Subcommittee on International Human Rights Committee on April 20th, 2026

[Maria Cheung]

The CCP used lawfare to make the world think that Shen Yun or the Falun Gong have done something wrong, but actually, all this has been debunked by Shen Yun Performing Arts and the Falun Gong Information Centre.

The Chinese Communist Party, starting in 1999, once the persecution started, used a cult narrative to describe Falun Gong, and that planted a seed even for Canadians in general. When they did not understand Falun Gong, they thought the CCP was right. Now, when there are, say, political differences, the CCP will use that to attack Falun Gong. That is cognitive warfare. That is very unfair to the Falun Gong community.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you, Madam Vandenbeld.

Now I would like to invite Madame Kronis to take the floor for five minutes, please.

[Tamara Kronis, Conservative, Nanaimo—Ladysmith, BC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and really, thank you to the witnesses. This has been a really interesting and important discussion we've had here today.

I want to turn back to the concept of cognitive warfare and misinformation and think about them in the context of both the goals that various would-be world powers have and the fora in which they are conducting the cognitive warfare that they're conducting in this country.

I'll start with Mr. Kolga.

What do you think the goals of Russia, China, Iran and the United States are with respect to Canada? How do they differ? Also, what role are university campuses playing in all of this? We talk a lot about the Internet, but where is the warfare occurring? It's occurring in the courts and it's occurring on the Internet, but where is it physically manifesting itself and who is being targeted and why?

[Marcus Kolga]

Thank you for that very big question. I'll try to be as concise as possible.

On the Russian side—and I don't think it's that much different on the side of the Chinese government—we have certain elements of its playbook, which was exposed in a 2024 FBI affidavit focused on Russia's doppelgänger operation. We have very sensitive top secret and high-level documents that were leaked from the Russian presidential administration that basically lay out what those objectives are. At the top of that list, at least for the Russians, is to disparage the Ukrainians and to erode public support for the war in Ukraine, but more importantly, it is to divide democratic nations, to find the most potentially divisive polarizing issues and to then basically target both sides of those issues with various forms of misinformation and disinformation.

From those same documents, we know that Russian strategic communications firms—and also leadership within the government—were instructed to persistently monitor our information space for those sorts of issues. They've been doing that for quite some time. We've seen Russian information operations target both sides of environmental issues. During Black Lives, they target both sides of that issue. During COVID, we know that they became extremely active in trying to intensify the social and political impacts of the pandemic on western societies, including Canada.

Right now, with my work with DisinfoWatch, we're monitoring what's happening in the Canadian information space now and are seeing Russia becoming very active in trying to amplify regional grievances inside of Canada to try to further flare up and polarize Canadians on those regional issues. This is what Russia does very well. China is doing it increasingly well, but what China does very well is that it focuses on—

[Tamara Kronis, Conservative, Nanaimo—Ladysmith, BC]

I apologize. I only have a minute and a half left.

You're right. People can probably extrapolate from what China is doing and which issues they are targeting both sides of, such as forced labour. On Iran, you can see where they're going.

The next question I want to ask is about the thing I want to get at for the people watching at home. This will probably be my last question of the day.

As politicians, we get a lot of emails. We get a lot of form emails. What advice do you have for the people watching at home when they get a report or watch something online and there is inevitably something that wants them to click a petition and send us a message? What advice do you have for people when they are learning about issues that look to divide Canadians?

[Marcus Kolga]

Take a step back. Take a deep breath. Think about what you're seeing. Consider who is behind it and what they're trying to achieve before you click on anything.

The other thing I tell Canadians is to stop looking at social media. Just get off social media, if you can. Get a subscription.

I know that the trust in professional journalism has been eroded over the past decade or two—intentionally so, I think, by some of our foreign actors. Get a subscription to a newspaper. Buy your children, especially, a subscription to a newspaper. Get off social media.

[Tamara Kronis, Conservative, Nanaimo—Ladysmith, BC]

Even better, subscribe to not just one newspaper but several newspapers.

[Marcus Kolga]

Absolutely.

[Tamara Kronis, Conservative, Nanaimo—Ladysmith, BC]

I personally try really hard to make sure that when I'm looking at sources that agree with me or when I see a whole bunch of sources taking the same position, I try to find the counterpoint, just to understand what else is going on in the world.

Thank you very much for that, because it is so important right now, at a time when it's so hard to tell whether you're being spoon-fed something and being taken down a path to something that people want you to believe, or you really are seeing data that should cause you to change your opinions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you, Ms. Kronis.

I now invite Mr. Brunelle‑Duceppe to take the floor for five minutes.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I just want to make a quick comment on the last conversation. I think that, if organizations such as the World Uyghur Congress use social media a lot, that might also be because of the lack of coverage in the traditional media.

Is that correct, Ms. Arkin?

[Zumretay Arkin]

You're right.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you. I know it's used by advocacy NGOs as well, but you always have to keep things in perspective.

Earlier, we talked about the politicians who were being targeted by Beijing. That is transnational repression. I'm talking about politicians who would like to help minorities who are persecuted by certain regimes. However, there are also politicians who are being targeted because they are on Beijing's side.

You're based in Munich, in the centre of Europe. You can see that there are a lot of different political parties in Europe. It's not like here. There are countries that have seven, eight, nine or ten political parties. Often, some are targeted by foreign governments seeking help in their mission of transnational repression. Have you seen that? Can you give any examples of political parties?

If you don't want to give an example, that's fine, but are you seeing that on the ground in Europe and here in Canada?

[Zumretay Arkin]

If I understand the question correctly, you want to know if Beijing is helping politicians in order to facilitate its transnational repression activities.

I don't have any concrete examples, but I know that some political parties are very close to the Chinese regime. One is the AfD party in Germany. The irony is that sometimes they want to meet with us, and we say no, of course, but we never know what the goal is. It's true that there are left-leaning parties in Germany and a few other countries that are very close to the regime. It is certainly very worrisome to see that. As defenders of human rights, we don't know whether they will subsequently inform the Chinese authorities of our meeting. So we definitely take precautions.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

So that's a message for all politicians: We have to be careful about the people we talk to in our meetings and to whom we report afterward. We also have to be responsible in our duties.

Mr. Therchin, I'll ask you the same question: Do you ever see Beijing trying to get closer to certain politicians, by whatever means, so that they can help it pursue its mission?

[Sherap Therchin]

While there could be a few politicians who are influenced by China, I come with a mindset that the majority of us and the majority of Canadian politicians are supportive of human rights. For example, today when I come here to testify, I know that all committee members here are supporting human rights. I come with a lot of confidence that, regardless of whatever I say here, whether agreeable or disagreeable, committee members, the MPs, support my freedom of speech.

Yes, I acknowledge that there are a few politicians who could be or are influenced by China.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

I'll ask you the same question, Mr. Kolga: Do you feel that various regimes are becoming more aggressive in targeting political parties, depending on the funding method, which can vary from country to country?

In your work, have you seen political regimes, be it Russia, China or Iran, target different politicians around the world to achieve their ends by bringing them onto their side, either financially or ideologically?

[Marcus Kolga]

It varies by region. In Europe, we have seen Russia fund far-right parties like the AfD. In many countries in central and eastern Europe, we've seen them do that. This is very well documented. Those influence operations are very well documented.

In Canada, what China tries to do is exploit its diaspora, and it has been doing this, I would say, rather effectively over the past 30 or even 40 years. I happen to live in Markham—Unionville, and I think the issues in that riding are very well documented as well.

Even though these issues are brought up publicly in committees like this one, one bright light in terms of foreign interference was the SITE task force's exposure to the campaign against Joe Tay and the bounty that was placed on him in Markham—Unionville. This is something we should learn from SITE. Its courage and confidence in calling out those sorts of operations were very effective. I would argue that it probably largely put an end to those sorts of operations and probably made the Chinese government think twice about this, but in terms of transnational oppression, they will continue their efforts to influence western governments, and certainly our government and its diaspora as well. It's only until we stand up to that and impose a cost for these sorts of operations that we will see them stop. We've seen some European governments do this. Estonia has done this very effectively. We need to do the same.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you.

On behalf of the subcommittee and all members, I would like to thank our witnesses. Thank you for being here for us. Thanks for your introductions, interventions and answers and for enlightening our committee. Thank you for your testimony during our meeting on the repercussions of transnational oppression.

My colleagues and I wish you the best.

The meeting is adjourned.