Subcommittee on International Human Rights Committee on May 4th, 2026

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

I call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 18 of the House of Commons Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the subcommittee on Monday, January 26, 2026, the subcommittee is meeting on its study of the global impact of transnational repression.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the Standing Orders. Members are attending in person in the room and remotely using the Zoom application.

I would like to make a few comments for the benefit of witnesses and members.

Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. For those participating by video conference, click on the microphone icon to activate your mic and please mute yourself when you are not speaking.

For those on Zoom, at the bottom of your screen, you can select the appropriate channel for interpretation: floor, English or French. For those in the room, you can use the earpiece and select the desired channel.

As a reminder, all comments should be addressed through the chair.

I would now like to welcome our first witnesses.

As individuals, we have Dr. Thomas Juneau, full professor, public and international affairs, University of Ottawa; Mark Kersten, assistant professor, school of criminology and criminal justice, University of the Fraser Valley; and Professor Frederick John Packer, associate professor of law, University of Ottawa.

By video conference, from the CAUKUS Foundation, we have Dimon Liu, human rights activist; from the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, we have Luke de Pulford, executive director; and from the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights, we have Brandon Silver, director of policy and projects.

I welcome you all.

I would like to give every one of our witnesses a time period of five minutes for your introduction. Please do your best to respect the time.

I would like to start with Dr. Thomas Juneau.

You have the floor for five minutes. Please go ahead.

[Thomas Juneau, Full Professor, Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, As an Individual]

Thank you very much for the offer to speak to you today.

I am in the process of writing and researching a book on transnational repression in Canada with my co-author, Professor Amarnath Amarasingam, from Queen's University. The book will focus on how China, India and Iran target diaspora activists in Canada. We've conducted about 100 interviews so far, the vast majority with victims of transnational repression, or TNR. It will be the first comprehensive assessment of the threat and the problem in Canada. What I will discuss today are preliminary results. We expect to finish the writing of the manuscript by the end of the summer.

There are four main elements to our research: tools, impact, how victims perceive the government's response and the importance of understanding diaspora politics.

Our interviews, first, asked victims to describe the tools that state perpetrators of transnational repression use against them. The main tools are physical threats in Canada: surveillance, monitoring of protests, verbal abuse and, in extreme cases, physical violence and assassination attempts.

Much transnational repression occurs digitally—intimidation online, disinformation and defamation—with the goal of draining the activist's energy to sow doubt in others' minds about their honesty or integrity. Many of the worst instances of TNR have involved threats to and pressure on families inside the perpetrator country: interrogations, physical abuse, freezing of financial assets, firings from jobs and expulsions from university or education. We've documented multiple cases of each of these instances.

There is a heavy gendered aspect to transnational repression. Women activists are often victims of especially brutal and violent threats, notably in terms of disinformation and defamation online.

One element that matters a lot here is perception. We spoke to some activists, for example, who have not been directly targeted but who know of colleagues who were. The simple fear that there is a possibility they could be targeted in the future because of their activism is more than enough to send a chilling message. Transnational repression, in a sense, works a bit like terrorism. There is a theatrical element whereby the public display of visible instances of violence, physical or digital, serves to intimidate a given population.

Second, we try to assess the impact of transnational repression on diaspora activism itself. The impact varies a lot. We've spoken to people on whom there was no impact at all. They decided to continue their activism despite the threats or the violence. We've spoken to activists who decided to completely stop, and anybody in the middle. The most important variable in shaping the response or impact is whether the activist has family inside the perpetrator country. Those with no immediate family were typically more likely to continue.

We are also asking our interviewees—close to 100 of them—about the personal impact. Here we saw, universally, tremendous personal distress, with many activists reporting excessive emotional suffering as a result of the pressure they're under, and in most cases there's little or no support.

Third, we asked interviewees about their perceptions of the government's response to transnational repression. We systematically asked in particular whether they had contacted the RCMP, CSIS or other police of jurisdiction, and if yes, what responses they received, and if no, why not. Again, responses varied a lot at this level. In many cases, the main criticism was one of neglect—the perception that authorities have limited awareness and interest in the threat. Another frequent response was a perception that officials, in the police in particular, had very little awareness or understanding of the threat. That being said, there was also a fairly clear perception among our interviewees that the government is taking the problem increasingly seriously. I'll get back to that at the end.

Finally, our research has also shown the importance of understanding the broader context of diaspora politics, and more specifically, among other implications, how fragmented communities—this is the case in particular of the Iranian Canadian community, which I study a lot—create more opportunities for state perpetrators of transnational repression to target individuals and also make the job of the federal government to counter transnational repression more difficult—in terms of reaching out, for example.

Another element of our research has been to understand the government's response. What I would briefly say here is that the response has improved, but much remains to be done. There is better awareness in government of the threat, a better understanding of the portfolio of tools used by perpetrators of transnational repression and a better understanding of the impact not only on individuals but also on the broader fabric of Canadian society.

The federal government has developed new tools—for example, Canada's national counter foreign interference coordinator and some of the tools that came with Bill C-70—and it is steadily learning how to better use these tools. There's better information sharing not only within the federal government, but also between the federal government and other levels of government. There have also been efforts to be more transparent and to engage with diaspora communities.

To conclude very quickly, I will just add a point I made in an op-ed in the National Post about a month ago. We can expect transnational repression against Iranian Canadians to get significantly worse in 2026. Past patterns show that when two variables are met—enhanced diaspora mobilization and more acute perceptions of vulnerability by the regime—there's an increase in the targeting of diaspora activists. That is exactly what we're seeing in the Iranian case now. The tragic assessment is that we should expect things to get worse at that level in the coming months.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you, Dr. Juneau. You exceeded your time by one minute, by the way. Please try to respect the time.

Now I would like to invite Mr. Mark Kersten to take the floor for five minutes, please.

[Mark Kersten, Assistant Professor, Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of the Fraser Valley, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, everyone, for having me.

As transnational repression, or TNR, continues to grow, it is critical to remind ourselves that transnational repression is not waged against abstract entities or states, but against people and communities. Canada's response must therefore be grounded in human rights.

With my time, I will emphasize three points and conclude with a number of recommendations. First, TNR in Canada is inextricably linked to human rights violations committed in source countries. Second, understanding these links means tackling both, by holding perpetrators accountable. Third, the threats of TNR are growing and include states that Canada considers allies.

TNR is not separate from repression in source countries. It's an extension of it. Those who call out and push back on atrocities in Iran, Russia, China, India, etc. are targets for repression here. How Ottawa responds must appreciate that it is those who dream of human rights in their homelands who face the nightmare of transnational repression in Canada.

Given it's the springtime, consider the following analogy. If Canada continues to focus only on how repression is expressed on Canadian soil, it will be cutting the dandelion flowers while leaving the roots intact. Worse, current Canadian policies might even allow the weedy world of repression to flourish.

I have studied the presence of Iranian regime figures in Canada and what responses are available to authorities to hold them accountable. Like others, I was troubled to see some members of Parliament calling for Iranian regime figures to be deported back to Iran. Trying to tackle TNR in Canada by sending perpetrators back to a regime engaged in the oppression of civilians is potentially reckless and dangerous. Sending agents back risks strengthening the Iranian regime and its repressive capabilities.

It was thus a lost opportunity in some ways when Canada decided last week not to investigate or potentially prosecute, but to return a former IRGC commander, Mehdi Taj, back to Iran. If Canada's response to TNR is to deport perpetrators, what lesson will those engaged in repression learn? “We can send our guys in to terrorize diaspora communities. The worst that will happen is Canada will send them back to us.”

Canada cannot tackle repression here by exporting its perpetrators abroad. We must instead uphold our sovereignty by reaffirming the human rights of those targeted by TNR. We can do this by holding perpetrators of repression and atrocities accountable in our own courts and under our own laws. Canada can become a world leader in this regard.

There is a framework that Canada can use to identify emerging threats of TNR. Look for states that perpetrate atrocities against their own people with impunity and that lack respect for state sovereignty. That means we must look not only at states like China, India and Iran, but also at the United States as an emerging risk of TNR.

Canadians are rightly worried that ICE, a paramilitary force engaged in rights violations in the United States, including the kidnapping and killing of migrants and citizens, might do the same in Canada. It's a reasonable fear. The U.S. may not be engaged in repression in Canada today, but it is precisely states that behave as they do that enable repression and seek to silence those who push back against their crimes.

Canada must be indiscriminate in our fight against repression and not allow the aspiration of good relations to blind us. Our commitment to accountability must not rest on double standards or partisan games.

Please allow me to conclude with three recommendations.

First, Canada should allocate new resources to the war crimes program and encourage it to open a structural investigation into transnational repression linked to the investigation and prosecution of atrocity perpetrators residing in Canada. This could include an analysis of whether transnational repression may in some cases amount to a crime against humanity.

Second, Canada could create a non-partisan working group to study the creation of a bill of rights for victims of TNR to offer them an effective institution to seek protection and remedies, including access to compensation from the seized assets of perpetrators.

Finally, Canada should review current ICE operations in the country. Ottawa should explain to Canadians why ICE, a force of an increasingly autocratic government, should still operate through its five offices in five Canadian cities.

It's not a matter of whether Canada can do this. We have the right people, the right resources and the right institutions. It's only a matter of whether Canada has the will and the courage to do so, in line with human rights and the goal of accountability. I certainly hope that it does.

I thank you very much for your time.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you. That was perfect timing.

I would like to invite Professor Frederick John Packer to take the floor for five minutes, please.

[Frederick John Packer, Associate Professor of Law, University of Ottawa, As an Individual]

Mr. Chair, we are behind the curve and at demonstrable peril. The Parliament of Canada was awoken by foreign interference in Canadian elections, a direct attack on Canadian sovereignty—that is, interference with our political independence and a breach of the foundational principle of sovereign equality, which has been a cornerstone of international law since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.

You, the Parliament of Canada, responded by having a public inquiry, the foreign interference commission, resulting in the adoption of Bill C-70, the Countering Foreign Interference Act, but that is the tip of the iceberg. The breach of Canadian sovereignty—our territorial integrity, the safety, security and freedom of the population, and the autonomy and integrity of our polity—has been and continues to be violated by an increasing number of foreign states, with the most grave and widening consequences.

The very purpose of Canadian sovereignty, and arguably the primary responsibility of Canada, according to article 55 of the UN charter, is the “creation of conditions of stability and well-being”, pursuant to the rule of law under the Constitution of Canada. We are an open society dedicated to these aims, which also create vulnerabilities that are being abused. Parliament and the Government of Canada need to act with urgency, precision and effectiveness.

Transnational repression is not new, but it is rapidly growing as technologies have expanded substantially the means and reach of interference. In 2022, the respected NGO Freedom House reported incidents from that year committed by 20 governments, as their database approached almost 1,000 cases perpetrated by 38 governments. Recently, Freedom House reported that some 54 governments have now committed verified acts of transnational repression. The reach affects over half the countries of the world—107, to be exact—as the repressive acts traverse geographic—i.e., sovereign territorial—boundaries.

This carefully compiled information is certainly just scratching the surface. For example, last autumn, on behalf of the Organization of American States, I advised on an unpublished survey of electoral management bodies throughout the hemisphere, including Canada's own Elections Canada. Of the 32 countries, over 90% reported forms of interference known to them, with many originating abroad, including direct attacks against authorities, with fully one-third having experienced deepfakes. In fact, most have no solid knowledge of the full extent and full effect of such acts, but they were unanimous that this is a real and growing problem striking at the heart of sovereignty and especially democracy. I am available to recount more examples, including my own, having been sanctioned by China for holding and sharing an expert opinion on which China simply disagrees.

The forms of transnational oppression vary in range, kind and severity—travel constraints, withholding of documents, conditioning entitlements on changes of political or other opinions, confiscations of property, denationalization, detentions, deportations, extraditions, breaches of physical integrity, inhumane conditions, torture and assassinations. Among the most insidious are acts of extortion and covert measures that often invisibly but effectively silence. Indeed, that is the clear aim: to repress and preferably eliminate the basic freedoms of thought, belief, association, assembly, movement, and social and political participation. In some cases, it is a component of genocidal policies to destroy a group in whole or in part, including to erase their history, memory and voice.

These acts are not limited by geography, diplomacy or the international rule of law. I would go further and say that they aim to counter and undermine the vigour and cohesion of democracies where such freedoms have taken root and blossomed. The perpetrator governments threaten, sow fears and doubts, and constrain critical scrutiny or even dialogue, instead promoting polarizing views. Their targets are not only activists in exile, although these are high on their list, but also allies and independent voices—like those on this panel—as well as journalists, civil servants, public authorities and, yes, parliamentarians. They affect second and third generations of extended families. Significantly, Canada has some four million dual nationals, many of whom are potentially subject to repressive acts and laws.

Canada needs to catch up. The Europeans have been considering measures that include a possible Council of Europe convention on transnational repression and an EU directive to protect human rights defenders and other activists in exile. It’s not only our elections and your integrity that need protecting. The essential sovereignty of our country and the safety, security and fundamental freedoms of every Canadian and visitor to Canada need protecting.

As such, I respectfully propose that the following be undertaken. One, a full-time point person should be tasked in the Privy Council. Two, an inter-ministerial working group should be established to ensure coherence. Three, an advisory group should be formed comprising public authorities, independent experts and civil society representatives with actual experience. Four, training should be mandated for all relevant departments, including provincial and municipal authorities. Five, as an observer of the Council of Europe, Canada should engage actively in the Venice commission for democracy through law, as well as support the elaboration of a convention on transnational repression open to non-member democracies like Canada. Finally, consider a possible royal commission on the full nature and extent of transnational repression and other kinds of foreign interference in Canada.

To conclude, the harsh reality of “the world as it is”—to quote our Prime Minister—means Canada is now among a shrunken number of genuine democracies, and we are vulnerable and already significantly compromised. The threats are coming from both fragile states and a burgeoning group of unscrupulous antagonists or rival states that are in fact breaching Canada's sovereignty right now. Moreover, they are collaborating and learning quickly how to exploit our open societies.

We are behind the curve. With all due respect, it is your duty to act to protect Canada now.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you.

Now I would like to invite Madame Dimon Liu, a human rights activist, to take the floor.

You have five minutes. You're welcome to go ahead.

[Dimon Liu, Human Rights Activist, CAUKUS Foundation]

Ever since the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921, violence and intimidation have been used by the CCP as routine means of control and dominance over the Chinese people.

During the fight over the passage of the permanent normal trading relations act in 1999, a friend found a rattlesnake in his mailbox. More recently, another friend found three sharpened knives neatly arranged on her front steps. “I can easily make you disappear” is sometimes whispered into the ears of activists, me included.

Guan Weiyan, noted physicist, former president of the University of Science and Technology—China's MIT—and a force for reform in the CCP, was killed on the sidewalk of a Texas street when a car plowed into him in 2003. Wei Jingsheng, China's most famous dissident, has had several assassination attempts on him, and three arranged near car accidents—one near Geneva, one near Hamburg and one in front of my house. Wei had one poisoning that landed him in the ICU for two weeks. Similar poisonings have killed dissidents in Australia, France and other countries. Wei continues to face endless lawfare cases that drain his time and finances.

Why do authorities choose to ignore the CCP's acts of violence and intimidation? We now have a relatively new phrase, “transnational repression”, to describe these acts of violence and intimidation. With this new phrase and proposed legislation by U.S. Congressman John Moolenaar and U.S. Congressman Chris Smith, will these acts of violence and intimidation be reported more often by the mainstream media?

Authorities in western democracies have been loath to take note of massive repression against the Chinese people, both inside and outside China, because the west adopted the British Empire's commercial approach beginning in 1793. It aimed to gain entry into the vast China market and maintain regime stability in order to continue raking in the money. Please note the difference here. Regime stability is not at all the same as stability and safety for the Chinese people. The British Empire even attempted to maintain regime stability for the Manchu Empire in 1900 by sending troops from eight western countries into China to quell rebellions for the ruling regime.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

I have a point of order, Mr. Chair.

Unfortunately, there is a problem with the interpretation. We should check that with the clerk and the interpreters.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

We will suspend for a few seconds. We have a technical problem.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

I call the meeting back to order.

Ms. Liu, we are going to try again with you, but if the problem persists, we'll have to stop.

Continue, please.

[Dimon Liu]

Ruling regimes have come and gone in China, but China has endured because the Chinese people have endured. We are now facing another possible crumbling of yet another abusive regime. Do the democracies have a China policy that is different from the approach of the old British Empire? The answer is no. All democracies are continuing the old British commercial approach of the last 233 years in pursuing deals with the ruling regime.

What would be the price of a deal with Xi Jinping for a peaceful coexistence with ongoing commercial relations? It would likely be the triumph of tyranny and the defeat of democracy.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you. You made it. We are happy.

Now I would like to invite Mr. Luke de Pulford to take the floor for five minutes.

[Luke de Pulford, Executive Director, Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for the opportunity.

I created and lead the secretariat for the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, or IPAC, which is the world's largest parliamentary organization dedicated to China-related issues. IPAC regularly receives requests for help from suspected TNR cases, and members of the network have been engaged, all over the world, in parliamentary discussions about how best to approach the problem. However, today I'm just going to focus on one area of transnational repression.

Committee members will know that a key aspect of the discussion regarding Beijing's transnational repression is the effort made to suppress political dissent, but little attention has been paid to the attempt to suppress and silence politicians themselves. For the purposes of this presentation, I'm going to call this “political TNR”, and I want to outline IPAC's experience, which serves as an almost sui generis example of what it is and how it operates.

As a brief definition, political TNR is a calculated, cross-border strategy in which a government reaches across national borders to intimidate, silence or harm foreign lawmakers, or their staff and/or their associations. Victims are individuals the aggressor state perceives as a threat and has a political incentive to control, regardless of their nationality or regardless of their status as elected lawmakers. This is not just harassment; it's a form of direct foreign interference.

The experience of IPAC serves as a stark case study of this evolving threat. IPAC members and its secretariat have faced a spectrum of repression. I'm going to give you, with your permission, a very truncated list.

One, there was the APT31 cyber-attack against the whole IPAC network in 2021, including 18 Canadian members of IPAC. The attack was confirmed by the United States Department of Justice in 2024 as a PRC state-sponsored attack.

Two, there was the arrest and torture of former IPAC volunteer Andy Li, and the subsequent coercion of Mr. Li to become a prosecution witness against Jimmy Lai.

Three, there was the naming of multiple IPAC politicians in Hong Kong national security law cases, and the naming of myself as one of three co-conspirators in the trial of Jimmy Lai.

Four, there was the formal sanctioning of 15 lawmaker members of and three advisors to IPAC, together with their families, in 2021. This includes one member of your committee, Mr. Brunelle-Duceppe.

Five, there was the coercion of four countries outside of the network of IPAC by the People's Republic of China, which threatened countries and parties with economic consequences unless their members quit IPAC.

Six, there were attempts to pressure politicians in 11 countries through their political parties not to attend an IPAC summit in Taiwan.

Seven, there was the impersonation of IPAC staff and targeted harassment of IPAC staff and advisors, which included the fabrication of AI-generated pornography and disinformation.

Eight, there was the threatening of IPAC staff from Hong Kong through their families or through the weaponization of bureaucracy in Hong Kong.

Nine, there were statements by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in China targeting and smearing IPAC.

Finally—and I emphasize that this is not an exhaustive list—there was the paying of a municipal representative in Belgium to spy on a Belgian IPAC member, Samuel Cogolati.

Perhaps the most concerning aspect of this nascent threat is the lack of transparency from democratic security apparatuses. The FBI, for example, discovered the APT31 activity in 2022 and notified relevant host governments, including Canada. However, in almost all cases, those governments failed to notify the targeted legislators. This includes Canada. Not only that, but the intimidation of lawmakers and secretariat staff, including their spurious naming in national security law trials, has largely been met with silence.

To protect the integrity of our political processes, we must move beyond viewing these incidents as isolated harassment.

We recommend, first, attribution. Affected governments must formally attribute attacks to the responsible parties and publicly condemn them.

Second, I would recommend initiating defending democracy task forces commissioned to understand Beijing's whole-of-state approach to transnational repression and how to defend and maintain the freedom of democratic institutions.

Third, we need sanctions. We have to impose consequences on the perpetrators.

Fourth, we really need prompt notification. We should commit to notifying lawmakers if they're targeted through cyber-attacks or other means.

Finally, we need strengthened support. Cybersecurity measures need to be improved. Environmental awareness training for lawmakers and their staff is really a must.

Thank you, Chair. I yield back to you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you. That was perfect timing.

Now I would like to invite our friend Mr. Brandon Silver, director of policy and projects, to take the floor.

Mr. Silver, it's nice to see you with us here. Thanks for participating in our subcommittee and this important study. I'm very happy to see you.

You have the floor for five minutes, please.

[Brandon Silver, Director of Policy and Projects, Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I also want to thank the members of the subcommittee.

It's a great pleasure for me to be here. Thank you for the opportunity to join you today.

Exactly seven years ago today, my friend Masih Alinejad testified before this very committee. As an Iranian journalist and one of the leaders of the women's rights movement, she warned of the dangers posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Not long after returning to her home in Brooklyn, Iran tried to kidnap her. The regime hired an operative to abduct her and return her to Iran to face likely execution. What is exceptional about Masih's story is not that Iran ordered her kidnapping; it is that she survived. Most others have not.

We live in what scholars have called the golden age of transnational repression. Since 2014, Freedom House has documented close to 1,400 incidents across 107 countries carried out by 54 governments against their citizens in exile. These numbers continue to rise every year.

Even where direct perpetrators are caught and prosecuted, as Masih's would-be kidnappers were, the statistics still do not go down, because transnational repression is by definition a leadership crime. It is not the spontaneous misconduct of rogue agents. It is the deliberate exercise of state power directed from the top against individuals whose only transgression was to exercise their right to freedom of expression or opinion from the supposed safety of exile.

The operative who attempted to kidnap Masih did not act alone. Behind him was a chain of command, a budget, an intelligence apparatus and, at the top of that chain, a senior official who gave the order. It is that person, the official who authorized the operation, who has never been held to account, and that gap is the topic of my testimony today.

The international community has studied transnational repression extensively, condemned it at the highest levels and built policy frameworks to counter it. The G7, for example, under Canada's presidency, has declared that TNR undermines national security, state sovereignty and the safety of human rights. Forty-five states signed a joint statement at the UN Human Rights Council in 2024 calling for coordinated action against it. This committee has heard powerful testimony about its human cost.

What the international community has not done is hold anyone criminally responsible for ordering it at the highest levels. The focus has been on detection, disruption and diplomatic pressure. Nobody is asking who bears criminal responsibility for directing transnational repression as a matter of state policy. The current responses, therefore, have very real limits.

Criminal prosecutions of operatives matter, but they can cover only those who carry out these crimes, not those who command them from abroad. Targeted sanctions, which have been an important tool that we've been using and should be used even further, still only levy costs without generating criminal accountability. They can be lifted under diplomatic pressure, for example. A senior foreign official who calculates that the worst-case outcome is a travel restriction has been given insufficient reason to stop.

The result is a landscape of responses that generate visibility without accountability and leave the command architecture of TNR entirely intact. The architects of these campaigns have drawn a clear conclusion: The international community will document these crimes, prosecute the low-level operatives and maybe sanction some associates, but it will do nothing to threaten their personal liberty. Until that calculation shifts, TNR will continue being ordered by the commanders and senior officials of foreign regimes.

International criminal law was built precisely to protect individuals from the criminal exercise of state power and to ensure that those at the highest levels who order these atrocities cannot hide behind their office or mandate. The dissident hunted across borders by the state she fled is exactly the kind of victim this framework was designed to protect, because she is someone for whom no other remedy exists.

I am seeking to underscore in my testimony today that the foundation to respond exists through the International Criminal Court and has simply never been used. Under article 12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the ICC, the court has jurisdiction where an alleged crime was committed on the territory of a state party. TNR operations produce their effects where the victim is located—on the soil of the host state. If that host state is a Rome Statute party member, the ICC has jurisdiction over those crimes.

Even if the primary perpetrating states are not Rome Statute members—and most of them are not—like Iran, China and Russia, their victims are almost always located in jurisdictions that are members of the court, including Canada.

I will note that Canada led a statement of the G7 condemning Iran regime transnational repression and a further statement of 14 countries condemning the following:

...attempts of Iranian intelligence services to kill, kidnap, and harass people in Europe and North America in clear violation of our sovereignty. These Services are increasingly collaborating with international criminal organisations to target journalists, dissidents, Jewish citizens, and current and former officials in Europe and North America.

As you know, the founder of our centre, Professor Irwin Cotler, a former minister of justice and attorney general of Canada, was one of these Jewish citizens and former officials targeted for assassination.

The widespread and systematic nature of this transnational repression targeting civilians as a matter of Iran state policy meets the exact legal definition of a crime against humanity.

To conclude, I would urge the subcommittee to consider calling on the Government of Canada to refer Iran's transnational repression to the International Criminal Court. Canada can even lead our allies—the five members of the G7 that are also members of the ICC, and the other 12 signatories of the joint statement on Iranian transnational repression that are also members of the court—in jointly referring the case to the ICC and allocating resources to the court to prioritize it. This would set a major global precedent that would resonate far beyond Iranian transnational repression in order to combat global TNR.

Too many Canadians continue to adjust their routines, triple-check their locks and look over their shoulders because the foreign architects of transnational repression know they are protected by a culture of impunity. This subcommittee can help change that.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you, Mr. Silver.

Now we will start the first round of questions and answers.

I would like to invite my friend Mr. Majumdar to take the floor for seven minutes.

[Shuv Majumdar, Conservative, Calgary Heritage, AB]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you to all the witnesses for participating in this deep dive on transnational repression we're pursuing at the subcommittee. We have too many questions, too few witnesses and not enough time.

Dimon Liu, I will start with you.

What are the reasons transnational repression is ignored by authorities in democracies?

[Dimon Liu]

The answer is very simple. We have followed the British Empire's commercial approach to a China policy, which is to maintain regime stability in order to gain access to the vast China market. Unless this commercial approach is changed, the authorities will continue to ignore repression and abuses both inside China and outside China.

[Shuv Majumdar, Conservative, Calgary Heritage, AB]

We have a serious issue in Canada with respect to the amount of transnational repression the PRC conducts across our country, our society and our economy. In your opinion, what would the correct China policy for the Canadian government be with regard to Beijing's transnational repression?

[Dimon Liu]

Actually, it's very simple. There is a successful model before us: President Reagan's approach to the U.S.S.R.

One, he targeted the U.S.S.R. as a main adversary, not its proxies, because after you defeat the proxies, you still have to face the main adversary.

Two, he contested the U.S.S.R. via escalated military spending, which eventually bankrupted the U.S.S.R.

Three, he pursued an effective economic containment strategy.

Four, he undermined the legitimacy of the U.S.S.R. by giving visibility and support to Eastern European dissidents.

To succeed, all four measures must be pursued simultaneously, not separately.

[Shuv Majumdar, Conservative, Calgary Heritage, AB]

That's a comprehensive perspective. I really appreciate you for your time and testimony.

Picking up on that, I will turn to Brandon Silver now.

You described, rightly so, how Iranian efforts, through criminal networks, have been targeting Iranian and Jewish populations around the world. You correctly ascertained that those officials are the ones who need to be held to account, not protected by some concept we heard about earlier today.

Let's think about the impact of the Iran conflict and its pursuit of transnational repression compared with what Beijing has been conducting. How might China, specifically, adjust its strategy of transnational repression in response to the attack on its vested interests in the current war affecting Iran?

[Brandon Silver]

Thank you for the question. It's an interesting one, because we've seen that for the most part, a lot of the perpetrators of transnational repression are trading notes and collaborating.

That is the reason China, in the first place, had interests in Iran, which were affected by the war. Russia, similarly, has been using Iranian drones to attack civilians in Ukraine. We have heard of cases where targets of Iran were subjected to harassment or assassination attempts by Russia in places Iranian agents couldn't reach. There is increasing collaboration—even if it's just anecdotal—on the TNR side among these regimes.

On the side of campaigning for freedom, equality, the rule of law and the protection of our sovereignty and citizens, we need to increasingly be working together. It was encouraging to see a statement by the G7 and the 14 countries affected by Iranian transnational repression, but a more holistic approach is needed. That targeted statement against Iran—and hopefully targeted action via the ICC that could create some accountability—would have a deterrent effect if applied more globally. Have a standing forum, perhaps via the G7 or other places, to jointly address transnational repression against the range of authoritarian perpetrators. Work on a more concerted, collective and concrete response.

[Shuv Majumdar, Conservative, Calgary Heritage, AB]

Thank you for that.

I'm going to turn now to Mr. de Pulford.

In your concluding comments, you articulated some very specific things that can be focused on to confront actors who are undertaking transnational repression: attributing a tax, defending democracy task forces, sanctions on perpetrators, notifications, transparency and cybersecurity. All of these things are really practical and specific things that leaders in the west—in the world—can undertake.

Let me ask you this, Mr. de Pulford: Do you find there's any enthusiasm about taking on the issue of transnational repression, or do you find that politics in different countries fall to division too deeply and they are incapable of actually addressing these issues?

[Luke de Pulford]

Thank you for the question. I think there are a few ways of answering it.

The easiest thing is to say that this is a nascent problem. It's quite new, and governments are trying to get a grip on it. It's not the case that governments around the world are doing nothing. I think they are trying to understand it. In some places, legislation has been passed and police have been trained.

The basic difficulty is that this is unavoidably diplomatic. We see, particularly around China, a culture of pre-emptive self-censorship in diplomatic missions. They're worried that if they talk about the behaviour of Beijing in their country, they will upset them and there will be a corresponding response. This is hamstringing us from responding the way we should. We should be much freer in imposing, at the very least, targeted sanctions on perpetrators, even if the perpetrator is an arm of the government.