my co-witnesses in this particular session of the Canadian House of Commons Subcommittee on International Human Rights.

In my five minutes, I will make three main remarks based primarily on the written testimony I submitted to this committee, together with Dr. William Maley and Dr. Melissa Chiovenda, in May of this year. Let me highlight three of the points we were making in that particular written testimony. I would be quite happy to elaborate on any of those points in the questions and answers.

First, the Hazaras in Afghanistan are a distinct ethnic and religious group. They are one of several ethnocultural groups that constitute the population of Afghanistan. The Hazaras are identified by a shared belief in a common ancestry in association with an ancestral homeland called Hazarajat, or Hazaraistan. They are also generally identified by their central Asian phenotype, which distinguishes them from the rest of the population of Afghanistan. The Hazaras are also predominantly followers of Shia Islam. As a result, they are a religious minority in a country of predominantly Sunni Muslims. They also speak a distinctive dialect of Dari or Persian in Afghanistan.

All of these features constitute the Hazaras as a distinctive ethnic and religious group under international law, especially within the context of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

While these features distinguish the Hazaras from other ethnic and cultural groups in Afghanistan as a sociological reality, these features have also been the reasons that the Hazaras have been the target of genocide, systematic persecution and displacement over several decades in Afghanistan.

This brings me to the second point that I would like to bring to your attention, members of the committee. During the years of the formation of the modern Afghan state under the reign of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan from 1880 to 1901, several wars and violence targeted different groups in Afghanistan. One of the major episodes of conflict in Afghanistan from 1891 to 1893 targeted the Hazaras. That war, known as the Hazaras War, resulted in what would be a textbook example of genocide under international law in Afghanistan.

I have documented and provided a detailed examination of that case in my book, which is entitled The Hazaras and the Afghan State: Rebellion, Exclusion and the Struggle for Recognition. It was published in 2017 by Hurst & Co. in London.

Let me quickly highlight some of the features of that genocide, that war on the Hazaras.

That war included a declaration of jihad, a holy war, on the Hazaras, which was officially sanctioned by the Government of Afghanistan under the leadership of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan. It was spread throughout Afghanistan by clerics and religious leaders who were also employed by the state. The war also involved a mass displacement of the Hazaras and slavery of the Hazaras. It resulted in the emergence of a flourishing trade in Hazaras slaves in Afghanistan.

More than a century later in Afghanistan, in recent years we have also seen a resurgence of similar patterns of persecution of the Hazaras in Afghanistan. We have seen in recent years a pattern of systematic attacks on Hazaras places of worship and educational centres and on cultural and religious figures in Afghanistan. Since August of 2021, with the return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan, the Hazaras have been systematically marginalized and persecuted politically, culturally and economically.

In recent years we have seen a mass displacement of Hazaras from their ancestral homelands in several provinces of Afghanistan, including Daykundi, Ghazni, Balkh and several other parts of Afghanistan.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Excuse me. Could you wrap up, please? The time is almost up.

[Dr. Niamatullah Ibrahimi]

Yes.

All of this, I think, brings us to the fact that the Hazaras are not only the victims of a genocide that was quite well documented in Afghanistan historically; there is also at present the danger of a genocide and atrocities targeting the Hazaras under the Taliban rule in Afghanistan. The Taliban as well as other groups, such as Islamic State Khorasan, are committing a series of acts of violence and mass atrocities that are specifically targeted towards the Hazaras and indicate an intention to destroy the Hazaras in whole and in part as an ethnic and religious group in Afghanistan.

Therefore, I would like to call on the Canadian House of Parliament to recognize the Hazaras genocide as a genocide and to show leadership in a process of recognition of this as part of a genocide.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you, Dr. Ibrahimi.

Ms. Salehi, welcome.

You now have the floor.

[Shabnam Salehi, Visiting Lecturer and Researcher, University of Ottawa, As an Individual]

Thank you so much.

Chair and members of the committee, today I stand before you to address a complex and troubling chapter in the history of Afghanistan that continues to haunt us.

I am a researcher dedicated to issues of law, human rights and scholarship, and it is my duty to unravel the intricate threads of history, analyze its lessons, and apply this knowledge to advocate for human rights.

The late nineteenth century brought significant transformation to Afghanistan. It was a time when power dynamics shifted from a decentralized tribal monarchy to a centralized one. Amir Abdur Rahman played a pivotal role in this transformation as he embarked on a ruthless campaign to bolster his authority. His objective was clear: to eliminate any perceived threats to his monarchy, be they ethnic chiefs or individuals in positions of power who might challenge him. In his pursuit of power, he employed a range of strategies, from deploying religious arguments to wielding tribal and even brute force. None, regardless of their ethnic or religious background, were spared from these methods.

While some people found protection, others, including groups of people of the Hazaras, Pashtuns, Tajiks, Nuristanis and various other ethnic groups, were marginalized, punished and subjected to oppressive rule. The atrocities committed against the Afghans, including the Hazara people and other ethnic groups, cast a sombre shadow over our history, raising the question of whether it was a genocide or a brutal campaign against all.

It is here that I must address a critical debate surrounding this dark chapter. Some argue that applying the term "genocide" to these killings would be retroactive, as the concept of genocide didn't exist at the time these events occurred. They contend that it would be inappropriate to retroactively apply a modern legal concept to historical events that took place before its formulation and establishment.

Others argue that Amir Abdur Rahman Khan's campaign against all whom he considered a threat to his power consolidation, including the killing of Hazaras, may not meet the legal definition of genocide as defined by the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. They maintain that the killings, while undoubtedly brutal and a gross violation of human rights, were not motivated essentially by ethnic, religious and racial hatred; a defining characteristic of genocide.

In conclusion, history is a multi-faceted and complicated tapestry, demanding a meticulous examination and profound understanding of context and contributing factors. It serves as a sombre reminder of how power can be misused through religious and other means.

As we strive for a more just and equitable world, further critical examination of history is essential. It requires experts well versed in historical intricacies to determine whether the term “genocide” is appropriate in this context and what may offer appropriate remedies.

Simultaneously, the establishment of an accountability mechanism that provides justice to victims from diverse ethnicities and groups who have endured unspeakable abuse and atrocities serves as a vital stepping stone toward sustainable peace. In our pursuit of justice and human rights it is imperative to remember the lessons of the past and to learn from them. We must strive to ensure that such atrocities never happen again, regardless of the terminology we use. The guidance offered by history should lead us toward a more just and equitable world in which human rights are cherished and protected above all else.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you, Ms. Salehi.

Now I invite Dr. Tahir Shaaran.

The floor is yours.

[Dr. Tahir Shaaran, Canadian Hazara Advocacy Group]

Honourable Chair, esteemed members of the committee and ladies and gentlemen, I stand before you today to address a matter of utmost importance: the ongoing atrocity against the Hazara community and ethnic and religious groups deeply rooted in Afghanistan.

For over a century, the Hazaras have faced unrelenting human rights violations, resulting in what can only be described as a prolonged ongoing genocide spanning 130 years. The Hazara community has faced various atrocities, including ethnic cleansing, land confiscation, and institutional subjugation. Shedding light on the denial of fundamental human rights, such as the right to life, freedom of religion, social connections, education and government employment, is crucial.

In 1978, the Hazaras gained a degree of freedom and political participation. However, the rise of the Taliban in 1994 marked the onset of a new era of oppression, characterized by heart-wrenching massacres.

Despite their suffering, the Hazaras have shown a firm commitment to peace and security. They have supported the peace process and have stood alongside the international community since 2001.

Hazaras have actively participated in the democratic process, including making significant contributions to elections since 2001. They have demonstrated resilience and dedication to education and peace, resulting in minimal violence in the region and no attack on international forces since 2001. However, with the return of the Taliban to power, Hazaras now face rapidly escalating targeted attacks, forced displacement, summary executions and mass atrocities, amounting to a systematic genocide characterized by intentional displacement and killings.

The ongoing atrocity against the Hazara community can be divided into four critical periods.

In the 1890s, under Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, the Hazaras faced devastating losses. With over 60% of their population massacred, tens of thousands were sold into slavery and a forced migration reshaped and altered our geography. Approximately 400,000 Hazara families were displaced, with 80% of them either losing their lives or becoming slaves.

During the 1990s, nearly 10 mass killings occurred, including the Afshar Kabul massacre in 1993 and the Mazar-i-Sharif massacre in 1998, resulting in thousands of Hazara casualties.

Between 2002 and 2022, the Hazara community faced 294 documented incidents of targeted violence, resulting in thousands of dead and injured. These attacks took place in various settings, from maternity wards to places of worship and schools. Additionally, Hazaras endured institutional discrimination, under-representation in government jobs and the controversial 500-kilovolt transmission line project, further contributing to their ongoing suffering.

With the return of the Taliban, hundreds of Hazaras have been killed and thousands displaced, and the number of Hazara government employees has been significantly decreased. International aid has been diverted from the region, while Hazara employment in international organizations has declined.

Recent examples include the attack on the Kaaj Educational Center in west Kabul, the systematic murder of 17 Hazara civilians in Khas Urozgan, an attack on the mosque in Pol-e-Khomri a week earlier, and the forced displacement of several hundred families in Daykundi province. Fabricated documents have been used to seize Hazaras' lands across the Hazarajat during the Pashtun Kuchi nomads' conflict with local Hazara residents. The Taliban imposed various taxes on Hazaras in the countryside, pushing them to leave their homes.

The evidence indicates that the Hazara community in Afghanistan is currently experiencing genocide, as defined by the convention, through acts like killing, deportation and forcible population transfers. It is crucial that we take immediate action to address the ongoing atrocities against the Hazara community and prevent further suffering.

Finally, on behalf of our community, I express my gratitude to this Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the House of Commons for addressing the ongoing atrocity against Hazaras. Your attention to this pressing issue is greatly appreciated.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you, Dr. Shaaran.

Now I will open the floor for the questions. Every member has seven minutes for the first round.

Mr. Genuis, you have seven minutes.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Thank you very much, Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses for being here and for your important testimony.

I'll start this question with Dr. Ibrahimi, but maybe the other witnesses will want to weigh in on it as well.

What is the nature of the Taliban discourse towards Shia Islam in general? To what extent is generalized Shia persecution part of the persecution of Hazaras, or do you see it as more of an ethnically targeted persecution?

[Dr. Niamatullah Ibrahimi]

Thank you for that question, which I think really goes into the heart of what is happening at the moment under the Taliban rule in Afghanistan.

As we know, historically the Taliban are a group that embraces two different types of tendencies in Afghanistan. One is an extremist interpretation of Islam in which Shia Islam is not regarded as a legitimate sect within the broader Islamic community. Second, the Taliban also embraces a particularly violent and exclusionary form of ethnic nationalism in Afghanistan, which I have recently discussed in an article that was published by The Review of Faith & International Affairs.

I think what is happening now in Afghanistan with regard to the Hazaras is that those two types of tendencies and forces are coming together. One is a religious tendency that is very strong; it goes back to the 1990s. The Taliban leaders have quite frequently made it quite clear that they do not see Shias as on par with Sunni Muslims in Afghanistan.

We have seen that in their policies on marginalizing Shias, deliberately excluding Shias from being taught at the university—for example, in a Hazara Shia majority area such as Bamiyan, where there is a university that was teaching Shia jurisprudence. The Taliban have also systematically removed all Shia judges from the courts across Afghanistan. At the moment, as we speak, there is not a single Shia judge anywhere in Afghanistan. That is also being reinforced by this historical tendency of land grabbing, which is something that was already mentioned by another witness, Dr. Shaaran. There is an ongoing pattern of land grabbing and violence towards the Hazaras, which is also backed by the Taliban leaders through their nominal court proceedings as well.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Thank you.

Do other witnesses want to weigh in on the question about the religious persecution component?

[Dr. Tahir Shaaran]

I want to add that what Dr. Ibrahimi mentioned about the Taliban ideology toward the Hazaras is true. They see Hazaras as infidels, and that's why we have a lot of examples in the past. When they took Mazar-i-Sharif—I was a young kid at that time—they killed more than 8,000 Hazaras, according to some records, while some recorded up to 5,000— based on their religion and ethnicity. I think this is something that, at least to our community, is very obvious. A lot of international human rights organizations also actually agree on that matter.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

I have another question for you, Ms. Salehi. Maybe I'll ask that, and then you can answer both together if you'd like.

Parliament often recognizes acts of genocide. Those are seen as particularly important in the context of contemporary events. At the same time, we have not typically recognized historical genocides before a certain point, not because genocides haven't happened for a very long time in human history but because it's potentially more fraught for parliamentary committees and for parliamentarians to evaluate questions of history. At the same time, I think we are more likely to recognize those historical genocides if there is a contemporary resonance. I think of the Armenian genocide as one example of a past event that feels very immediate because of current events.

Could you speak about why it's important for us to evaluate, in the context of present events, this historical question of the 19th-century genocide that you spoke of?

[Shabnam Salehi]

I totally echo my two fellows on the Taliban, specifically on the Shia. When it comes to the recent events, I see it more from the ISIS side than the Taliban side. Every incident and every suicide bombing that's happened was claimed by ISIS. You can find the documents. That's the thing I acknowledge on that. There should be an accountability mechanism to find the truth.

I found it more anti-Shia than anti-Hazara. When some of our Shia countrymen were equipped and recruited by Iran under the Fatemiyoun and then sent to Syria to fight against ISIS, ISIS at that time told us it would take revenge against the Shia. I see all of that as anti-Shia, rather than anti-Hazara, because we have a lot of Hazaras who are not Shia and who are not a target. We also have a lot of Shia who are also not Hazara, and they are targeted. That's the one point I want to mention.

On the other point that you told us, as lawyers, we have a principle: The law is enforced and the law is applicable to all events that happened after the enforcement of the special law. However, if you go to historical events, it's impossible to really document them. There are a lot of crimes in history. We wouldn't find a limit to how far we can go to reinvestigate this kind of incident.

As a lawyer, that's very difficult for me—

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Wrap up your answer, please.

[Shabnam Salehi]

I work at the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission. We documented the crimes that happened from 1980 up until 2001. We documented all of the crimes, but transitional justice didn't happen because there are a lot of complex ethnic, religious....

We can't apply it just to recent events and it's impossible to somehow apply it just to the historical events. That's my point of view.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Chair, if I may, I'll ask just one short clarification question. Were you saying ISIS or ISI?

[Shabnam Salehi]

It was ISIS.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Okay. It's important we get that clarified. Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you, Mr. Genuis and Ms. Salehi.

Dr. Ibrahimi, I'm sorry. After finishing the first round, I will give you the floor.

Ali Ehsassi, you have the floor for seven minutes.

[Ali Ehsassi, Liberal, Willowdale, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'm very grateful.

Allow me to start off by thanking all the witnesses.

If I could pick up where Mr. Genuis left off, Ms. Salehi, I listened to your testimony very closely and I have to say I'm quite disturbed by the legal interpretation that you adhere to. From what I heard, you stated that genocide can only occur prospectively, after the concept was crystalized or after the genocide convention was adopted in 1948. I have never in my life come across any scholar who has held to such a definition.

Why would you state that? You are saying that genocide did not take place by the Nazis or genocide did not take place against Armenians. That's a very disturbing interpretation that is not supported by any academic research.

Please respond to that.

[Shabnam Salehi]

I didn't say that was not genocide. I'm mostly in the terminology. In the law, we have a principle. That principle is—

[Ali Ehsassi, Liberal, Willowdale, ON]

It's the terminology, but you admit that genocide could have taken place prior to 1944.

[Shabnam Salehi]

Yes, but we, as lawyers, can't use the terminology of genocide for it. We can use “crime against humanity”—