Subcommittee on International Human Rights Committee on April 20th, 2026

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to echo the thanks to all of you for your courage and for continuing to speak out despite the intimidation you face. I think I speak for all committee members here. We are very grateful for your testimony and advocacy, and we are 100% supportive of the work you do.

I'm very happy to see some of you back here at the committee. Our committee has done a lot of work on these issues.

I'd like to start with the Falun Dafa Association.

There's a word you used, and I noticed others also used the same term. Can you delve a bit more into that? Then, perhaps, I'll open it up. You said that it's a “coordinated” campaign. Mr. Kolga said the same thing. If you say “coordinated”, it will mean different things to different people.

What exactly does that look like, who is coordinating it and how are they doing it?

[Grace Wollensak]

Thank you for the question. It's important to understand how the Chinese Communist regime works.

“Coordinated” means that it is always from the very top. It's from Xi Jinping and the highest echelons of leaders in the public security ministry and the state ministry. They have directives. They instruct that they be worldwide so that all countries are working in the same way. What is happening to Falun Gong in Canada is also happening in other countries.

In the past few years, we've seen a sharp escalation because Xi Jinping gave an order in 2022. He said that so far, the global fight against Falun Gong was a failure. He initiated a new campaign. He instructed all ministries to fight Falun Gong overseas. They have a joint office in North America. They have a new office to directly tackle Falun Gong. They have public opinion warfare, legal warfare and bomb threats. This happens globally.

Also, thousands of social media accounts are spreading the CCP's anti-Falun Gong narrative worldwide. You can see them working together. This is all happening in a coordinated way.

The bomb threats follow the same pattern. They even use different languages. The threat sent to Canada was in Swiss, Czech, French and Chinese—in different languages but from the same person. The one who sent a threat to shut down the Four Seasons Centre in Toronto sent the same threat to Vancouver, but they continued the performance in Vancouver. He sent it to other countries like France, the U.K., the United States and Denmark. There was one threat sent to Canada regarding the Prime Minister and all the senior leaders in Parliament. That same threat message was sent to six heads of state. Australia, Denmark and other countries received exactly the same threat message at the same time, on the same day and from the same sender.

We see the pattern. The work is by the state. It cannot be individual or isolated incidents.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

Thank you so much. We see that this is happening globally.

I would like to hear from Ms. Arkin and Mr. Therchin.

It's a similar question, Ms. Arkin. You talked a lot about the surveillance on you and others. We're seeing a coordinated, global campaign and this level of surveillance. Where is all that surveillance data going and what is happening to it?

I'll start with Ms. Arkin. If we have time, I'll then go to Mr. Therchin.

[Zumretay Arkin]

All that data is going back to Beijing at the highest level, as my colleague said.

The surveillance is both physical and digital. As I mentioned in my statement, I was surveilled on UN premises, and it's perpetrated by Chinese diplomats. We reported this to the UN reprisals office. They've taken note. There's not much being done at the UN level either, but I think that's changing now.

Digitally, everything that goes online—all the information and the people we communicate with—is being surveilled through relatives and people in our networks. For example, we have had issues in the last few years with informants infiltrating our communities. Sometimes they're Uyghurs, Tibetans or Hong Kongers. You can imagine the sense of anxiety and fear that our community members have to live with. Sometimes you don't know. Sometimes it's the closest people to you who are surveilling and infiltrating your networks.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you, Ms. Vandenbeld.

I would like to invite Ms. Tamara Kronis to take the floor for five minutes.

[Tamara Kronis, Conservative, Nanaimo—Ladysmith, BC]

Thank you so much, Mr. Chair.

I really want to thank the witnesses for being here, especially given the sheer number of you who are under sanctions by various countries. You take a risk in coming here and are exacerbating your relationships with those governments.

Traditionally, transnational repression involved a country targeting its own citizens living abroad. Increasingly, we're seeing broader efforts by those governments aimed at damaging the institutions, public debates and governments of the countries hosting human rights defenders in order to make those environments increasingly inhospitable to that kind of human rights action.

Mr. Kolga, I want to start with you.

Can you comment on the intersection between transnational repression and foreign interference?

[Marcus Kolga]

Sure.

On the Russian side of things, this is nothing new. This has been going on for the past 100 years or so. Certainly, after the Second World War, we saw Soviet Russia target all critics of the regime then. That was primarily communities that were forced to flee, whether it was the Ukrainians, the Balts, the Poles or others.

Anyone who was critical of Soviet Russia's colonial and neo-imperialist practices was often labelled as a fascist, as a neo-Nazi. That means anyone, from those who fled to even children of those refugees—and including me. Using that term was intended to silence them, discredit them and dehumanize them. That's a tactic that's been modernized over the past 20 years by the Russian government.

[Tamara Kronis, Conservative, Nanaimo—Ladysmith, BC]

Of course, we're familiar with it in the context of the Cold War, but we're less familiar with it in terms of China and the things that China is currently doing to mimic some of the concepts that the Russians used to use in the context of Canada.

I want to turn to Ms. Arkin.

At least three of you have personally been sanctioned by the Chinese government. When you hear claims that forced labour in China is merely hearsay, I'm wondering how this fits for you inside the framework of transnational repression, which attempts to make Canada less hospitable to human rights defenders who note the practices that China is perpetrating. I'm wondering how you respond to that, based on your experiences. Do you think dismissing those concerns as hearsay really risks downplaying credible evidence and discourages victims, witnesses and activists from being able to do the good work they do?

[Zumretay Arkin]

Absolutely. I think that does downplay the severe abuses, especially in a context where the Chinese government has consistently refused access to international experts, including UN experts. The last UN special rapporteur who actually visited was Manfred Nowak, the special rapporteur on torture, in 2009. Since then, no meaningful access has been given, except for one special rapporteur last year, the special rapporteur on unilateral coercive measures, who basically said that sanctioning China was bad for the economy and for the development in China overall. We criticized that a lot.

No meaningful access was given, even to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet Jeria, in 2022. It does downplay a lot.

[Tamara Kronis, Conservative, Nanaimo—Ladysmith, BC]

Mr. Therchin, in the context of the threats that you have faced, do you feel that the moves we're making towards doing more business with China—in the context of the questions about electric vehicles that my colleague asked and some of the other activities that we're doing—send a signal to those regimes that their activities aimed at silencing voices around human rights are effective and that they should keep going? What does this mean for you? What does it mean for your personal safety?

[Sherap Therchin]

China has used trade to its advantage for a long time to coerce anyone speaking on Tibetan and human rights issues. We could learn a lesson from the U.S. It had a very engaged, interlinked trade relationship with China for decades, and now China has turned it around to its advantage.

We have to be very careful. I'm not saying that we shouldn't diversify trade and engage with China, but when we do, we have to establish very strong guardrails. We must understand that this is a regime that could be very ruthless.

A colleague spoke about the United Front, but what we haven't spoken about is how China has an intelligence wing called the MSS, which has three times more people than the CIA. It uses the MSS to surveil people.

Am I in favour of engaging in trade with China? I'm not really as a Tibetan Canadian, but I also understand Canada's need to diversify trade, so I would focus on establishing guardrails, which China would take as, really, a step to challenge its coercion capability.

[Tamara Kronis, Conservative, Nanaimo—Ladysmith, BC]

Thank you so much.

Mr. Kolga, do you have anything you would like to add?

[Marcus Kolga]

I completely agree with that. We have to have an understanding that the Canadian government is trying to diversify trade, but at the same time, we should also be able to call out human rights abuses and speak up for those 20 Canadians who have been placed on China's sanctions list. I didn't hear any mention of that when the Prime Minister was in Beijing. I know that a lot of us were concerned that our situation was not at all mentioned during that trip.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you, Ms. Kronis.

I invite Mr. Brunelle‑Duceppe to take the floor for five minutes.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'm going to pick up on that, Mr. Kolga. There are a few members of this subcommittee, myself included, who are subject to sanctions from China and Russia. So we have some things in common.

The warming of diplomatic relations with China is one thing, but isn't it the very nature of diplomatic relations to be able to address delicate and sensitive matters? While boasting about warming diplomatic relations with China, doesn't Canada have a duty to address those matters?

[Marcus Kolga]

I believe we have diplomatic tools in place to hold the perpetrators of human rights abuses, especially mass human rights abuses, to account. I don't think that Canada, having those tools in place.... We've used them quite effectively for Russia's crimes against Ukraine, for Russia's domestic repression inside of Russia and with the Belarusian regime as well, which engaged in mass repression of the Belarusian people after 2020.

We haven't been so effective in using them against the Chinese regime perpetrators of mass human rights abuses, and I think this is the first tool we have. We should be using it to demonstrate to the Chinese government that we will not stand for these sorts of abuses and that we stand with the victims.

At the current rate, we have very few Chinese officials on the sanctions list, and if we're talking about diplomatic tools, this is the first one that we should be using, and we should be using it to greater effect.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

In 2021, the Parliament of Canada recognized the Uyghur genocide. That's not insignificant. However, as you said, we're much less serious with China than we are with Russia, for example.

Mr. Therchin, the case of the 11th Panchen Lama, who has been missing for decades, is often cited as a symbol of repression in Tibet. How can this affect the Tibetan diaspora today, particularly in terms of oppression, intimidation abroad and self-censorship?

We know that the current Dalai Lama will not be around forever. So there is a concern about the next Dalai Lama. I'd like to hear your thoughts on that. Is there a connection? Could transnational repression increase right now as a result of that situation?

[Sherap Therchin]

The detention of the Panchen Lama at six years old has a direct connection with China's long-term plan to capture and control Tibetan Buddhism through its influence in the succession of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. He is 90 years old, and China has already claimed that it would have the right to appoint the next Dalai Lama.

The Dalai Lama is an honorary Canadian citizen, and I have advocated in the past, in a different committee, that Canadian soil shouldn't be used by the Chinese government to spread disinformation about its claim on the religious rights of Tibetan people, including the Dalai Lama. In 2018, a Chinese delegate claiming to be a representative of the Tibet Autonomous Region came and testified before the foreign affairs committee on many issues, but also on the Panchen Lama. One of the witnesses said the Panchen Lama was doing fine and did not wish to be disturbed, but the world hasn't seen him or heard from him for more than 30 years.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you very much.

Ms. Arkin, since we were just talking about Canadian citizenship, that brings me to the case of Huseyin Celil.

Can you tell the subcommittee about Celil's case? Isn't it a perfect example of transnational repression?

[Zumretay Arkin]

Absolutely. As I said in my presentation, that is the perfect example. We are really disappointed because we have not received any confirmation that the Prime Minister publicly mentioned his case during his visit to Beijing. This case is a clear example of transnational repression. We know that the two Michaels have been released, but in this case, the authorities have not made the same effort.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

That's exactly where I was going. The two Michaels are Canadian citizens. Celil is a Canadian citizen, but he obtained his Canadian citizenship after he was born. Does that make him some kind of second-class Canadian citizen? If we compare the Celil case with the case of the two Michaels, we can see that the efforts made by Canadian diplomacy, whether currently or in the past, have not been at all the same. Yet they have the same rights, as Canadian citizens. Only one of those people obtained their citizenship after they were born, while the other two are Canadian citizens by birth.

Isn't that paradoxical?

[Zumretay Arkin]

Yes, that is indeed a paradox. I'm not saying that Canadian authorities haven't tried, but I think more effort is needed. There has been no consular visit since his disappearance. This is a very basic recommendation, and we urge the government to mention his case in all of its bilateral and multilateral dealings with Beijing. The case of the two Michaels received a lot of media coverage, but the case of Huseyin Celil did not. His family here is still waiting to hear from him. It has been 20 years. I think Canada could do more, specifically by calling on its international partners to find out about him.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you.

Now, I invite Mr. Zuberi to take the floor for five minutes.

[Sameer Zuberi, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

Thank you.

I'd like to start with you, Mr. Mattis. We heard testimony about how there's been an evolution of TNR. With respect to that evolution, we heard that at one point it was officials, and later on it moved into organizations. Do you want to comment on that at all, based on your experience and background, and on where we are today specifically?