Subcommittee on International Human Rights Committee on April 20th, 2026

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

This meeting is called to order.

Welcome, everyone, to meeting number 16 of the Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the subcommittee on Monday, January 26, 2026, the subcommittee is meeting as part of its study on the global impacts of transnational repression.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the Standing Orders. Members are attending in person in the room and remotely using the Zoom application.

I would like to make a few comments for the benefit of witnesses and members.

Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. For those participating by video conference, click on the microphone icon to activate your mic, and please mute yourself when you are not speaking.

For those on Zoom, at the bottom of your screen, you can select the appropriate channel for interpretation: floor, English or French. For those in the room, you can use the earpiece and select the desired channel.

As a reminder, all comments should be addressed through the chair.

I would now like to welcome the witnesses.

From the Falun Dafa Association of Canada, we have Dr. Maria Cheung, senior researcher, and Ms. Grace Wollensak, national coordinator.

As individuals, we have Madam Zaha Hassan, senior fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, by video conference; Mr. Marcus Kolga, senior fellow, Macdonald-Laurier Institute; and Mr. Peter Mattis, president of The Jamestown Foundation, by video conference.

From the Canada Tibet Committee, we have Sherap Therchin, executive director.

From the World Uyghur Congress, we have Zumretay Arkin, vice-president.

Welcome to you all. You will have five minutes to give your remarks.

I would like to start with Dr. Maria Cheung.

You have the floor for five minutes.

[Maria Cheung, Senior Researcher, Falun Dafa Association of Canada]

Honourable members, thank you for this opportunity.

The CCP's transnational repression against Falun Gong is a sustained global campaign, not isolated incidents. What is happening on Canadian soil is a direct encroachment on sovereignty, democratic values and fundamental freedoms. Falun Gong is a spiritual practice centred on the principles of truth, compassion and forbearance, practised in over 100 countries.

In 1999, the CCP launched a systematic campaign to eradicate it due to its popularity and independence, resulting in mass atrocities. For 27 years, the CCP has deployed a full spectrum of transnational repression against the Falun Gong community worldwide, including disinformation, surveillance, intimidation, harassment, assault, political manipulation, pressure on groups and institutions that work with the community, cyber-attacks and threats to family members in China.

A defecting high-level Chinese diplomat testified that persecuting Falun Gong is a formalized daily task for Chinese diplomatic missions worldwide. Central to this campaign is disinformation. Falun Gong is unfamiliar to many in the west, and the CCP has exploited this gap by systematically spreading a hate narrative across all available channels in Canada and globally. Canadian tribunals have ruled such content abusive and hate-inciting and have recognized Falun Gong as a protected creed.

Despite this, CCP diplomatic missions and proxies continue to spread propaganda and disinformation. The CCP's “50 cent army” amplifies this disinformation across Chinese and non-Chinese social media platforms. Recent reports found thousands of fake social media accounts spreading anti-Falun Gong content, likely aligned with China. Prolonged disinformation has fostered indifference, eroded public support and undermined Canada's ability to respond to serious human rights abuses in China and the repression occurring here on Canadian soil.

[Grace Wollensak, National Coordinator, Falun Dafa Association of Canada]

Two leaked CCP documents reveal that Xi Jinping directly ordered a new coordinated campaign, one that has escalated sharply over the past two years, combining disinformation, lawfare and a hoax bomb threat targeting Shen Yun and Falun Gong. In Canada alone, there have been 20 hoax bomb and shooting threats in two years among over 270 violent threats worldwide.

This year, targets expanded to Canadian leaders, including a threat stating that if Shen Yun dared to perform in March, something bad would happen to both Justin Trudeau and Mark Carney, and there would be a massive explosion on Parliament Hill. Police deemed this threat non-credible, yet six performances at Toronto's Four Seasons Centre were cancelled. The perpetrator then boasted in Chinese emails that the Toronto fall season incident was their most successful one yet and that Canada is hardly worth taking seriously.

The sender referred to the CCP as “my motherland's Communist Party”, and email time-stamps corresponded to China standard time. The Vancouver police's cybercrime unit determined that the phone number associated with the sender is based in China. The sender went further to impersonate our organization while sending bomb threat to targets internationally, including the White House and the Tokyo theatre.

We urge our government to take the following actions.

One, publicly condemn this campaign and convey through diplomatic channels that the CCP-directed interference against Canadians and institutions must stop.

Two, direct security agencies to investigate this threat as foreign interference, pursue perpetrators and train frontline police to recognize transnational repression.

Three, bring Bill C-70's countering foreign interference provisions into force without delay, and enact dedicated legislation explicitly criminalizing transnational repression as a distinct offence.

Four, brief performing arts venues on responding to foreign-linked hoax threats. Where law enforcement finds no credible threat, Canadians' right to attend lawful performances must be upheld. No foreign actor should veto cultural life in Canada.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you.

I would like to invite Madam Zaha Hassan to take the floor for five minutes.

The floor is yours.

[Zaha Hassan, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, As an Individual]

Thank you to the subcommittee for the invitation to offer testimony.

In addition to being a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C., I'm the co-editor of Suppressing Dissent: Shrinking Civic Space, Transnational Repression and Palestine–Israel.

The main point I want to make in my opening remarks today is that our traditional understanding of TNR is insufficient to capture the full extent of the problem and how it functions in liberal democracies. The widely accepted definition is that TNR encompasses actions of a foreign government, typically an authoritarian adversary of the target country, to silence or harm exiles or others critical of the regime with a goal of chilling dissent. However, this definition overlooks TNR perpetrated by states considered allies or liberal democracies. The aim of TNR in such cases is to discourage or punish activism that could lead to policy change toward the TNR-perpetrating state. Coordinated efforts by the Israeli government to suppress dissent in North America and Europe is illustrative of this brand of TNR.

Efforts to suppress dissent advocating for a rights-respecting foreign policy toward Israel-Palestine began after the Gaza war in 2008-09, but it was not until 2015 that the Israeli government mandated its Ministry of Strategic Affairs to combat international civil society efforts. The international grassroots pro-Palestinian rights movement was modelled after the campaign against apartheid in South Africa. Consumer boycotts, divestment and sanctions, or BDS, were the tactics advocated, similar to the tactics deployed by American civil rights activists in the 1960s. The Israeli military's objective was to create costs for this activism.

Over the next decade, the ministry and its various successor ministries worked in coordination or partnership with pro-Israel organizations and individuals around the world, even hosting conferences for them. According to a 2017 annual report, the ministry intended to build the “infrastructure” for “an organized network”.

Three professional networks were established by the ministry: the Global Coalition for Israel, the Legal Network Initiative and the DigiTell Network. Most of the work and identities of the members of these networks were classified by Israel. However, through open-source material, freedom of information act requests and research conducted by Dr. Yousef Munayyer and other experts for the book Suppressing Dissent, we can understand how Israel and its networks coordinated their efforts to silence and intimidate speech and protest.

Some of the very early accomplishments that the MSA, or Ministry of Strategic Affairs, took credit for in 2019 included the adoption of anti-boycott laws in 27 U.S. states and also by Congress and the U.K. government; the filing of 50 lawsuits against activists and their organizations around the world; the crackdown on campus activists; and the growing adoption of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, or IHRA, definition for anti-Semitism.

How did these networks do this? The ministry's so-called Global Coalition for Israel campaigned for the widespread adoption of IHRA's expansive definition of anti-Semitism, which equated legitimate criticism of Israeli policies or critique of political Zionism with hate speech. As a lawyer involved with the legal network for Israel stated, “If we permit administrators on university campuses, representatives on Capitol Hill, and the general public to perceive the situation as merely a political disagreement...then we neuter the most important weapons in our arsenal.” The weapons she was referring to were the uses of anti-discrimination legislation offensively against activists. The result has been far-reaching, including the cancellation of certain college courses, repression against pro-Palestinian campus protesters, doxing, arrests, deportation and physical attacks against students.

Members of the ministry's legal network for Israel worked to mire pro-Palestinian rights organizations in civil lawsuits and administrative actions, claiming that their advocacy supports terrorism or incites against Jews. Individuals and organizations are also facing reputational harm, resulting in loss of employment or opportunities and threats of losing non-profit status or of funding cuts.

Members of the DigiTell Network and the Israeli Cyber Unit worked to pressure media companies to take down posts on the human rights situation in Palestine with great success during the war in Gaza in 2021. Over 90% of the requests for takedowns were honoured. Today, content moderation policies have been adopted that treat certain pro-Palestine advocacy as hate speech or terrorism.

Beyond these real-world harms to individuals and institutions, these activities suppressed robust debate essential for policy-making, weakened democracies and undermined civil liberties.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you. The time was well respected.

Now I would like to invite Mr. Marcus Kolga to take the floor for five minutes, please.

[Marcus Kolga, Senior Fellow, Macdonald-Laurier Institute, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, members of the committee and my fellow witnesses.

I have fond memories of working with this committee more than a decade ago, when it played a key role in advancing Canada's Magnitsky law, a campaign that I had the honour of leading with Bill Browder and my dear friend Irwin Cotler. That work, along with my efforts to expose foreign authoritarian influence and information operations and transnational repression, has also made me a target of them. I am one of only three Canadians sanctioned by both China and Russia.

The threats, intimidation and harassment against me intensified when I led the civil society campaign for Magnitsky sanctions and after I published the first major Canadian report on Russian influence operations in Canada for the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, titled “Stemming the Virus”, which I have provided to the clerk. That report exposed Russian information and cognitive warfare targeting Canada. It also outlined how the Kremlin arbitrarily accuses critics of being fascists or tolerant of Nazis in order to discredit, dehumanize and silence them.

Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has been labelled this way, as have prominent Canadian MPs, including former deputy prime minister Chrystia Freeland, MP James Bezan and former MP Borys Wrzesnewskyj. Shortly after my report was published, an article appeared in an Ottawa newspaper falsely accusing me of the same.

After I exposed the role of a former Canadian ambassador to Russia as a board member of a Russian resource company and Canadian academics who collaborate with Vladimir Putin's Valdai Club think tank and their role in advancing Kremlin-aligned positions within Canada's information environment, I became the target of a coordinated defamation campaign intended to have me removed from the Macdonald-Laurier Institute and to discredit my work.

For their courage to stand by me, the Macdonald-Laurier Institute was among the first organizations outside of Russia to be officially designated undesirable by the Kremlin, effectively criminalizing contact with the institute or its members. Shortly thereafter, Russia's most widely read daily tabloid, Komsomolskaya Pravda, accused me of falsifying Russian history and attacked my Estonian heritage using Russian neo-colonial tropes designed to incite hatred.

This was followed by a long series of harassing emails and social media messages, many of which included death threats and threats against my family. I have submitted samples of these to the clerk. These threats caused sustained psychological stress for me and my family, and their effects continue to linger to this day.

Finding help within Canadian law enforcement was extremely difficult. My local police service told me to contact the RCMP. The RCMP told me to go back to the local police. I was then told to contact CSIS. No one provided much help. I was left in limbo, isolated and alone. Isolation deepens the fear and psychological stress victims are already enduring.

I am deeply grateful to John Khoshandish of York Regional Police, whose team took up my case. York Regional Police's approach is now being recognized internationally as an effective victim-centred model for responding to transnational repression. While that helped end the worst of the attacks against me, the pressure continues in other forms.

In 2022, shortly after I published an opinion piece about Russian oligarch and close associate of Vladimir Putin Roman Abramovich, I was informed by the publisher, Maclean's magazine, that they had received a legal threat from lawyers connected to Chelsea Football Club, which was then still owned by Abramovich. He was seeking removal of the piece. Fearing costly legal action from one of the richest Russian oligarchs, the publisher backed down.

I am also regularly warned by digital service providers that foreign governments are constantly seeking to hack my accounts and devices, but my reaction has been to fight back and to support others, those far more courageous than me and for whom the stakes are much higher, including the brave Belarusian, Ukrainian, Russian, Iranian, Jewish, Hong Kong, Uyghur, Falun Gong and Tibetan activists, like my friend Sherap Therchin, who continues to be surveilled, intimidated and threatened for exercising rights that should be protected in any democracy.

Canada must treat transnational repression as a national security threat. That means ending the impunity through which foreign authoritarians and their domestic allies and enablers operate. We need clearer reporting pathways; better coordination among police, intelligence and government agencies; and stronger victim-centred responses so that no one in Canada is left isolated when targeted by a foreign regime.

I've submitted to the clerk frameworks that I have helped develop for Digital Public Square and the Atlantic Council, which I hope will be useful to the committee in this study.

I thank the committee, but especially my fellow witnesses for their courage and their bravery. I look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you.

Now I'd like to invite Mr. Peter Mattis to take the floor for five minutes, please.

[Peter Mattis, President, The Jamestown Foundation, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair and members of the committee, for inviting me to testify.

Many Canadians have already testified about the dangers and realities of transnational repression, including that perpetrated by the Chinese Communist Party. Therefore, I'd like to focus my remarks on the party's infrastructure for transnational repression and political influence.

The party's main instrument is the United Front policy system. It works from the Politburo standing committee, down to local party committees. In every kind of organization where you can find a party committee, you are likely to find united front work departments. This could be in a business or in a research institution. This is not something where you can simply say that the United Front Work Department is doing this, because there's a central level and provincial levels, and it goes all the way on down.

United front work is a CCP tool for political struggle and conflict that U.S. intelligence once described as “A technique for controlling, mobilizing, and utilizing non-Communist masses.” The purpose of this system was to mobilize friends to isolate or strike at enemies of the party. In the 1930s, Mao Zedong was explicit about this, describing the party as a “warrior” that wields the twin weapons of “the united front and the armed struggle, to storm and shatter the [enemy]”.

The United Front system builds bridges between the party and society through creating, co-opting or controlling social groups that can be leveraged for the party's political purposes. The closest thing in a democratic political context is like having a political campaign organization that never stops running, even after elections. Moreover, that same organization has to keep extending itself into schools, into media, and into community organizations in a never-ending process to identify threats and to ensure the control of ideas that might be dangerous to the party.

While Mao's perspective may seem historical rather than contemporary, Mao's basic framing of united front work within the party's tool box has been consistent and clear across all of his successors, up to Xi Jinping today, all of whom have characterized united front work as a magic weapon or talisman to facilitate China's rise in the midst of an international and ideological battleground.

United front work is not equivalent to influence operations or covert actions that our governments might understand. Those are set-piece operations with a specific goal. United front work is characterized as the day-to-day work of the party. It's not only a party system with the committees. It's present in almost every single government ministry—the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of State Security, etc.

To do such work, the United Front system and the CCP cadre who participate in this target civil society organizations, wealthy proxies—like Hong Kong tycoons—universities, companies, politicians and local governments, media organizations and even some celebrity personalities, as well as any other institution that might shape interactions with the PRC.

Not only can this organizational infrastructure be used to support transnational oppression, including surveillance and intimidation, but it can also be used to support other harms, including trying to insert itself between democratic citizens and governments and representatives so they speak with the party's voice or they see the legitimacy of their constituents represented by the party to them. The second harm is that by constructing and influencing politicians, they undermine the integrity of decision-making. Finally, these groups can be used for facilitating intelligence operations and technology transfer.

This is an all-purpose tool for creating and applying political power while hiding the party's hand. Even though some elements of the system are open to the public and are visible, the ultimate aim is still subversion and control.

This is why all the analysis and discussion of this should begin with the CCP and work outward. We know what the party's intentions are, and we know what the party organizations are. We should be able to have a conversation about what it means to channel our engagement with China through organizations whose purpose is to break and shatter us.

This is something where many of us may be naive rather than malicious, but that's the reason we have to be able to have a conversation. We have to be able to understand how the party operates so we can control this and ensure the integrity of our democracies and our governments.

Thank you very much for having me. I look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you.

Now I would like to invite Mr. Sherap Therchin to take the floor for five minutes, please.

[Sherap Therchin, Executive Director, Canada Tibet Committee]

Thank you, Mr. Chair and committee members. I deeply appreciate this opportunity to speak with you today on the important matter of transnational repression.

I'm one of the 20 Canadians who were sanctioned by the Government of China on December 21, 2024. While we wear this sanction as a badge of honour and as a recognition of our commitment to human rights and justice, it does come with real and lasting consequences. We have been deemed a threat to China's national security, sovereignty and development interests by the Chinese foreign ministry and almost all major Chinese state media.

These sanctions are not merely symbolic. Since being sanctioned, our daily life has become more difficult, more fearful and more restrictive. I receive frequent phishing emails. Our website has been infected with malware. We have received threatening online comments from anonymous accounts. We have had to install VPNs on our phones and devices for basic security, but even that comes at a cost: slowing down other applications and constantly reminding us that we are living under threat. These are not abstract concerns. They affect how we work and how we communicate and live.

Our international travel has also become increasingly complicated. We have to think carefully about where we go, who we speak to and what risks we may face in countries that are friendly to China. We have to watch our backs, be cautious with strangers and remain constantly alert.

At the same time, many of us carry deep concern for our loved ones inside Tibet or in countries with close ties to China, knowing that these sanctions can be weaponized at any moment. Despite our determination not to be deterred in our advocacy, this reality creates fear. It indirectly and subconsciously curtails our sense of freedom and, at times, even our courage to speak as openly as we otherwise would.

The Canadian government has been supportive during this difficult time in extending solidarity, listening to our concerns, holding consultations and providing safety workshops. We are grateful for that support, but the fact remains that being sanctioned by one of the world's most powerful authoritarian regimes, known for silencing dissent both inside and outside its borders, changes a person's life. Despite our best efforts to remain strong and continue our work, our lives have never been the same. We are constantly securing our digital tools—email, social media, websites—and living with a level of vigilance that no Canadian should have to accept.

To understand the true meaning of being sanctioned by China, we must first recognize the broader threat posed by the People's Republic of China. This is not simply about one government disagreeing with criticism. It is about a state with a documented record of foreign interference, cyber-aggression, transnational repression and intimidation.

The final report of the public inquiry into foreign interference found that the PRC is the most active perpetrator of foreign interference targeting Canada's democratic institutions. A recent report, Canada's 2026 “National Cyber Threat Assessment”, states that the PRC poses the “most sophisticated and active state cyber threat to Canada today”. It notes that China “conducts cyber operations against Canadian interests” to advance “political and commercial objectives, including espionage, intellectual property (IP) theft, malign influence, and transnational repression.”

China's blatant disregard for freedom of speech has gone beyond its own citizens. It has gone transnational now. The threat is already here in Canada.

Canadians remember the arbitrary detention of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor for nearly three years. In a similar case in 2014, which many of you might have forgotten, Canadians Kevin and Julia Garratt were detained after the arrest of Chinese national and Canadian permanent resident Su Bin in Canada on charges related to the theft of sensitive U.S. military technology. Also, Canadian citizen of Uyghur origin Huseyin Celil has been imprisoned in China since 2006.

China's own laws help explain why these risks cannot be dismissed. Article 14 of China's National Intelligence Law clearly states that national intelligence institutions may require that “relevant organs, organisations, and citizens provide necessary support, assistance, and cooperation”. In other words, the obligation to assist the state's intelligence work is written directly into Chinese law.

While we seek to diversify our trade and investment, we should not let the arbitrary arrests and sanctions of Canadian citizens be normalized. These incidents should not be treated as isolated events. We can continue to push for strengthened trade ties with countries around the world, including China, while standing firm on international law and democratic values, without fear of retaliation and transnational repression.

While we pursue trade, we must build solid guardrails, as mentioned by the government last year, including with transparency in the supply chain linked to China, an unrestricted and independent fact-finding mission to China, and reciprocal access to Tibet and East Turkestan. I'm adding “reciprocal access” here because of the announcement of visa-free access for Canadians to visit China. After the announcement, some Tibetan-origin Canadians bought tickets and tried to visit Tibet and mainland China, but they were sent back to Canada without any clear reasons.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you.

Now I would like to invite Madame Zumretay Arkin to take the floor for five minutes, please.

[Zumretay Arkin, Vice-President, World Uyghur Congress]

Mr. Chair and honourable members, thank you for this opportunity.

My name is Zumretay Arkin. I'm a Uyghur Canadian activist and vice-president of the World Uyghur Congress, an international organization defending Uyghur rights.

For over 20 years, my organization has documented transnational repression targeting Uyghurs globally. Transnational repression is a growing phenomenon aimed at silencing human rights defenders, journalists, academics and diaspora communities. According to Freedom House, China is the leading perpetrator, using tactics such as online harassment, coercion by proxy, mobility controls, Interpol red notices, spyware, SLAPP lawsuits and abuse of extradition systems.

One of the most cruel tactics is the family hostage policy: detaining or threatening relatives to silence activists abroad. I want to highlight the case of Huseyin Celil, a Canadian citizen detained in Uzbekistan in 2006 and deported to China under an Interpol red notice, despite Canada's objections. Nearly 20 years later, his fate remains unknown. His case reflects the systematic campaign that continues to affect people in Canada today.

My own experience has demonstrated that the Chinese government uses these tactics everywhere. Since I joined the World Uyghur Congress in September 2019, my family and I have become visible targets. My relatives in Urumqi face ongoing harassment, despite losing contact with me in 2017.

In 2024, I received anonymous messages, with images suggesting my uncle was being interrogated. I have been followed in multiple countries, including on UN premises in Geneva, and filmed by individuals linked to Chinese entities. I have been targeted by online smear campaigns, deepfakes and threats. In 2024, my colleagues and I received death threats during our general assembly.

Although I am a Canadian citizen, I do not feel safe anywhere. My father, also a Canadian citizen, was detained and interrogated in 2013 while visiting Urumqi, and pressured to spy on Uyghur activists. When reported, no action was taken.

Transnational repression does not only strike individuals; it is actually engineered to strike communities. It creates fear, anxiety and self-censorship, forcing people to withdraw from public life and undermining collective advocacy. Tactics have evolved to avoid international attention: quietly intimidating individuals from speaking publicly, placing community figures under surveillance and even enlisting community members to create positive images of China. Trust collapses from within, and communities begin to police themselves.

Canada already knows this. Commissioner Marie-Josée Hogue described transnational repression as a “genuine scourge” in Canada, and identified China as “the most active perpetrator of foreign interference” targeting Canada.

Recent steps, including the appointment of a foreign influence transparency commissioner, are important, but these measures focus primarily on elections and political interference, not on the lived reality of diaspora communities facing daily threats. Canada still lacks a clear mechanism for victims to report transnational repression or to receive support. Many are turned away because cases do not meet national security thresholds, leaving victims without protection and further traumatized.

In light of this, we urge the subcommittee to take the following steps. First, expand the mandate of the foreign influence transparency commissioner to explicitly address transnational repression targeting diaspora communities. Second, legislate a clear definition of TNR and create specific offences, ensuring accountability for those acting on behalf of foreign governments. Third, establish a safe, trusted and accessible reporting mechanism, separate from national security agencies, where victims can come forward without fear. Fourth, train law enforcement and policy-makers to recognize and respond to transnational repression, and strengthen investigative capacity. Fifth, improve coordination across federal, provincial and municipal levels to better protect affected communities. Sixth, develop legal and diplomatic tools, in coordination with international partners, to hold perpetrators accountable. Finally, build long-term, trust-based engagement with affected communities.

Uyghur Canadians who are surveilled, threatened and silenced are your constituents. This subcommittee has a critical opportunity to ensure that they are not left behind.

Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you.

I would now like to move to the first round of questions. I invite Mr. Majumdar to take the floor for seven minutes, please.

[Shuv Majumdar, Conservative, Calgary Heritage, AB]

Thank you to all for your testimony today on transnational repression. It's certainly illuminating on many levels.

In the interest of time, Peter Mattis, let me start with you.

I want to give you an opportunity to respond to Senator Yuen Pau Woo, who described your recent Jamestown report as “disinformation”, “fear mongering” and “bad fiction”. You've warned that more than 575 organizations in Canada are linked to the CCP's United Front Work Department. What do you make of a sitting Canadian senator refusing to take this threat seriously?

[Peter Mattis]

It's a kind of laziness not to look at the methodology and not to look at the party. The point is, as I said in my testimony, that we were not blaming Canadians for not understanding. We were saying that you should be able to look at the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, the United Front Work Department and its supporting units, like the Chinese Overseas Exchange Association, the China Overseas Friendship Association and all of the associated provincial organizations. These are not friendly organizations. They explicitly exist to do harm.

We should be able to have a conversation about what the appropriate channel is for engagement. What should we think of an organization whose leadership attends multiple world Chinese media forums in the PRC? This is about collaborating with the propaganda system and the United Front system to influence foreign audiences about how to understand China and to tell China's story well.

If people are Canadian citizens, American citizens or anything else and take official advisory or delegate positions with these United Front organizations—again, a set of organizations that seek to do us harm—that seems to me a reasonable question that we could ask of our fellow citizens in a democratic state.

If we want to protect integrity, we have to be able to have a conversation that deals with facts and deals with those sources. Our report left a clear methodology for examining and following up on those questions.

[Shuv Majumdar, Conservative, Calgary Heritage, AB]

As a follow-up, you described, alarmingly, how the United Front Work Department is deploying a swarm approach—an asymmetric approach—in democracies like ours and indeed countries around the world. You likened it to a 24-7 political campaign that never ends and constantly looks for opportunity, with Canada having the highest per capita density of United Front organizations, which have been going after our own Uyghurs, Hong Kongers and Falun Dafa, among many others. In Canada, the presence per capita is five times more than that of the United States.

What unique risks does this create for our North American security? What practical reforms do you recommend not just for North America but for the western world?

[Peter Mattis]

First, I think this kind of expansion, in terms of it being open and accessible, is a product of a lack of direct push-back. If you go back to the controversial project Sidewinder report in the 1990s, this was a speculative effort. It was a sense that something could happen. What you can see from the report done by Cheryl Yu earlier this year is that this is what happens when there is no push-back—when there are no investigations and no discussions about what takes place.

Many Canadian reporters have discussed what has happened in Richmond, Vancouver and Toronto—the way in which the party and crime kind of come together. The first thing is that you have to make sure that news organizations are equipped to research and look at this, because there are elements of this that only a news organization can report and can provide a credible discussion on.

The second thing is that you have to be building expertise inside companies, universities, politics and government, because how are you supposed to recognize that some obscure...? Let's say the Guangdong Overseas Exchange Association is operating in your district. Why should you know that it is a problem? You should be able to find some sort of resource. This is the kind of thing that CSIS and the RCMP should be able to do.

With the foreign influence registration system that's coming online, it also means that you should be thinking about how we enforce this and how we create consequences. Unless there are consequences, Beijing is running no risks whatsoever by continuing its operations.

[Shuv Majumdar, Conservative, Calgary Heritage, AB]

I appreciate your testimony today. Thank you for that.

Marcus Kolga, it's nice to see you, a friend and former colleague at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute. I thank you for your courage, having borne witness to what you have endured for well over a decade in your advocacy for human rights. You and your family are truly courageous.

Let me ask you about Bill C-219, a private member's bill introduced by James Bezan on confronting transnational repression in Canada. I have the honour of co-sponsoring it with him.

In your mind, how would that bill help improve the federal government's response to all the problems you described with respect to the threat of transnational repression?

[Marcus Kolga]

Thank you for that very important question.

I had the honour of leading the Magnitsky campaign when it began in 2012. It concluded in 2018. It provided the first key tool in deterring transnational repression—holding the perpetrators to account. I don't think we've used it to good enough effect to create deterrence with those sanctions.

The other problem is that it is missing a few tools. James Bezan's private member's bill adds new, very important amendments to our existing sanctions legislation. It includes, as many of the witnesses here have asked for, a clear definition of transnational repression. This is the first piece of Canadian legislation that has a very clear definition of transnational repression. It also adds, very importantly, visa bans for the immediate family members of perpetrators and includes measures for far more robust enforcement of our sanctions legislation.

Allow me to quickly reiterate that transnational repression is not a partisan issue, nor are the solutions to it partisan. The integrity of our democracy and defending the right of Canadians to express themselves free of threat, harassment and intimidation are not trivial, partisan issues. They affect all of us, including, as we very well know, those who sit in the House of Commons.

I urge all members of this committee to go back to their caucuses and urge all of their fellow MPs to support Bill C-219 in order to hold these perpetrators to account.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you, Mr. Majumdar.

Now I'd like to ask Mr. Zuberi to take the floor for seven minutes.

[Sameer Zuberi, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

I want to thank the witnesses for being here and for their courage and testimony. Thank you for remaining strong despite the challenges you face personally, as well as those around you.

I want to start off with Maria and Grace.

I know you've been dealing with transnational repression over several decades. Have you seen an evolution in the repression you've been facing over recent periods of time—an evolution since you've been involved and active?

[Maria Cheung]

Yes, we've seen this over the 27 years.

At the beginning, it was Chinese consulates—embassy people taking anti-Falun Gong disinformation and hate propaganda to forums and the public. They were spreading it. Over the last 15 or 20 years, we've seen a lot more proxies in Canada doing these things for the consulates.

Recently, the bomb threats have become a very serious matter. This is an international issue because Shen Yun performs around the world in 200 cities every year. Nowadays, bomb threats have become a daily reality. Wherever Shen Yun goes, bomb threats follow.

For Canada, if we cancel the shows without understanding foreign interference and transnational repression, it's a very dangerous sign. We bow to the Communist regime so they can silence us. It is very important for Canada to stand up.

[Sameer Zuberi, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

Definitely, the point you're mentioning, the raising of how things have evolved over time, is important.

Sherap, you mentioned how technology is playing a role. I'm assuming that's part of the evolution of repression that you have experienced or have seen manifest. Do you want to add to the question and expand upon the technological aspect as it relates to the repression that you've seen in the community?

[Sherap Therchin]

As I mentioned in my opening remarks, some of the threats that came right after we were sanctioned were on Twitter accounts. They called for our assassination. I took an immediate screenshot knowing that they might just delete it, because it was from a fake account, which they did.

There's also an unverified website called The Canada Files, which has been compiling information on Tibetans speaking out on human rights issues, labelling us as “foreign proxies” actually, which is very ironic. Our website—Tibet.ca—was down last year, just three days before March 10, which marks the annual Tibetan uprising day. It actually took us a long time, two months, to bring it back.

Similarly—