Subcommittee on International Human Rights Committee on Oct. 8th, 2024

[Shuv Majumdar, Conservative, Calgary Heritage, AB]

Thank you very much for that.

Iria, let me come back to you. We know that the Maduro regime is working closely with despotic regimes in Beijing, in Tehran and in Moscow to repress their people and to coordinate their consolidation of power over the Venezuelan economy, over the Venezuelan people and over the Venezuelan security services. They've entered into dangerous relationships with the greatest rivals to our North American sensibility.

You would think that Canada and the United States would be shoulder to shoulder in our own hemisphere when it comes to confronting Venezuela and the Cuban, Iranian, Russian and Chinese regimes that are going after them. Can you explain why Canada might have such a meek voice at a time when it's critical to stand for the people of Venezuela?

[Iria Puyosa]

Yes, these authoritarian regimes work together. They share knowledge, they share tools and they support each other. We see that clearly in the context of Venezuela.

We believe, or it's my assessment, that democratic governments are shy about responding to the autocratic regimes rising all over the world. In this session we are talking about Venezuela, but we see similar situations in other parts of the world. They collaborate to stay in power. Unfortunately, we don't see democratic governments working together with the same impulse. They have good intentions and there is support, but something more could be done. This is probably a good moment for good allies to get together and on board with that.

[Shuv Majumdar, Conservative, Calgary Heritage, AB]

Thank you for that.

I mean, here we have the Biden administration trying to show some strength when it comes to Venezuela, and the Trudeau government is nowhere to be seen. There are occasional statements and platitudes, but there are no serious measures—no serious investment, commitment of sanctions, support to Venezuelan civil society or recognition of the opposition. It's a total betrayal of our relationship with America and with the people of Venezuela.

I appreciate your testimony very much.

With that, I'll close my time.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

I'll give you time to answer that in the next round, because he exceeded his time by one minute.

I'll go to Mr. Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe for seven minutes.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[Member spoke in Spanish, interpreted as follows:]

Thank you very much for being here today.

Ms. Marin, we talk a lot about disinformation. A number of official Venezuelan media outlets have close ties with the government, of course, which means that social media has increasingly come to the fore in Venezuela. To what extent has disinformation become embedded within social media?

To what extent is it used and promoted by social networks?

[Maria Marin]

[Witness spoke in Spanish, interpreted as follows:]

The Maduro regime's logic regarding social media means that we can't believe anything we see on social media. Traditional media has been completely co-opted, and now this online strategy minimizes any presence of independent media—civil society, human rights defenders and so on.

Because of the way the truth is twisted, it's very hard to distinguish the wheat from the chaff. They are using bot and drone networks that are state-funded and implemented by the same mechanism the government uses to pay for operations that demoralize opponents, not only within the country but also abroad.

This same mechanism abroad tries to minimize any criticisms made by civil society about human rights. This is all something the regime is trying to hide.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

I find it interesting that you make a connection with mechanisms outside the country.

You are an expert, which is why you were invited to testify before the committee today. As such, here is my question to you.

To what extent are social networks used, not only for disinformation purposes, but also for transnational repression purposes abroad?

Does overseas social media play a role in transnational repression?

[Maria Marin]

[Witness spoke in Spanish, interpreted as follows:]

I wouldn't say the social platforms directly play that role.

However, the regime has a repressive capacity to extend beyond national borders. The persecution that takes place through social media doesn't just affect people within Venezuela. People outside may fear that their loved ones may be arrested within the country. This has happened to a number of journalists who are no longer in Venezuela. Their possessions and loved ones can all be placed at risk. They also may find that their passports are cancelled.

This is a form of transnational repression. It also seeks to further divide those who are inside and outside the country.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

The social networks of opponents of the Maduro regime are also being monitored. Obviously, those same social networks are used by the powers that be to surveil opponents through social media. They are used not only against opponents, but also against the families or loved ones of opponents who remain in the country.

I see that you agree. Do you have anything to add?

[Maria Marin]

[Witness spoke in Spanish, interpreted as follows:]

No, I have nothing further to add, other than to say, once more, that this is a double-edged sword. The regime is trying to use social media only to repress opposition. However, we know the election process is highly documented in Venezuela today. We know records are kept about the election. This is only possible due to the way civil society uses social media.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Very well.

You just talked about the electoral process. Media outlets that are close to the party in power broadcast exit polls, in violation of the Elections Act.

What do we know about the companies that conducted these polls?

[Maria Marin]

[Witness spoke in Spanish, interpreted as follows:]

We collaborated on an investigation with several other organizations, which showed that many of these polls before the election did not meet basic levels of transparency. In many cases, the owners of these businesses had financial relationships with state actors, and they were not meeting basic methodological standards. In that way, they were hoping to influence people and to demoralize people in advance of the elections to prevent them from voting, but it didn't work.

On the day of the election, a so-called “exit poll” was set up by a business that didn't really exist. It was entirely false, and this was one of the many disinformation tactics used by the regime to confuse people and to play on their emotions in order to discourage people, to make them afraid and to try to prevent them from making the details of the election results public. However, in the end, that was nonetheless made public despite the attempts to quiet the information. They were trying to confuse and upset people even before the election.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

My question is for both witnesses.

We know about Freddy Superlano's case. I don't know if you're familiar with it, but I imagine you are. He is the national political coordinator of the Voluntad Popular Party. He was arrested on Tuesday, July 30, around 10 a.m. by agents of the Maduro government. We don't know which government branch made the arrest. We don't know where Mr. Superlano was.

Can you give us some information on that?

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Your time is up. Give a quick answer, please.

[Maria Marin]

[Witness spoke in Spanish, interpreted as follows:]

I don't have specific information about where Superlano is. We can guess that he may be in one of the locations used by the Venezuelan intelligence, like the El Helicoide. However, the state of repression in the country has escalated so quickly that the regime doesn't even have enough space left to hold the people they've arrested, so I don't know specifically where Superlano is.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you.

Mr. Johns, you have the floor for seven minutes, please.

[Gord Johns, NDP, Courtenay—Alberni, BC]

I'm going to go to Ms. Puyosa.

The U.S. Department of Justice, right now, is investigating a Russian, Kremlin-owned company for spreading disinformation using bots.

Do you believe that this Kremlin-owned company is connected to the type of, what I would call, bots and to the psychological warfare that has been happening to Venezuelans when it comes to using X or other platforms on social media?

[Iria Puyosa]

The techniques are similar. As I mentioned before, it's known that Venezuela and Russia have been co-operating in information operations for 20 years, since they funded Telesur in Venezuela and Russia Today. That co-operation has been ongoing for two decades in the way they design information manipulation targeting different populations both inside their countries and internationally.

They share tactics. They share techniques. They use similar ways to deploy propaganda and information manipulation, but that doesn't mean they work together on the operational side. Venezuela had its own apparatus for deploying propaganda, its own trolls, its own troops, its own bots and its own...all the same apparatus similar to Russia but separate. They coordinate in some campaigns, particularly those targeting international audiences in issues related to human rights and issues related to sanctions. In those cases, they work together, but when they are targeting their domestic audiences, they work separately. Each of them has a different apparatus, with similar tactics but not operationally linked.

[Gord Johns, NDP, Courtenay—Alberni, BC]

What accountability role would you like to see the international community play when it comes to the social media platforms and how they're held to account, but of course, balancing and ensuring that freedom is happening? What are Venezuelans using to get the right information, to get accurate information, and where do Venezuelans access independent media today?

Maybe I'll start with you, Ms. Puyosa, and I'll give Ms. Marin a chance to follow up.

[Iria Puyosa]

After more than a decade of intense government-sponsored disinformation and propaganda in social media and also the companion of censorship of independent media outlets, Venezuelans had to learn to circumvent censorship. Venezuelans who are interested in following the news and who are politically active, make a lot of effort to access information. Venezuelans have been learning how to use VPNs and have been learning how to use different communications to share news using social media platforms.

We have been talking about how the regime weaponized social media platforms to repress, to control and to surveil citizens, but citizens have also learned how to use those same platforms and those things to share information, to work together, to organize and to build communities.

Social media platforms in Venezuela are the battleground on which the regime and the democratic forces have had constant clashes, trying to win over the opinions and shared ideas.

[Gord Johns, NDP, Courtenay—Alberni, BC]

Ms. Marin, do you want to follow up?

Also, could you touch on the Ven phone application and how that's being used to influence and to target dissidents?

[Maria Marin]

[Witness spoke in Spanish, interpreted as follows:]

Yes, one of the techniques used by the regime is to manipulate any information that it can control directly.

Today, the way civil society and independent journalism function in Venezuela is actually one of the most robust systems in the region, which is what has enabled us to adapt quickly to these advanced repressive mechanisms with the use of various technological methods.

For example, today in Venezuela, we're using techniques like VPNs or using social networks by redownloading them, even when they've been forbidden, like X. There have also been uses of AI to keep the citizenry informed while protecting journalists' identities. This is a positive example of how, even during this terrible period of increased repression in the country, nonetheless, journalists and civil society have taken up the gauntlet and have kept the structures resilient.

The use of VenApp reached a peak in the days following July 30. Once the application was removed from most major download platforms, its use diminished greatly, but its use, nonetheless, remains seared into people's recent memories.

There is a great deal of fear that someone you know or that one of your neighbours might have seen, for example, a WhatsApp status, and that might be enough so-called evidence for the regime to call you a terrorist or a fascist, or even to arrest you.

[Gord Johns, NDP, Courtenay—Alberni, BC]

Okay.

Ms. Puyosa, I will give you 30 seconds to just follow up on the VenApp.

[Iria Puyosa]

They developed this app, a sort of super app. In some ways, it's similar to WeChat in the sense that the app has channels for messaging between individuals, but it also has features for a marketplace for people to share and buy business. That's helping to get people to use the app, preparing the user base for the moment when they need it for their political aims.

To me, one of the most dangerous things is the ability to geolocate reports, and that is what they have been utilizing in this case. They created a new feature for individuals, the users of the app, to geolocate their reports, so they see the coordinates of the place in which the person they are pointing out as a dissident is located. That is a very dangerous use of a social media platform. Of course, it violates data privacy, and it puts the user in real danger. It's probably one of the more recent developments that are highly sophisticated, and it's part of the kit they have for instilling fear in the population.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Ms. Damoff, you have the floor for five minutes, please.