CAW has participated in the automotive consultative group, and I think it has been useful to do that. I will be frank, though, and say I'm not happy with how that consultative group has proceeded. The industry has been consulted; I would not say the industry has been listened to.
As to the key messages, I can't speak for everyone at the table, but certainly the dominant view would be, number one, from the auto industry's perspective, don't go into these talks; number two, if you do go into them, try to exclude the auto industry from the agreement; and number three, if the auto industry must be part of the agreement, then you have to attach some kind of binding, performance-related conditions to the agreement, whether it's in the form of a contingent tariff reduction, as Mr. Nantais indicated, or in the form of some kind of explicit condition, that the growth of automotive sales from Korea to Canada has to be offset by absolute, visible, measured progress in our automotive exports back to Korea.
In every case, the government officials at the committee said, “That's not a free trade agreement.” I'm not sure whether that's the case or not. It looks an awful lot like the Canada-U.S. softwood lumber deal, to be frank.
At any rate, I'm not happy with the progress of that committee, and I'm going to be very concerned if I start to hear the argument that the auto industry was consulted and therefore they're fine with it. The auto industry retains its unanimous opposition to this direction. Again, that includes the big three, Honda, Toyota, the parts industry, the CAW, and other sectors.