Good afternoon, everyone.
Thank you for your invitation.
In my view, the Subcommittee on International Human Rights must monitor three interrelated aspects of the current situation in Georgia: the content of the draft law on foreign agents; instances of violent repression of peaceful protests; and parallel announcements of legislative changes targeting the LGBTQ+ community that target “gay propaganda”.
The Georgian Dream government is presenting the transparency of foreign influence draft law as being similar to the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act. The opposition, on the other hand, sees it more as modelled on the Russian legislation, with potential consequences for freedom of expression and civil society activism in general.
Comparing the content of the three statutes—the American and Russian statues, as well as the Georgian draft law—clearly leans toward the opposition's interpretation. While the U.S. act targets individuals and political organizations that are controlled and funded predominantly by foreign governments deemed to be enemies, the Georgian draft law targets all civil society organizations, media, academic institutions, religious or sports organizations and even humanitarian organizations that are funded at a rate of 20% or more by foreign sources. All of those organizations would have to register as agents of foreign influence and, as a result, their activities would be closely monitored.
Although the draft law does not mention which foreign power is concerned, the rhetoric of the government and members of Georgian Dream is clear: Western influence is being targeted.
An event slipped under the radar as a result of the tensions surrounding the draft law on foreign agents. On April 19 of this year, the Georgian Parliament introduced amendments to tax legislation. Those amendments facilitate financial exchanges, especially with Russia, and investments in tax havens. The amendments clearly benefit the founder of the ruling party, Bidzina Ivanichvili, a Georgian millionaire who got rich in Russia, and Russian oligarchs.
Why did the government decide to introduce the legislation on foreign agents now? Why do so at all, knowing that mass protests will follow? The same draft law had already been proposed in the spring of 2023, but it was withdrawn as a result of massive street protests. This is déjà vu. Experts are speculating, but there is every reason to believe that this is an election strategy. Parliamentary elections will take place in October 2024—I could talk more about that, as needed. It also may have seemed timely, as Europe and the United States are busy elsewhere, focused on their own upcoming elections and so on. Also, since it has already been a candidate for membership in the European Union since last December, Georgia feels, in the short term, that the stick is less important than in 2023.
Is the situation beyond Georgian Dream's control? Although the governing party was counting on the fatigue and exhaustion of the protest movement owing to the slow legislative process, the use of force against protesters can have the opposite effect on the resolve of protesters and the potential rallying of otherwise very fractured opposition forces. So this is an attempt to distract the public and divide the opposition further by bringing LGBTQ+ issues and legislation banning same-sex marriage back on the political agenda. However, despite the overwhelming support—some 80%—of the population for membership in the European Union and NATO, this societal issue is divisive and, with all the propaganda, has the potential to rally some of the undecided voters.
The Orthodox Church and social conservatism are still well rooted in the Georgian public sphere, all in a society where 62% of people report feeling unrepresented by existing political parties and where perspectives on society diverge between urban centres and rural spaces.
Another card that Georgian Dream is playing is the threat of a second front in Georgia opening if neighbouring Russia is provoked. The memory of the 2008 Russo-Georgian war is strong, as is the lack of western support to push Russia back from the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.