Thank you, Mr. Chairman, gentlemen.
Thank you for your presentation, Mr. Robertson. I had some rather specific questions, and perhaps because one can tend to run out of time, I'll read you the questions. I'm hoping you can answer some probably quite quickly, but if we run out of time in this round, perhaps you could get back to the committee with answers to these questions in the next few days, before we would ever get to a clause-by-clause study of the bill.
The questions focus on two areas. One is obviously Atlantic Canada's exclusion, and the other one is something I have been concerned about for some time. It's the question of independent remanufacturers.
With respect to Atlantic Canada, on page 4 of your presentation you correctly talk about the exclusion of Atlantic Canada, for reasons you've properly described. However, some parts of the proposed legislation refer to an exemption or to Atlantic Canada being zero-rated. I don't have a great deal of experience at trade law, but in my view, there is a big difference between being excluded, meaning you are never in the play, or being exempted or zero-rated, which means you're in the pot, but for whatever moment at this particular time, the export tax, for example, is not being applied.
I'm concerned that the language of the proposed legislation may not in fact track the language of the softwood lumber agreement, which itself is much tighter with respect to the exclusion, in my view. So that's one issue.
With respect to independent remanufacturers, again the proposed legislation itself doesn't provide a definition for what independent remanufacturers are. Clause 2, the definitions clause, doesn't address what independent remanufacturers are. This was a significant win for Canada in the agreement. I think many people will concede that. But I think the legislation would be improved if there were a definition of what an independent remanufacturer actually is.
Clause 12 of the bill stipulates that “‘independent remanufacturer’ means a person who is certified under section 25.” Clause 25 then says that the minister may certify an operation as an independent remanufacturer, but again there is no definition. This key concept is not circumscribed in any way in either of these two clauses. Is that something that could be tightened up, in your view?
Again, clause 100 says that the Governor in Council may make regulations regarding independent remanufacturers, and it says: “The Governor in Council may make regulations...respecting any requirements or conditions that must be met...”.
The word “any” is a very broad word. It is not circumscribed in any way. I wonder if the Governor in Council is limited to the requirements and conditions, for example, of the softwood lumber agreement itself. Is it a common practice that this is circumscribed by the agreement itself, or is it in fact much broader than that?
Then, on the power of the minister in subclause 25(2) to “amend, suspend, renew, cancel or reinstate a certification”, the power again seems to be very broad. There's not even a requirement for notice to a party in question. I was struck by how broad that may be.
Finally, with respect to quota allocation, you gentlemen know better than anybody how contentious the whole issue of quota allocation can be. You properly referred to the amendments to the Export and Import Permits Act. Would the legislation be improved by prescribing limits on the minister's power with respect to quota allocation, for example, so that it must be fair, reasonable, and transparent? It seems to me that to have such a broad power to allocate quota is open to some question.
For those who will face hardship as a result of quota allocation, there seems to be no transparency. Independent remanufacturers have for a long time requested a separate carve-out, and you know the reasons why, although we don't have time to go into them. I'm worried that they could end up inadvertently getting a bit of a squeeze with respect to quota allocation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.