Thank you so much for the opportunity to testify today. My name is Noura Aljizawi. I'm an exiled human rights defender as well as a senior researcher at the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto.
My research investigates digital transnational repression against exiled activists and human rights defenders. In Canada we hear much about foreign interference, cyber espionage and attacks on critical infrastructure, but the phenomenon of digital transnational repression, which is a growing global threat, remains under-recognized. While transnational repression itself is not a new phenomenon, it involves the extension of authoritarian practices to target individuals who may feel safe because they live beyond the authoritarian borders of their countries of origin.
Digital surveillance technology has made it easier for dictators to expand their repression beyond borders. Digital transnational repression arises, basically, when authoritarian regimes use digital surveillance tools to intimidate, silence and harass dissident voices in exile and the diaspora. These tactics include a range of technologies such as spyware and malware, phishing, harassment, disinformation and smear campaigns.
For example, in 2018 Citizen Lab revealed that Saudi activist Omar Abdulaziz, who is based in Montreal, had his device compromised by Pegasus spyware. This attack, attributed to a Saudi-linked operator, gave full access to Abdulaziz's device and private communications with fellow dissidents, including some who were back home as well as those in exile, such as the journalist Jamal Khashoggi—messages exchanged just weeks before Khashoggi's assassination. Abdulaziz also endured physical threats and attempts to lure him to go back to Saudi Arabia. This story, in particular, inspired us at Citizen Lab to look at how exiled dissidents are targeted and impacted by digital threats.
Based on the experiences of 103 exiled dissidents in Canada and other democracies, our research revealed widespread perpetration. Basically, more than 20 state actors are involved in digital transnational repression—and I mean 20 state actors beyond Russia, China and Iran, the classic actors. Digital threats often escalate to physical threats. Despite their resilience, targets experience the chilling effects of digital transnational repression, including impacts on their well-being, sense of security, essential freedoms and even immigration status. Many of them have experienced emotional, physical, professional and financial distress. Some even became socially isolated: They had to cut ties with their family members and friends back home. As well, many of them reported questioning the meaning of continuing their activism in exile, and some decided to cease their activism altogether.
There's absolutely a significant gendered dimension of digital transnational repression when women are targeted. They endure additional layers of gender-based harassment and abuses and, while many victims reported to law enforcement, they found the responses insufficient. Finally, the inactions of host states can embolden perpetrators to escalate their attacks.
To combat this growing threat, we recommend to Canada that, to start, we need, really, for Canada to believe that we must take preventive measures and to not respond to cases as individual cases. These are not isolated cases or incidents. These practices and incidents are a pattern, and we need to prevent them, not only respond to them.
My key recommendations are in four areas. I can elaborate more on them. Basically, we need legislative and policy reforms. We need Canada to recognize digital transnational repression and oppression, to revise existing frameworks to prevent any harm that can be caused on targets and to differentiate transnational repression from foreign interference.
We need Canada to hold perpetrators accountable, including state actors as well as the private sector, whose technology is being used in digital transnational repression or whose platforms have been facilitating the harassment of exiled activists.
We need Canada to design a framework to support the targets by, maybe, creating a whole-of-government agency to monitor, report and respond to digital transnational repression systematically, to empower targets and to provide digital security resources, legal assistance and mental health support. Also, we need to work with the communities. On top of that, we need to adopt an intersectional approach to recognize the unique vulnerabilities of women, racialized groups and other marginalized targets of digital transnational repression and transnational repression.
Finally, transnational repression is a global problem—