I am here wearing the hat of vice-chair of the Canada Eurasia Russia Business Association.
This association represents companies and business stakeholders from western Canada, Ontario and Quebec, as well as those currently present in Moscow, all members of a business association that serves to represent the interests of its members to their counterparts in Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union. The major concentration is in Moscow, Russia, where our counterpart is an association of Russian entrepreneurs and industrialists.
Let me begin, if I may, by just setting a quick picture, which is really a broad overview of where Russia is today. For many of you, this will be familiar. I speak as someone who has spent most of the last 18 years engaging in Russia in one way or another, living there and living here, but working with Russia.
Since Putin's accession in January 2000, Russia has steered a remarkable course of economic and political stability. The chaotic and volatile Yeltsin period, which saw the country come close to bankruptcy and to fragmentation, now seems a long time ago. Many of us find it difficult to understand how close to civil war Russia was in the mid-1990s. It very nearly broke down. We look at a country today that is a united country.
Now we are faced with an economic powerhouse. Admittedly it's fundamentally dependent on oil and gas revenues. It's increasingly seeking to leverage its economic power to reacquire the political authority that it lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union. A number of key themes have emerged.
On the domestic front, some positives are the breakup of the railroads. Its privatization of the railways is a step far ahead of anything achieved by India or China or what might be considered to be similar types of economies. Russia has gone way ahead in terms of a privatization process, so there have been some very strongly positive reforming activities.
There is a focus on developing key strategic industries: telecommunications and aerospace. For some of those, it's a question of the rebirth, the renaissance, particularly in the case of the aerospace industry, which was critically hit by the collapse of the Soviet Union.
There has been a huge investment in building a mid-range industrial base. Since the 1998 financial crisis, which devalued the ruble significantly, local products have become increasingly competitive. The ruble now is sitting at 26 to the U.S. dollar. It was sitting at about 30 to the U.S. dollar in 2000. There has been virtually no movement. Indeed there has been appreciation in the ruble or depreciation in the U.S. dollar, but the ruble has remained stable, buoyed by a combination of a very strong balance sheet of natural resources, but also particularly by major domestic industries that have built up over the period of the last six to seven years.
Agrifoods, services, consumer businesses, construction—all of these have been pulled through by increasing middle-class prosperity. Also, and this is very positive, there has been a search for greater economic equity and poverty alleviation across the country. Let us not forget that in a population of 145 million, there is still something in the region of 35 million people at the poverty line.
However, this is accompanied by some bad news. There is a concentration of power in the Kremlin. There had started to be quite a broad delegation of power around the country, which is now firmly concentrated back in the Kremlin. There is economic nationalism, which is really both a means of redressing the excesses of the Yeltsin period, and an unfortunate way of concentrating economic benefit in the Kremlin inner circle. There is almost total state control of the press.
We have the prospect of a presidential election in 2008, which will leave essentially the same group in power. Who will stand, and who will officially run? We won't know until very shortly before the election, but it will be more of the same. There is not really going to be an open-fought election in 2008.
On the international front, Russia has transferred its imperial ambitions from exporting dogma—the dogma of communism to obtain global political power—to becoming a critical link in a number of global commodity markets: oil and gas, nickel, and steel. In some respects, the tank diplomacy of the 1950s and 1960s has been replaced by the pipeline diplomacy that we have seen applied so effectively in the Ukraine, and that hangs as a threat over some of western Europe.
Canada's position in this new balance is particularly interesting and presents excellent opportunities. Our own natural resources base provides competition or partnership opportunities. Our proximity to, but independence of, the United States offers an interesting conduit. Our ambiguous relationship with China is similar to that of Russia, and we offer the Russians interesting reciprocal partnership opportunities as a means of counterbalancing the strength of the Chinese dragon.
Enough of the macro: let me move more to a micro perspective.
Canadian business in Russia has doubled since 2004, from $415 million to over $800 million a year. Those are the officially recorded statistics of direct trade from Canada to Russia. An enormous amount of trade passes through third countries, whether it be in terms of subcontracts supplied to contractors in the oil and gas sector who are actually technically offshore, out of Russia, or whether it be in aircraft that may be registered outside the country but the buyer, and the cash for the purchase, actually comes from Russia. I would be quite confident in saying that the figure is probably double that officially recorded statistic. The growth is about the same, but I would say that it has gone from $800 billion to probably $1.5 billion.
Canadian business operating in Russia is no longer just in the oil and gas sector or just in Moscow. It is not just in oil and gas, but it's also in the minerals and mining sector. It has moved out substantially. We now have around Russia a number of metropolitan centres with big consumer businesses and consumer demand, and a lot of Canadian business is moving outside Moscow to those centres.
We see that there also is strongly growing investment. At the moment, Canadian investment in Russia is in the order, approximately, of an estimated $450 million to $500 million. Two projects alone are being negotiated at the moment, each of them significantly over $1 billion, by Canadian companies. It will make a quantum shift in Canada's footprint in Russia if those projects do come through, and we have some confidence that they are moving in the right direction to perhaps start being implemented within the next two to three years. That's going to be a very significant increase in the Canadian position in Russia and the weight Canada will have in Russia. It's still well below western European countries like France and Germany, but it's a very big increase.
Canadian businesses dealing with Russia face a number of challenges. There are historic perceptions, many of which were formed during the early nineties, the rather chaotic period in Russia. And alas, I'm afraid that for too many people in Canada, “Russia” is still a two-syllable word that rhymes with “mafia”.
There are perceptions of the risk of government intervention, and those are perhaps justified, and there has been an increase in that in the last two to three years, I would say. Things were looking good, but increasingly, the government is looking carefully at anything it might consider to be a strategic industry.
Other challenges are actually rather closer to home. The St. Petersburg consulate is being closed. It will be closed at the end of March. It is a pity that we see that happening now, at a time when major Russian corporations are actually moving their headquarters to St. Petersburg, reflecting the economic and political importance of the city. Gazprom, for example, the largest company in Russia, and one of the largest companies in the world, is moving its headquarters out of Moscow to St. Petersburg, precisely at a time when Canada is withdrawing from St. Petersburg. It also so happens that Gazprom is the counterparty in one of those negotiations for the $1 billion-plus investment.
In this context, we at CERBA have been trying to encourage and develop relationships between Russia and Canada on a business-to-business level. There are a number of regular missions in each direction in the forestry sector and in the mining sector. And we have next week, in Montreal, a group of Russian bankers coming from the financial sector. They have been late coming to the party, just as Canada's financial sector, with the notable exception of EDC, has been late going to the party in Russia. But the Russians are now coming, looking for links with Canadian financial services institutions.
We have, at the end of March, the Canada-Russia Intergovernmental Economic Commission. We have, at the same time, the Canada-Russia Business Council, which will see some 150 to 200 of the most senior Russian business people coming together with the most senior Canadian business people engaged in Russia. This is a process of rapprochement and a process of increasing the business-to-business ties, very important at a time when we are trying to wean off the government-to-government relationships that typically characterized old Russia.
Overall, CERBA is very definitely optimistic. We give our members cautious advice about how to manage some of the issues and challenges that they perceive are facing them, but overall, we feel very strongly encouraged by what we see as business opportunities in Russia. And our members, simply by measuring the growth in membership, suggest to us that there are more and more Canadian companies engaging in Russia and looking for the support of the Canadian government to continue to do so.
Thank you.