Subcommittee on International Human Rights Committee on Dec. 10th, 2024

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

I call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 63 of the House of Commons Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

Today is the 76th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The human heart is the most deceitful of all things, capable of the best and the worst, but we must not give in to the temptation to be cynical when faced with the disgusting spectacle of the affairs of nations in recent times. Human history requires that we forget that the inconceivable is conceivable, for both individuals and masses. Advancing human rights will continue to depend on gradually building mutual trust between nations and the work of non-state actors. It will be achieved over time through regular co‑operation among them.

On a small scale, little victories occur in the macabre dance of human incomprehension and ignorance. Let's celebrate the work of our subcommittee, which has, over the years, been able to offer these small victories to various causes that exist in the shadows. We are bringing some humanity to places that really need it.

I want to thank my colleagues for their work and for their efforts to stand together to improve the human condition and support the universality of human rights.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on September 24, 2024, the subcommittee is resuming its study of patterns of forced migration in different regions of the world.

I'd like to welcome the witnesses. We have with us, as an individual, Napas Thein, research fellow. From the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, we have Alice Baillat, policy adviser, by video conference.

Each witness will have up to five minutes for their opening remarks, after which we will proceed with a round of questions.

We'll start with you, Mr. Thein.

I invite you to take the floor for five minutes.

[Napas Thein, Research Fellow, Myanmar Policy and Community Knowledge Hub, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto, As an Individual]

Thank you for this invitation to speak on the situation in Myanmar concerning forced displacement.

I'm here as part of the Myanmar policy and community knowledge hub based at the University of Toronto and supported by the International Development Research Centre. As part of our ongoing research, I would like to share some information about the situation in Myanmar.

On February 1, 2021, the Myanmar military launched a coup against the democratically elected government, jailing elected political leaders and MPs. This set into place a nationwide revolt between the military junta and various emergent groups. Initially, thousands took to the street in protest, witnessing mass killings and the arrest of thousands. Many fled and joined resistance groups. Among these groups was a diverse civil disobedience movement; the National Unity Government, or NUG, with its People's Defence Force; and various ethnic revolutionary organizations, EROs, that had been engaging in resistance for decades prior.

The situation has renewed violence and precarity for the Rohingya, who faced one of the biggest displacement crises the world has ever seen in 2016 and who endured a genocidal campaign by the Myanmar military. There are over a million Rohingya refugees currently in Bangladesh, and hundreds of thousands in Malaysia and Indonesia. The number of Rohingya refugees fleeing Rakhine state in Myanmar has recently surged due to increasing violence, conscription by the Myanmar military, indiscriminate bombing and reports of increasing intercommunal violence, which has boiled tensions between the Rohingya and Rakhine communities.

This coup has not only affected the Rohingya. IDPs face significant insecurity, with conflict, air strikes and land mine use impacting civilians throughout the country. By the UNHCR's most recent count, there are over three million IDPs within Myanmar today. Over 2.8 million of them have been displaced since the coup in 2021.

In Thailand, the number of Burmese people fleeing conflict in Myanmar is likely in the hundreds of thousands if not millions. A report by the UNDP in 2023 found that there were 1.9 million Myanmar migrants in Thailand. As Thailand is not a party to the 1951 refugee convention, most of these migrants, many of whom we met in Thailand in our research, were unable to acquire refugee status or protections. They currently sit in limbo, particularly as the Myanmar military has been restricting passport renewals, which may lead to deportations to Myanmar.

Another cause of displacement was the junta's activation of conscription laws on young men and women in the wake of mass military defections. Many young people who have been out of school or unemployed since the coup are left with the precarious decision of risking conscription, joining resistance forces or fleeing Myanmar. I have family members who have been forced to make that decision.

There is an urgent need for action, as the plight of these displaced peoples is directly linked to regional and global security interests. International criminal gangs, particularly cyber-scam networks, are exploiting the crisis in Myanmar and displaced people.

In closing, I would like to share three broad considerations for the committee about actionable goals towards alleviating the situation in Myanmar.

First, there is a pressing need for cross-border assistance. The vast majority of IDPs in Myanmar, particularly those outside of the control of the Myanmar military, face significant precarity and lack support. Local humanitarian assistance providers depend on systems and networks of cross-border aid from Thailand and India. These are largely funded by the international Myanmar diaspora and various organizations and have even been able to support internal areas in Myanmar, including Bago and Sagaing.

Second, there is a need to work with neighbouring countries to support refugees and migrants. Individuals working on the situation in Myanmar in Thailand noted the precarious conditions of migrants. While there are a variety of local organizations that support migrants, they lack funding and support. Additionally, migrants lack rights and protections, putting them at risk of deportation to Myanmar. Canada should work with Thailand, India and Bangladesh on pathways for refugees and undocumented migrants.

Finally, there's a need to support non-traditional pro-democracy actors who provide assistance and support within Myanmar. Pro-democracy resistance organizations, including the NUG and various EROs, hold jurisdiction in many parts of the country and are subsequently responsible for humanitarian aid, local service delivery and IDP camps.

A study from the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar suggests that the Myanmar military has lost control of 86% of the country's territory. Moreover, 67% of the national population is reported not to be under stable military control and lacks access to traditional humanitarian support mechanisms. Supporting—

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Would you please wrap up? You have five more seconds.

[Napas Thein]

Absolutely.

Supporting actors that have de facto control in several areas will be paramount to alleviating the crisis of forced displacement within Myanmar.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you.

I now invite Dr. Alice Baillat to take the floor for five minutes.

[Dr. Alice Baillat, Policy Adviser, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre]

Thank you.

Dear Chairperson and members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to brief you today on the critical issue of internal displacement. I will do my intervention in English, but I will be glad, during the Q and A session, to answer in French or English.

I represent the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, or IDMC, a Geneva-based organization established in 1998 as part of the Norwegian Refugee Council, or NRC. The NRC is one of the world’s largest humanitarian organizations, dedicated to assisting people forced to flee their homes.

For 25 years, IDMC has provided the international community with data and analysis on internal displacement caused by conflict, violence and disasters. We monitor internal displacement in over 200 countries and territories. Our mission is to highlight the plight of internally displaced persons, or IDPs, who are often overlooked, and to inform policy-making and action with reliable data.

What does our data tell us about the scale of internal displacement? As of the end of 2023, there were 75.9 million IDPs globally, a record high. This figure includes 68.3 million people displaced by conflict and violence and 7.7 million displaced by disasters.

In addition to tracking IDP numbers, we monitor displacements or movements, which count instances of displacement within a given year and not individuals, as one person can be displaced multiple times within one year. In 2023, disasters caused 26.4 million displacements in almost 150 countries and territories, while conflict and violence triggered 20.5 million displacements in 45 countries and territories.

New escalations of conflict, such as in Sudan and Palestine, forced millions to flee in 2023, adding to the populations already displaced for a long time in countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo, Colombia and Syria. Earthquakes, storms, floods, wildfires and drought displaced millions more last year.

Although IDMC figures treat conflict and disasters as distinct triggers, the reality is that in many countries these factors overlap, contributing to prolonged and repeated displacement. Our final figures for 2024 are not available yet, but the trends that led to record levels of IDPs in 2023 continued in 2024.

The hardships faced by IDPs are severe. These include loss of shelter, safety and livelihood, as well as increased exposure to disease. Mental health is also an important concern. Women and girls are often disproportionately affected. The gaps in disaggregated data per sex contribute to blanket approaches to programming that tend to treat IDPs as a single homogeneous group that experiences displacement in the same way, but a person's gender inevitably shapes their experience of internal displacement, the risks they face and their ability to access appropriate support.

There are signs of progress in addressing internal displacement. In Bangladesh and India, for instance, where cyclone Remal displaced 1.6 million people in May of this year, early warning systems and community-based disaster management helped mitigate the impacts. In Bangladesh, nearly 75% of displacements were actually pre-emptive evacuations, demonstrating the life-saving potential of disaster risk management and anticipatory action. In Iraq, millions of IDPs have also found a durable solution in the past few years.

Despite such efforts, the overall trend remains alarming. With the growing impacts of climate change and the multiplication of humanitarian crises, and in the absence of durable solutions, the number of IDPs is likely to rise further.

The guiding principles on internal displacement affirm that national governments bear the primary responsibility for addressing internal displacement. With strong government leadership, international support and a commitment to listening to IDPs, we can help them achieve durable solutions and break the cycle of protracted displacement.

Internal displacement is a human rights and humanitarian issue, but it can’t be only. In 2019, at the request of 57 member states, including Canada, the UN Secretary-General established a high-level panel on internal displacement, which issued a seminal report that led to the adoption of the action agenda on internal displacement.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Will you please wrap up? You have 10 more seconds.

[Dr. Alice Baillat]

Yes.

This agenda advocates for a shift from short-term humanitarian aid to more development-oriented approaches and calls for a greater involvement of affected governments in finding durable solutions. We hope that Canada will also continue to demonstrate a steadfast commitment to supporting those countries in addressing the issue of internal displacement.

Thank you for your attention.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

I'd like to thank both witnesses for your good declarations.

Now I'll open the floor for questions and answers.

I would invite Mr. Mike Lake to take the floor for five minutes.

[Mike Lake, Conservative, Edmonton—Wetaskiwin, AB]

Thank you to both witnesses today.

Napas, I'll start with you.

You struck me with the conversation you were having about conscription laws. We can think of forced migration and about having no choice whatsoever in a matter, but you're talking about conscription laws. You're talking about people who have to make an almost impossible choice.

Could you elaborate a bit on what that's like for folks?

[Napas Thein]

Absolutely.

The country had conscription laws that were activated last year as a result of the military losing ground and facing mass defections. Many people on the ground—young men and young women throughout the country—have been forced to make the decision of risking conscription, joining resistance organizations or fleeing. Of the people we spoke to, the vast majority chose to either flee or join resistance organizations, as many young people who grew up under previously democratic conditions couldn't bear to see themselves supporting a military structure like that, which enacted the coup in 2021.

[Mike Lake, Conservative, Edmonton—Wetaskiwin, AB]

I took a look at the three things you mentioned as your recommendations for the committee. I don't know if you want to elaborate on any of them, but feel free to do that with your time.

For the third one, the support for pro-democracy organizations, what does that look like?

What can we do here in Canada? What would be the ideal outcome of a committee hearing like this? On behalf of the Canadian government, what would you like to see?

[Napas Thein]

The MyPACK Hub—the Myanmar policy and community knowledge hub—recently released a report outlining various recommendations that particularly pertain to this question around working with pro-democracy groups on the ground.

There is the National Unity Government, which is the main pro-democracy or anti-junta force, and there are various ethnic revolutionary organizations throughout the country that have either recent or even decades-long capacity on the ground. They have, in and of themselves, functioning governments. They have democratic structures. They have ministries of education and ministries of health, and so does the National Unity Government.

What supporting pro-democracy actors looks like on the ground is actively engaging with these organizations, potentially opening up the question of recognition of government rather than recognizing the junta government, and actively working toward the provision of assistance for any activities that are pro-democracy in nature and are in support of local humanitarian assistance. It means supporting any of the ministries that are directly involved in humanitarian assistance, whether it's for education, health care or support for IDPs.

It also means supporting the democratic building of these organizations and not waiting for them to be fully functioning, perfect governing structures. Rather, it's about supporting them towards those goals, especially if organizations are working toward democratic structures.

[Mike Lake, Conservative, Edmonton—Wetaskiwin, AB]

On the second point you made, which is support for migrants, how is Canada doing at this point in time, in December 2024? We've obviously had a lot of conversation on that at committee and in the House of Commons. How are we doing? What more could we do?

[Napas Thein]

Canada has had two strategies. The first strategy began in 2017 or 2018, in response to the Bob Rae report on the situation of the Rohingya. Canada has been sending a lot of money to support Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. There are organizations Canada funds that support migrants in Thailand as well.

What we want to see is more support for these migrants. We need more recognition that the situation of migrants and refugees is not one dimensional, that refugees and migrants fleeing conflict are themselves impacted in different ways and that local organizations that work along the border areas need significant supports in order to help these migrants.

Entire families of migrants are developing along the borders. There's a need for education. There's a need for health. There's a need for development assistance. It would be critical for supporters to provide people along the borders with assistance so they can develop, especially young people who are out of school, out of work or growing up in these conditions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you, Mr. Lake.

I invite Madam Vandenbeld to take the floor for five minutes, please.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

Thank you very much.

I'd like to thank both of our witnesses.

I'd like to start with you, Mr. Thein.

This morning, CNN was reporting that the Arakan Army has claimed the entire border between Myanmar and Bangladesh. First of all, what are the implications of that?

When we talk about migration, we don't often talk about who controls international borders, who controls the exit of migrants, who controls those entering and how international law applies in those situations. I wonder if you could let us know what you think about the events that are happening as we speak. What are the larger implications for our migration study?

[Napas Thein]

Thank you for asking the question.

There are very serious implications. It comes down to the question of the organizations that control, with de facto powers, the territory that borders the country. This has implications for the situation of the Rohingya. It has implications for the wider country's situation of conflict, and it also has implications for Bangladesh.

It's not clear exactly what the Arakan Army will do with that border, but it is clear that any action done within Rakhine state needs to be done with the actors on the ground. That means international organizations may need to work with the Arakan Army and may need to work with Rohingya groups to provide humanitarian assistance effectively. There are various ways to do that, and there's the tool of using condemnation, especially if these groups are enacting atrocities towards the Rohingya.

For the second question on cross-border analysis, essentially, analyzing Myanmar in the context of who controls the borders is very important for understanding the situation. You can't really understand humanitarian assistance as a whole within Myanmar without considering that many of these ethnic revolutionary organizations, resistance organizations, control most of Myanmar's border. They are responsible for humanitarian assistance. They are responsible for the security situation on the ground. You can't expect the junta, which doesn't have control of these areas, to provide humanitarian assistance without control of those areas. Working with these border organizations, the ethnic revolutionary organizations, would allow more assistance to be provided.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

It's a lot more complex in situations like this. I don't have that much time, but I'd like to ask Alice a question as well.

You talked about internally displaced people. In that case, you're talking about millions of people globally and some being displaced more than once. What are the main causes of internal displacement as opposed to the kinds we're looking at where people are crossing international borders?

[Dr. Alice Baillat]

Thank you for your question.

I think the causes of internal displacement are, in many cases, similar to those of international displacement or migration. What we observe is that conflict and different sources of violence or persecution are a significant trigger of internal displacement. Disasters and the growing impacts of climate change are also becoming a significant trigger.

As I was saying in my intervention, I think it's really important to look at these triggers as interconnected and not necessarily as separate triggers, as they tend to overlap in more and more situations and increase the vulnerabilities of people who are displaced. That's also important because, while we tend to focus our intention on international migration, the numbers all show that internal displacement is way more significant in terms of numbers. That's an overlooked challenge, but it deserves way more attention.

There are quite a few studies looking at the nexus between internal and cross-border displacement. In some situations, especially when IDPs do not find solutions within their country after a certain period of time, it can lead to more international migration. People are going to try to find solutions elsewhere.

I hope that answers your question.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

Yes. Thank you very much.

You mentioned a couple of conflicts—like in the DRC—where a lot of pressures are coming up internationally from across a border, putting pressure on internal—

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

I'm sorry.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

Is the time up?

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Yes.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

Okay. Thank you.